Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts

This Article uses the techniques of modern decision analysis and game theory to analyze the decisionmaking strategies of parties to long-term commercial contracts. Most parties to long-term contracts initially allocate the risks of future contingencies and agree – either explicitly or implicitly – to adjust this initial risk-allocation scheme if unanticipated events occur. Once contract risks are initially distributed, however, each party\u27s self-interest may compel them to evade their responsibility rather than adjust cooperatively as originally agreed. Visualizing the interactions between contracting parties as an iterated prisoner\u27s dilemma, the Author attempts to clarify the dynamics of this adjustment process. Professor Scott employs a game theoretic model to demonstrate that two polar behavioral patterns – either conflict or cooperation – would dominate if parties were unable to bargain over adjustment. However, this choice may not occur, he suggests, because even parties that are precluded from negotiating each adjustment option, nevertheless can communicate their intentions to each other. Under these conditions, a cooperative equilibrium will emerge so long as one of the parties commits to a strategy of conditional cooperation before the first adjustment is necessary. Professor Scott notes that in more realistic contractual situations, some breakdowns in patterns of mutual cooperation are inevitable. In actual contract settings, substantial problems of information and enforcement may threaten the parties\u27 efforts to realize a cooperative equilibrium. Nevertheless, he concludes that parties in continuing relationships can invoke various legal and extralegal mechanisms to reduce these information and enforcement deficits and strengthen the existing matrix of social and contractual norms

Game theoretic modeling and analysis : A co-evolutionary, agent-based approach

Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH

Altruistically Inclined?: The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity

Altruistically Inclined? examines the implications of recent research in the natural sciences for two important social scientific approaches to individual behavior: the economic/rational choice approach and the sociological/anthropological. It considers jointly two controversial and related ideas: the operation of group selection within early human evolutionary processes and the likelihood of modularity—domain-specific adaptations in our cognitive mechanisms and behavioral predispositions. Experimental research shows that people will often cooperate in one-shot prisoner\u27s dilemma (PD) games and reject positive offers in ultimatum games, contradicting commonly accepted notions of rationality. Upon first appearance, predispositions to behave in this fashion could not have been favored by natural selection operating only at the level of the individual organism. Emphasizing universal and variable features of human culture, developing research on how the brain functions, and refinements of thinking about levels of selection in evolutionary processes, Alexander J. Field argues that humans are born with the rudiments of a PD solution module—and differentially prepared to learn norms supportive of it. His emphasis on failure to harm, as opposed to the provision of affirmative assistance, as the empirically dominant form of altruistic behavior is also novel. The point of departure and principal point of reference is economics. But Altruistically Inclined? will interest a broad range of scholars in the social and behavioral sciences, natural scientists concerned with the implications of research and debates within their fields for the conduct of work elsewhere, and educated lay readers curious about essential features of human nature.https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/faculty_books/1325/thumbnail.jp

Inclusive Fitness, Reciprocal Altruism and Emotion: Testing a Social-Functional Model of Anger and Gratitude Across Kin and Non-Kin Relationships

Guided by the theories of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), two studies tested hypotheses related to the notion that emotions are part of an evolved psychological system that functions, in part, to regulate social exchange. Emotional experience and exchange behaviors were predicted to vary based on both the structure of the situation and the type of relationship one has with a partner. Due to an absence of inclusive fitness effects, interaction with non-kin (compared with kin) exchange partners was expected to trigger more intense emotional responses. Study 1 found that, as expected, unfair offers led to feelings of anger, but more so for non-kin partners compared to kin partners. Similarly, fair offers led to feelings of gratitude, but more so for non-kin partners. Study 2 used a 3 (emotion induction: anger, gratitude, control) by 4 (relationship partner: stranger, friend, cousin, sibling) by 2 (social dilemma task: take-some, give-some) experimental design and found evidence in support of the prediction that emotions are more likely to influence exchange behaviors with non-kin partners compared with kin partners. This research extends the social-functional approach to emotions into the context of evolutionary social psychological theory

Morality as natural history

What are moral values and where do they come from? David Hume argued that moral values were the product of a range of passions, inherent to human nature, that aim at the common good of society. Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour, psychology and neuroscience suggest that Hume was right to suppose that humans have such passions. This dissertation reviews these developments, and considers their implications for moral philosophy. I first explain what Darwinian adaptations are, and how they generate behaviour. I then explain that, contrary to the Hobbesian caricature of life in the state of nature, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic under certain circumstances. I introduce four main types of cooperation: kin altruism, coordination to mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution and provide examples of "adaptations for cooperation" from nonhuman species. I then review the evidence for equivalent adaptations for cooperation in humans. Next, I show how this Humean-Darwinian account of the moral sentiments can be used to make sense of traditional positions in meta-ethics; how it provides a rich deductive framework in which to locate and make sense of a wide variety of apparently contradictory positions in traditional normative ethics; and how it clearly demarcates the problems of applied ethics. I defend this version of ethical naturalism against the charge that it commits "the naturalistic fallacy". I conclude that evolutionary theory provides the best account yet of the origins and status of moral values, and that moral philosophy should be thought of as a branch of natural history

Exploring Hopes And Fears From Supply Chain Innovations: An Analysis Of Antecedents And Consequences Of Supply Chain Knowledge Exchanges

This dissertation sheds light on severalhopes and fears from supply chain innovation in three distinct papers. Paper one introduces the concept of Process Innovation Propagation as an appropriation technique helping to extract the most returns out of a process innovation by exporting to supply chain partners. Paper two devises and empirically tests knowledge properties that best lead to radical and incremental supply chain innovative capabilities. Lastly, paper three conducts an exploratory study that introduces factors affecting a firm’s optimum supply chain innovation strategy. The dissertation makes a strong argument that supply chain innovation is most prominently governed by power asymmetry that may either help or hurt innovative performance

The mechanics of trust: a framework for research and design

With an increasing number of technologies supporting transactions over distance and replacing traditional forms of interaction, designing for trust in mediated interactions has become a key concern for researchers in human computer interaction (HCI). While much of this research focuses on increasing users’ trust, we present a framework that shifts the perspective towards factors that support trustworthy behavior. In a second step, we analyze how the presence of these factors can be signalled. We argue that it is essential to take a systemic perspective for enabling well-placed trust and trustworthy behavior in the long term. For our analysis we draw on relevant research from sociology, economics, and psychology, as well as HCI. We identify contextual properties (motivation based on temporal, social, and institutional embeddedness) and the actor's intrinsic properties (ability, and motivation based on internalized norms and benevolence) that form the basis of trustworthy behavior. Our analysis provides a frame of reference for the design of studies on trust in technology-mediated interactions, as well as a guide for identifying trust requirements in design processes. We demonstrate the application of the framework in three scenarios: call centre interactions, B2C e-commerce, and voice-enabled on-line gaming