Virtuous and Adverse Selection within Economic Organizations

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Governance and Surplus Distribution in Commodity Value Chains in Africa

The governance of food markets is a crucial element for efficiency and distributional effects. In this paper, we use a conceptual model to show that this governance itself is endogenous in an environment of weak contract enforcement and imperfect markets, and importantly depends on the value in the chain. We relate the predictions of the theory to empirical evidence on differences in supply chain governance in Africa across different commodity types. In doing so we offer an explanation as why private sector governance systems with interlinked market transactions have emerged for higher value crops but not for staple food crops. We discuss the efficiency and equity effects and the implications for policy.Agribusiness,

Computational rationality and voluntary provision of public goods: an agent-based simulation model

The issue of the cooperation among private agents in realising collective goods has always raised problems concerning the basic nature of individual behaviour as well as the more traditional economic problems. The Computational Economics literature on public goods provision can be useful to study the possibility of cooperation under alternative sets of assumptions concerning the nature of individual rationality and the kind of interactions between individuals. In this work I will use an agent-based simulation model to study the evolution of cooperation among private agents taking part in a collective project: a high number of agents, characterised by computational rationality, defined as the capacity to calculate and evaluate their own immediate payoffs perfectly and without errors, interact to producing a public good. The results show that when the agents’ behaviour is not influenced either by expectations of others’ behaviour or by social and relational characteristics, they opt to contribute to the public good to an almost socially optimal extent, even where there is no big difference between the rates of return on the private and the public investment.Computational Economics; Agent-based models; Social Dilemmas; Collective Action; Public Goods

A Direct Reputation Model for VO Formation

We show that reputation is a basic ingredient in the Virtual Organisation (VO) formation process. Agents can use their experiences gained in direct past interactions to model other’s reputation and deciding on either join a VO or determining who is the most suitable set of partners. Reputation values are computed using a reinforcement learning algorithm, so agents can learn and adapt their reputation models of their partners according to their recent behaviour. Our approach is especially powerful if the agent participates in a VO in which the members can change their behaviour to exploit their partners. The reputation model presented in this paper deals with the questions of deception and fraud that have been ignored in current models of VO formation

Cooperating intelligent systems

Some of the issues connected to the development of a bureaucratic system are discussed. Emphasis is on a layer multiagent approach to distributed artificial intelligence (DAI). The division of labor in a bureaucracy is considered. The bureaucratic model seems to be a fertile model for further examination since it allows for the growth and change of system components and system protocols and rules. The first part of implementing the system would be the construction of a frame based reasoner and the appropriate B-agents and E-agents. The agents themselves should act as objects and the E-objects in particular should have the capability of taking on a different role. No effort was made to address the problems of automated failure recovery, problem decomposition, or implementation. Instead what has been achieved is a framework that can be developed in several distinct ways, and which provides a core set of metaphors and issues for further research