11 research outputs found
Convergent learning algorithms for unknown reward games
In this paper, we address the problem of convergence to Nash equilibria in games with rewards that are initially unknown and must be estimated over time from noisy observations. These games arise in many real-world applications, whenever rewards for actions cannot be prespecified and must be learned online, but standard results in game theory do not consider such settings. For this problem, we derive a multiagent version of -learning to estimate the reward functions using novel forms of the -greedy learning policy. Using these -learning schemes to estimate reward functions, we then provide conditions guaranteeing the convergence of adaptive play and the better-reply processes to Nash equilibria in potential games and games with more general forms of acyclicity, and of regret matching to the set of correlated equilibria in generic games. A secondary result is that we prove the strong ergoditicity of stochastic adaptive play and stochastic better-reply processes in the case of vanishing perturbations. Finally, we illustrate the efficacy of the algorithms in a set of randomly generated three-player coordination games and show the practical necessity of our results by demonstrating that violations to the derived learning parameter conditions can cause the algorithms to fail to converge
Game-theoretical control with continuous action sets
Motivated by the recent applications of game-theoretical learning techniques
to the design of distributed control systems, we study a class of control
problems that can be formulated as potential games with continuous action sets,
and we propose an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm that provably
converges to equilibrium in this class of problems. The method employed is to
analyse the learning process under study through a mean-field dynamical system
that evolves in an infinite-dimensional function space (the space of
probability distributions over the players' continuous controls). To do so, we
extend the theory of finite-dimensional two-timescale stochastic approximation
to an infinite-dimensional, Banach space setting, and we prove that the
continuous dynamics of the process converge to equilibrium in the case of
potential games. These results combine to give a provably-convergent learning
algorithm in which players do not need to keep track of the controls selected
by the other agents.Comment: 19 page
Channel Selection for Network-assisted D2D Communication via No-Regret Bandit Learning with Calibrated Forecasting
We consider the distributed channel selection problem in the context of
device-to-device (D2D) communication as an underlay to a cellular network.
Underlaid D2D users communicate directly by utilizing the cellular spectrum but
their decisions are not governed by any centralized controller. Selfish D2D
users that compete for access to the resources construct a distributed system,
where the transmission performance depends on channel availability and quality.
This information, however, is difficult to acquire. Moreover, the adverse
effects of D2D users on cellular transmissions should be minimized. In order to
overcome these limitations, we propose a network-assisted distributed channel
selection approach in which D2D users are only allowed to use vacant cellular
channels. This scenario is modeled as a multi-player multi-armed bandit game
with side information, for which a distributed algorithmic solution is
proposed. The solution is a combination of no-regret learning and calibrated
forecasting, and can be applied to a broad class of multi-player stochastic
learning problems, in addition to the formulated channel selection problem.
Analytically, it is established that this approach not only yields vanishing
regret (in comparison to the global optimal solution), but also guarantees that
the empirical joint frequencies of the game converge to the set of correlated
equilibria.Comment: 31 pages (one column), 9 figure