Convergence of Opinion Diffusion is PSPACE-complete

We analyse opinion diffusion in social networks, where a finite set of individuals is connected in a directed graph and each simultaneously changes their opinion to that of the majority of their influencers. We study the algorithmic properties of the fixed-point behaviour of such networks, showing that the problem of establishing whether individuals converge to stable opinions is PSPACE-complete

Convergence of opinion diffusion is PSPACE-complete

We analyse opinion diffusion in social networks, where a finite set of individuals is connected in a directed graph and each simultaneously changes their opinion to that of the majority of their influencers. We study the algorithmic properties of the fixed-point behaviour of such networks, showing that the problem of establishing whether individuals converge to stable opinions is PSPACE-complet

A Structural Complexity Analysis of Synchronous Dynamical Systems

Synchronous dynamical systems are well-established models that have been used to capture a range of phenomena in networks, including opinion diffusion, spread of disease and product adoption. We study the three most notable problems in synchronous dynamical systems: whether the system will transition to a target configuration from a starting configuration, whether the system will reach convergence from a starting configuration, and whether the system is guaranteed to converge from every possible starting configuration. While all three problems were known to be intractable in the classical sense, we initiate the study of their exact boundaries of tractability from the perspective of structural parameters of the network by making use of the more fine-grained parameterized complexity paradigm. As our first result, we consider treewidth - as the most prominent and ubiquitous structural parameter - and show that all three problems remain intractable even on instances of constant treewidth. We complement this negative finding with fixed-parameter algorithms for the former two problems parameterized by treedepth, a well-studied restriction of treewidth. While it is possible to rule out a similar algorithm for convergence guarantee under treedepth, we conclude with a fixed-parameter algorithm for this last problem when parameterized by treedepth and the maximum in-degree

Random Majority Opinion Diffusion: Stabilization Time, Absorbing States, and Influential Nodes

Consider a graph G with n nodes and m edges, which represents a social network, and assume that initially each node is blue or white. In each round, all nodes simultaneously update their color to the most frequent color in their neighborhood. This is called the Majority Model (MM) if a node keeps its color in case of a tie and the Random Majority Model (RMM) if it chooses blue with probability 1/2 and white otherwise. We prove that there are graphs for which RMM needs exponentially many rounds to reach a stable configuration in expectation, and such a configuration can have exponentially many states (i.e., colorings). This is in contrast to MM, which is known to always reach a stable configuration with one or two states in $O(m)$ rounds. For the special case of a cycle graph C_n, we prove the stronger and tight bounds of $\lceil n/2\rceil-1$ and $O(n^2)$ in MM and RMM, respectively. Furthermore, we show that the number of stable colorings in MM on C_n is equal to $\Theta(\Phi^n)$, where $\Phi = (1+\sqrt{5})/2$ is the golden ratio, while it is equal to 2 for RMM. We also study the minimum size of a winning set, which is a set of nodes whose agreement on a color in the initial coloring enforces the process to end in a coloring where all nodes share that color. We present tight bounds on the minimum size of a winning set for both MM and RMM. Furthermore, we analyze our models for a random initial coloring, where each node is colored blue independently with some probability $p$ and white otherwise. Using some martingale analysis and counting arguments, we prove that the expected final number of blue nodes is respectively equal to $(2p^2-p^3)n/(1-p+p^2)$ and pn in MM and RMM on a cycle graph C_n. Finally, we conduct some experiments which complement our theoretical findings and also lead to the proposal of some intriguing open problems and conjectures to be tackled in future work.Comment: Accepted in AAMAS 2023 (The 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Minimum Target Sets in Non-Progressive Threshold Models: When Timing Matters

Let $G$ be a graph, which represents a social network, and suppose each node $v$ has a threshold value $\tau(v)$. Consider an initial configuration, where each node is either positive or negative. In each discrete time step, a node $v$ becomes/remains positive if at least $\tau(v)$ of its neighbors are positive and negative otherwise. A node set $\mathcal{S}$ is a Target Set (TS) whenever the following holds: if $\mathcal{S}$ is fully positive initially, all nodes in the graph become positive eventually. We focus on a generalization of TS, called Timed TS (TTS), where it is permitted to assign a positive state to a node at any step of the process, rather than just at the beginning. We provide graph structures for which the minimum TTS is significantly smaller than the minimum TS, indicating that timing is an essential aspect of successful target selection strategies. Furthermore, we prove tight bounds on the minimum size of a TTS in terms of the number of nodes and maximum degree when the thresholds are assigned based on the majority rule. We show that the problem of determining the minimum size of a TTS is NP-hard and provide an Integer Linear Programming formulation and a greedy algorithm. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm by conducting experiments on various synthetic and real-world networks. We also present a linear-time exact algorithm for trees.Comment: Accepted in ECAI-23 (26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Learning a social network by influencing opinions

We study a campaigner who wants to learn the structure of a social network by observing the underlying diffusion process and intervening on it. Using synchronous majoritarian updates on binary opinions as the underlying dynamics, we offer upper bounds on the campaigner’s budget for learning any network with certainty, considering both observation and intervention resources, and further improving them for the case of clique networks. Additionally, we investigate the learning progress of the campaigner when her budget falls below these upper bounds. For such cases, we design a greedy campaigning strategy aimed at optimising the campaigner’s information gain at each opinion diffusion step

Predicting voting outcomes in presence of communities

We study several fairness notions in allocating indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive values): envy-freeness and its relaxations. For allocations under each fairness criterion, we establish their approximation guarantees for other fairness criteria. Under the setting of additive cost functions, our results show strong connections between these fairness criteria and, at the same time, reveal intrinsic differences between goods allocation and chores allocation. Furthermore, we investigate the efficiency loss under these fairness constraints and establish their prices of fairness

Majority Opinion Diffusion in Social Networks: An Adversarial Approach

We introduce and study a novel majority-based opinion diffusion model. Consider a graph $G$, which represents a social network. Assume that initially a subset of nodes, called seed nodes or early adopters, are colored either black or white, which correspond to positive or negative opinion regarding a consumer product or a technological innovation. Then, in each round an uncolored node, which is adjacent to at least one colored node, chooses the most frequent color among its neighbors. Consider a marketing campaign which advertises a product of poor quality and its ultimate goal is that more than half of the population believe in the quality of the product at the end of the opinion diffusion process. We focus on three types of attackers which can select the seed nodes in a deterministic or random fashion and manipulate almost half of them to adopt a positive opinion toward the product (that is, to choose black color). We say that an attacker succeeds if a majority of nodes are black at the end of the process. Our main purpose is to characterize classes of graphs where an attacker cannot succeed. In particular, we prove that if the maximum degree of the underlying graph is not too large or if it has strong expansion properties, then it is fairly resilient to such attacks. Furthermore, we prove tight bounds on the stabilization time of the process (that is, the number of rounds it needs to end) in both settings of choosing the seed nodes deterministically and randomly. We also provide several hardness results for some optimization problems regarding stabilization time and choice of seed nodes.Comment: To appear in AAAI 202

An algorithmic analysis of deliberation and representation in collective behaviour

The selection of a nominee by a group of players in the process of selecting a winner is present in many contexts. In sports, it is a major strategic problem to select the best team members. Crucially, in politics, this problem is essential for the process of primaries. There, factions decide which of their candidates should take part in the elections. We study the strategic behaviour of coalitions from the game-theoretic perspective. More precisely, we analyse the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in the games capturing the strategic nomination problem. First, we adapt the well-known Hotelling-Downs model, capturing the strategic behaviour of political parties in primaries. Subsequently, we explore this problem for tournament-based rules. There, winners are chosen based on the pairwise comparisons between candidates. First, we study the setting of knockout-tournaments. Next, we investigate tournaments, in which participants do not compete in rounds. For each of these mechanisms, we analyse the computational complexity of checking the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Nominee selection can also be influenced by the deliberation between the voters. To account for that, we investigate the complexity of checking the convergence of a synchronous, threshold-based protocol. There, in every time step all agents update their opinion if the strict majority of their influencers disagrees with them. Furthermore, we explore computational aspects of majority illusion. This phenomenon occurs when a large number of agents in a network perceives the opinion, which is a minority view, as the one which is held by the majority of agents. We study the problem of checking the possibility of assigning opinions to agents, so that it holds for a large fraction of them. We further address the complexity of checking the possibility of eliminating the majority illusion by changing a small number of edges in a social network