26 research outputs found
A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games
This paper provides a simple formula describing all Nash equilibria in symmetric monotone singleton congestion games. Our approach also yields a new and short proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this kind of congestion games without invoking the potential function or the nite improvement property.Singleton congestion games, Nash equilibria, Potential function, Finite improvement property
Stochastic Optimization of Service Provision with Selfish Users
We develop a computationally efficient technique to solve a fairly general
distributed service provision problem with selfish users and imperfect
information. In particular, in a context in which the service capacity of the
existing infrastructure can be partially adapted to the user load by activating
just some of the service units, we aim at finding the configuration of active
service units that achieves the best trade-off between maintenance (e.g.\
energetic) costs for the provider and user satisfaction. The core of our
technique resides in the implementation of a belief-propagation (BP) algorithm
to evaluate the cost configurations. Numerical results confirm the
effectiveness of our approach.Comment: paper presented at NETSTAT Workshop, Budapest - June 201
Nonsymmetric singleton congestion games: case of two resources
In this note we study the existence of Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric finite congestion games, complementing the results obtained by Milchtaich on monotone-decreasing congestion games. More specifically, we examine the case of two resources and we propose a simple method describing all Nash equilibria in this kind of congestion games. Additionally, we give a new and short proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this type of games without invoking the potential function or the finite improvement property.Singleton congestion games, Nash equilibria, Potential function, Finite improvement property
Weighted Congestion Games With Separable Preferences
Players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences (e.g., the benefit they get from using a specific resource), their contribution to congestion, or both. In many cases of interest, intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are (additively or multiplicatively) separable. This paper considers the implications of separability for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the prospects of spontaneous convergence to equilibrium. It is shown that these properties may or may not be guaranteed, depending on the exact nature of player heterogeneity.congestion games, separable preferences, pure equilibrium, finite improvement property, potential.
Network Topology and Equilibrium Existence in Weighted Network Congestion Games
Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negatively) affected by it. This paper shows that the topology of the underlying (undirected two-terminal) network provides information about the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. For some networks, but not for others, every corresponding game has at least one such equilibrium. For the weighted presentation, a complete characterization of the networks with this property is given. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the network has at most three routes that do traverse any edge in opposite directions, or it consists of several such networks connected in series. The corresponding problem for player-specific costs remains open.Congestion games, network topology, existence of equilibrium
Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing
We study the asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We obtain the first constant upper bound on the price of anarchy and significantly improve the existing upper bounds on the price of stability. Moreover, we show that any optimal solution is a good approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present better performance analysis and fast implementation of pseudo-polynomial algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria
Load Balancing Algorithms In Software Defined Network
Compared with the traditional networks, the SDN
networks have shown great advantages in many aspects, but also exist the problem of the load imbalance. If the load distribution uneven in the SDN networks, it will greatly affect the performance of network. Many SDN-based load balancing strategies have been proposed to improve the performance of the
SDN networks. Therefore, in this paper a finding form
comprehensive review help to improve further understanding of lead b balancing algorithms in SDN