Ambassadors of the game: do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously?

Do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously? A number of philosophers have investigated this question by examining whether famous athletes are subject to special role model obligations (Wellman 2003; Feezel 2005; Spurgin 2012). In this paper we will take a different approach and give a positive response to this question by arguing for the position that sport and gaming celebrities are ‘ambassadors of the game’: moral agents whose vocations as rule-followers have unique implications for their non-lusory lives. According to this idea, the actions of a game’s players and other stakeholders—especially the actions of its stars—directly affect the value of the game itself, a fact which generates additional moral reasons to behave in a virtuous manner. We will begin by explaining the three main positions one may take with respect to the question: moral exceptionalism, moral generalism, and moral exemplarism. We will argue that no convincing case for moral exemplarism has thus far been made, which gives us reason to look for new ways to defend this position. We then provide our own ‘ambassadors of the game’ account and argue that it gives us good reason to think that sport and game celebrities are subject to special obligations to act virtuously

The efficiency of the non-profit enterprise: constitutional ideology, conformist preferences and reputation

According to one thesis the non profit enterprise (in short NPE) is able to attract ideological entrepreneurs and workers (Rose-Ackerman 1996). In fact I prove that without the ideological element, a simple game between the entrepreneur, worker and beneficiary is condemned to an opportunistic equilibrium, beneficial to the internal members of the organization but detrimental to the beneficiary. Thus the NPE does not better than its for profit counterpart. In my model ideologues, both entrepreneurs and workers, share a principle of justice seen as the constitutional ideology of the NPE, agreed upon in an hypothetical ex ante bargaining game. The constitutional principle provides an independent source of motivation (a source of utility) of the players, in so far as they believe in the reciprocity of conformity to the ideology by all the participants. I call this conformity-based utility “ideological”, and I see it as the representation of a preference for expected conformity to the given constitutional principle. The philosophical underpinnings of this reform of the players' utility functions in worked out by distinguishing two concepts of preferences of the Self: consequentialist preferences and conformist preferences. The latter are preferences for those actions that are part of states of affairs described in terms of interdependent actions conforming to an abstract norm or principle, which become effective once the preferences' holder does expect that the other players do they part in that state of affairs and they do expect that himself do his part in the same state of affairs. What result is that a player's ideological utility depends on the expectation of deontological modes of behaviour followed by all the participants, himself included. On this basis it is possible to overcome personal incentives to embrace opportunistic behaviour, so that the proper Non-profit Enterprise emerges. It is proved that in the “social enterprise game” amongst the member of the organisation there exists an organisational equilibrium minimising transaction costs to the beneficiaries. At last, this equilibrium rests on the emergence of an expectations system of reciprocal conformity to the constitutional ideology. As the existence - not even the selection – of the internal organizational equilibrium rests heavily on the existence of the appropriate system of reciprocal expectation, the problem of how we can justify the emergence of the appropriate system of beliefs must be underlined. Here is where the explicit moral codes of the NPE enters the scene. I see the code of ethics as the building block for deriving a reputation equilibrium between the NPE as a whole and its external stakeholders within a repeated game, whose stage-game is the typical game of trust played under incomplete knowledge and unforeseen contingencies. At last the conformist-motivation model and the reputation model under unforeseen contingencies are shown to play together in a mutually supporting explanation of the efficiency of the NPE.

Drug doping in sports : an overview and recommendations for the Maltese context

The use of legal and illicit medical substances is widespread in international sport and becoming more complex. Serious concern exists about the use of illicit substances, as listed in the list of the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) of prohibited substances. This phenomenon is also present among Maltese athletes and positive doping cases have been reported in the media among local sportspersons from varying disciplines. In this paper, a review of the current international conventions with respect to drug doping in sport will be given together with an overview of the prohibited substances. The Maltese situation will also be assessed. Limited local data indicate that this is an underground phenomenon which has existed and persisted over the years. The testing programs, with some exceptions, have to date been very poor and most sporting disciplines are not tested regularly. Recommendations will be made in order to readdress the lacuna in data available, as well as the knowledge and education of this subject among local sportspersons, coaches and sports officials, and various health care professionals. In addition, a call is made for Malta to implement the WADA Code as soon as possible, and sign and ratify the UNESCO and Council of Europe conventions, while ensuring that adequate resources are made available for their enforcement.peer-reviewe

Directors\u27 Duties in Failing Firms

Despite many cases with seemingly contrary dicta, corporate directors of failing firms do not have special duties to creditors. This follows from the nature of fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule, the directors have broad discretion to decide what to do and in whose interests to act. There is some authority for a limited creditor right to sue on behalf of the corporation to enforce this duty. However, any such right does not make the duty one owed to creditors. The creditors individually may sue the corporation for breach of specific contractual, tort, and statutory duties, particularly on account of fraudulent conveyances. But the creditors are not owed general fiduciary protection even if they are subject to a special risk of abuse in failing firms

Does virtuous circle between social capital and CSR exist? A “network of games” model and some empirical evidence

Social capital and corporate social responsibility (CSR) have received increasing attention in research on the role that elements such as trust, trustworthiness and social norms of reciprocity and cooperation may have in promoting socio-economic development. Although social capital and CSR seem to have features in common, their relationship has not yet been analysed in depth. This paper investigates the idea of a virtuous circle between the level of social capital and the implementation of CSR practices that fosters the creation of cooperative networks between the firm and all its stakeholders. By using both a theoretical approach developed by considering tools of network analysis and psychological game theory and an empirical approach based on original evidence from three case studies, this study shows the role that cognitive social capital (understood as a disposition to conform with ethical principles of cooperation) and the adoption of CSR practices may have in promoting the emergence of sustainable networks of relations between the firm and all its stakeholders (structural social capital).Social capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Social norms, Network, Cooperation, Trust