Contracting For Personalization

This paper presents a stylized model based on the principal-agent framework in the absence of monetary instrument as a compensation device to agents with privately known production costs. Our results identify a new trade off that arises from alternative compensation devices, as well as the associated implications on firm’s profitability and consumer welfare

Organizational culture and knowledge management success at project and organizational levels in contracting firms

Author name used in this publication: Patrick S. W. Fong2009-2010 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journalAccepted ManuscriptPublishe

Pricing in Matching Markets

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values in the absence of any muneration (payments)---created by the buyer-seller match. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria agree. In this case, we have efficient allocations, including pre-match investment decisions, without the costs of personalized pricing. We then examine the inefficiencies that arise when the premuneration values preclude the agreement of uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria. We view premuneration valuesas an important consideration in market design.Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Telehealth Wound Applications: Barriers, Solutions, and Future Use by Nurse Practitioners

Telehealth applications are an emerging technology in a new era of health care system technologies. Although telehealth technologies, including a number of different applications, are used by various members of the health care team, nurse practitioners (NPs) utilize them for a variety of patient issues across healthcare settings. The Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne Computer Science Department has recently developed a wound scanning application, WoundView for nurse practitioners to utilize in different healthcare settings. Such telehealth mobile applications are used in clinics, home health, rural, and remote settings where a physician may not be readily available. However, there are obstacles with the current practice of using telehealth technologies such as a dire need for evidence-based research that supports attainable solutions for these barriers. Extensive, ongoing research will allow NPs to anticipate an immense mainstream implementation of telehealth applications in the very near future

Pricing in Matching Markets

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values in the absence of any muneration (payments) -- created by the buyer-seller match. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria agree. In this case, we have efficient allocations, including pre-match investment decisions, without the costs of personalized pricing. We then examine the inefficiencies that arise when the premuneration values preclude the agreement of uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria. We view premuneration values as an important consideration in market design.Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search

"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers---created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of "coordination failures," while uniform-price equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature inefficient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus a trade-off between the costs of personalizing prices and the inefficient investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of coordination failures.Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers -- created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of "coordination failures," while uniform-price equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature inefficient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus a trade-off between the costs of personalizing prices and the inefficient investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of coordination failures.Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search