A use of Cournot's competition model in oligopolistic markets in the terms of limited capacities

Cilj ovog rada je da teorijski utemelji primenu Kurnoovog modela kao skraćene forme dvostepene konkurencije na oligopolskim tržištima u uslovima ograničenih kapaciteta. Razvijen je model koji predstavlja prečicu za analizu potencijalnih efekata na blagostanje horizontalnih spajanja preduzeća. Model mogu upotrebiti komisije za zaštitu konkurencije kao simulacioni model pri kontroli horizontalnih spajanja preduzeća. Pokazano je da se ishod modela dvostepene konkurencije, gde se preduzeća obavezuju na određene nivoe kapaciteta, pre konkurencije cenama, poklapa sa ishodom Kurnoovog modela količinske konkurencije. Šta više, ispostavlja se da ovaj rezultat važi kako za tržišta homogenih proizvoda tako i za tržišta diferenciranih proizvoda. To protivreči gotovo standardnom stavu da je količina strateška varijabla isključivo na tržištima homogenih proizvoda. Robusnost ovog rezultata proverava se kako za simetrični oligopol, što predstavlja standardno polazište svih modela iz ove klase, tako i za okolnost asimetričnog oligopola. Asimetrija se uvodi kroz internalizaciju konkurencije izazvanu spajanjem dva simetrična preduzeća na tržištu diferenciranih proizvoda. Komisijama za zaštitu konkurencije je predložen algoritam za primenu modela simulacija. U skladu sa definisanim koracima, sprovedene su simulacije spajanja na realnom primeru, primenom Kurnoovog modela konkurencije u uslovima ograničenih kapaciteta. Na osnovu rezultata simulacija, komisijama su date praktične preporuke za sprovođenje kontrole koncentracija.The objective of the thesis is to examine the Cournot model as a reduced form of the two-stage competition in oligopolistic markets with limited capacities. A short-cut model for analysing welfare effects of potential horizontal mergers is developed. The model can be used by Anti-trust commissions as a simulation model in the process of horizontal merger assessment. It is shown that the outcome of the two-stage competition, where firms had been conditioned by their level of capacities even before the price competition has started, coincide with the outcome of the Cournot quantity competition model. Moreover, it turns out that this result is valid for both the homogeneous product markets and the markets of differentiated products. This contradicts an almost universal belief that the quantity is a strategic variable exclusively within the homogeneous product markets. The robustness of this result is examined both for symmetric oligopoly, which is a starting point for all models in the class, and for the asymmetric oligopoly. The asymmetry is introduced through the internalisation of competition due to a merger of two symmetric firms in the differentiated products market. The implementation algorithm of the simulation model is suggested to the Anti-trust commissions. In accordance with defined steps, merger simulation can be carried out in the real world by using the Cournot model of competition with limited firm capacities. Based on the simulation results, practical recommendations for the merger control policies are offered to the commissions