From Domains Towards a Logic of Universals: A Small Calculus for the Continuous Determination of Worlds

At the end of the 19th century, 'logic' moved from the discipline of philosophy to that of mathematics. One hundred years later, we have a plethora of formal logics. Looking at the situation form informatics, the mathematical discipline proved only a temporary shelter for `logic'. For there is Domain Theory, a constructive mathematical theory which extends the notion of computability into the continuum and spans the field of all possible deductive systems. Domain Theory describes the space of data-types which computers can ideally compute -- and computation in terms of these types. Domain Theory is constructive but only potentially operational. Here one particular operational model is derived from Domain Theory which consists of `universals', that is, model independent operands and operators. With these universals, Domains (logical models) can be approximated and continuously determined. The universal data-types and rules derived from Domain Theory relate strongly to the first formal logic conceived on philosophical grounds, Aristotelian (categorical) logic. This is no accident. For Aristotle, deduction was type-dependent and he too thought in term of type independent universal `essences'. This paper initiates the next `logical' step `beyond' Domain Theory by reconnecting `formal logic' with its origin

A Dempster-Shafer theory inspired logic.

Issues of formalising and interpreting epistemic uncertainty have always played a prominent role in Artificial Intelligence. The Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of partial beliefs is one of the most-well known formalisms to address the partial knowledge. Similarly to the DS theory, which is a generalisation of the classical probability theory, fuzzy logic provides an alternative reasoning apparatus as compared to Boolean logic. Both theories are featured prominently within the Artificial Intelligence domain, but the unified framework accounting for all the aspects of imprecise knowledge is yet to be developed. Fuzzy logic apparatus is often used for reasoning based on vague information, and the beliefs are often processed with the aid of Boolean logic. The situation clearly calls for the development of a logic formalism targeted specifically for the needs of the theory of beliefs. Several frameworks exist based on interpreting epistemic uncertainty through an appropriately defined modal operator. There is an epistemic problem with this kind of frameworks: while addressing uncertain information, they also allow for non-constructive proofs, and in this sense the number of true statements within these frameworks is too large. In this work, it is argued that an inferential apparatus for the theory of beliefs should follow premises of Brouwer's intuitionism. A logic refuting tertium non daturìs constructed by defining a correspondence between the support functions representing beliefs in the DS theory and semantic models based on intuitionistic Kripke models with weighted nodes. Without addional constraints on the semantic models and without modal operators, the constructed logic is equivalent to the minimal intuitionistic logic. A number of possible constraints is considered resulting in additional axioms and making the proposed logic intermediate. Further analysis of the properties of the created framework shows that the approach preserves the Dempster-Shafer belief assignments and thus expresses modality through the belief assignments of the formulae within the developed logic

Constructive Logics Part I: A Tutorial on Proof Systems and Typed Lambda-Calculi

The purpose of this paper is to give an exposition of material dealing with constructive logic, typed λ-calculi, and linear logic. The emergence in the past ten years of a coherent field of research often named logic and computation has had two major (and related) effects: firstly, it has rocked vigorously the world of mathematical logic; secondly, it has created a new computer science discipline, which spans from what is traditionally called theory of computation, to programming language design. Remarkably, this new body of work relies heavily on some old concepts found in mathematical logic, like natural deduction, sequent calculus, and λ-calculus (but often viewed in a different light), and also on some newer concepts. Thus, it may be quite a challenge to become initiated to this new body of work (but the situation is improving, there are now some excellent texts on this subject matter). This paper attempts to provide a coherent and hopefully gentle initiation to this new body of work. We have attempted to cover the basic material on natural deduction, sequent calculus, and typed λ-calculus, but also to provide an introduction to Girard\u27s linear logic, one of the most exciting developments in logic these past five years. The first part of these notes gives an exposition of background material (with the exception of the Girard-translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, which is new). The second part is devoted to linear logic and proof nets

An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic

I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism

Information completeness in Nelson algebras of rough sets induced by quasiorders

In this paper, we give an algebraic completeness theorem for constructive logic with strong negation in terms of finite rough set-based Nelson algebras determined by quasiorders. We show how for a quasiorder $R$, its rough set-based Nelson algebra can be obtained by applying the well-known construction by Sendlewski. We prove that if the set of all $R$-closed elements, which may be viewed as the set of completely defined objects, is cofinal, then the rough set-based Nelson algebra determined by a quasiorder forms an effective lattice, that is, an algebraic model of the logic $E_0$, which is characterised by a modal operator grasping the notion of "to be classically valid". We present a necessary and sufficient condition under which a Nelson algebra is isomorphic to a rough set-based effective lattice determined by a quasiorder.Comment: 15 page

On Nested Sequents for Constructive Modal Logics

We present deductive systems for various modal logics that can be obtained from the constructive variant of the normal modal logic CK by adding combinations of the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5. This includes the constructive variants of the standard modal logics K4, S4, and S5. We use for our presentation the formalism of nested sequents and give a syntactic proof of cut elimination.Comment: 33 page

Constructive Mathematics in Theory and Programming Practice

The first part of the paper introduces the varieties of modern constructive mathematics, concentrating on Bishop’s constructive mathematics(BISH). It gives a sketch of both Myhill’s axiomatic system for BISH and a constructive axiomatic development of the real line R. The second part of the paper focuses on the relation between constructive mathematics and programming, with emphasis on Martin-Lof’s theory of types as a formal system for BISH

Predicativity and parametric polymorphism of Brouwerian implication

A common objection to the definition of intuitionistic implication in the Proof Interpretation is that it is impredicative. I discuss the history of that objection, argue that in Brouwer's writings predicativity of implication is ensured through parametric polymorphism of functions on species, and compare this construal with the alternative approaches to predicative implication of Goodman, Dummett, Prawitz, and Martin-L\"of.Comment: Added further references (Pistone, Poincar\'e, Tabatabai, Van Atten

Computer theorem proving in math

We give an overview of issues surrounding computer-verified theorem proving in the standard pure-mathematical context. This is based on my talk at the PQR conference (Brussels, June 2003)