87,511 research outputs found
Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games
In problems of choosing âaspirationsâ for TU-games, we study two axioms, âMW-consistencyâ and âconverse MW-consistency.â In particular, we study which subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MW-consistency. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of the aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus
Mechanism Design for Team Formation
Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has
addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for
the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition
formation in the related hedonic games has received much attention, but only
from the perspective of coalition stability, with little emphasis on the
mechanism design objectives of true preference elicitation, social welfare, and
equity. We present the first formal mechanism design framework for team
formation, building on recent combinatorial matching market design literature.
We exhibit four mechanisms for this problem, two novel, two simple extensions
of known mechanisms from other domains. Two of these (one new, one known) have
desirable theoretical properties. However, we use extensive experiments to show
our second novel mechanism, despite having no theoretical guarantees,
empirically achieves good incentive compatibility, welfare, and fairness.Comment: 12 page
With a Little Help from My Friends: Ministerial Alignment and Public Spending Composition in Parliamentary Democracies. LEQS Paper No. 133/2018 April 2018
The determinants of public spending composition have been studied from three broad
perspectives in the scholarly literature: functional economic pressures, institutional constraints
and party-political determinants. This paper engages with the third perspective by placing
intra-governmental dynamics in the center of the analysis. Building on the portfolio allocation
approach in the coalition formation literature and the common pool perspective in public
budgeting, I argue that spending ministers with party-political backing from the Finance
Minister or the Prime Minister are in a privileged positon to obtain extra funding for their
policy jurisdictions compared to their colleagues without such support or without any partisan
affiliation (non-partisan ministers). I test these propositions via a system of equations on six
spending categories using seemingly unrelated regressions on a panel of 32 parliamentary
democracies over two decades and offer largely supportive empirical evidence. With the
exception of education, I provide evidence that budget shares accruing to key spending
departments reflect this party-political logic of spending outcomes. In addition to the
econometric results, I also illustrate the impact of ministerial alignment by short qualitative
accounts from selected country cases
Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in
multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an
approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory.
Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous
non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition externalities. In
this family, games differ by the size of maximum coalition, partitions and by
coalition structure formation rules. A result of every game consists of
partition of players into coalitions and a payoff? profiles for every player.
Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly
more than one coalition. The results of the game differ from those
conventionally discussed in cooperative game theory, e.g. the Shapley value,
strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus. We discuss
the following applications of the new game: cooperation as an allocation in one
coalition, Bayesian games, stochastic games and construction of a
non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal
points.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1612.02344,
arXiv:1612.0374
The Prediction value
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational
importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and
a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player 's prediction
value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of when
cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member
of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a
consistency property. Every -player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV
for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV
can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some
semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be
interpreted in terms of informational importance.Comment: 26 pages, 2 table
Unions against governments: explaining general strikes in Western Europe, 1980-2006
Across Western Europe, unions have increasingly engaged in staging general strikes against governments since 1980. This increase in general strikes is puzzling as it has occurred at the same time as economic strikes have been on the decline. We posit that theories developed to explain economic strikes hold little explanatory power in accounting for variation in general strikes across countries and over time. Instead, we develop a framework based on political variables; in particular, whether governments have included or excluded unions in framing policy reforms; the party position of the government; and the type of government. Our empirical analysis, based on a conditional fixed-effects logit estimation of 84 general strikes between 1980 and 2006, shows that union exclusion from the process of reforming policies, government strength, and the party position of the government can provide an initial explanation for the occurrence of general strikes
Aggregation and Representation in the European Parliament Party Groups
While members of the European Parliament are elected in national constituencies, their votes are determined by the aggregation of MEPs in multinational party groups. The uncoordinated aggregation of national party programmes in multinational EP party groups challenges theories of representation based on national parties and parliaments. This article provides a theoretical means of understanding representation by linking the aggregation of dozens of national party programmes in different EP party groups to the aggregation of groups to produce the parliamentary majority needed to enact policies. Drawing on an original data source of national party programmes, the EU Profiler, the article shows that the EP majorities created by aggregating MEP votes in party groups are best explained by cartel theories. These give priority to strengthening the EPâs collective capacity to enact policies rather than voting in accord with the programmes they were nationally elected to represent
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