Causality - Complexity - Consistency: Can Space-Time Be Based on Logic and Computation?

The difficulty of explaining non-local correlations in a fixed causal structure sheds new light on the old debate on whether space and time are to be seen as fundamental. Refraining from assuming space-time as given a priori has a number of consequences. First, the usual definitions of randomness depend on a causal structure and turn meaningless. So motivated, we propose an intrinsic, physically motivated measure for the randomness of a string of bits: its length minus its normalized work value, a quantity we closely relate to its Kolmogorov complexity (the length of the shortest program making a universal Turing machine output this string). We test this alternative concept of randomness for the example of non-local correlations, and we end up with a reasoning that leads to similar conclusions as in, but is conceptually more direct than, the probabilistic view since only the outcomes of measurements that can actually all be carried out together are put into relation to each other. In the same context-free spirit, we connect the logical reversibility of an evolution to the second law of thermodynamics and the arrow of time. Refining this, we end up with a speculation on the emergence of a space-time structure on bit strings in terms of data-compressibility relations. Finally, we show that logical consistency, by which we replace the abandoned causality, it strictly weaker a constraint than the latter in the multi-party case.Comment: 17 pages, 16 figures, small correction

Martin's conjecture, arithmetic equivalence, and countable Borel equivalence relations

There is a fascinating interplay and overlap between recursion theory and descriptive set theory. A particularly beautiful source of such interaction has been Martin's conjecture on Turing invariant functions. This longstanding open problem in recursion theory has connected to many problems in descriptive set theory, particularly in the theory of countable Borel equivalence relations. In this paper, we shall give an overview of some work that has been done on Martin's conjecture, and applications that it has had in descriptive set theory. We will present a long unpublished result of Slaman and Steel that arithmetic equivalence is a universal countable Borel equivalence relation. This theorem has interesting corollaries for the theory of universal countable Borel equivalence relations in general. We end with some open problems, and directions for future research.Comment: Corrected typo

Varying G, accelerating Universe, and other relevant consequences of a Stochastic Self-Similar and Fractal Universe

In this paper the time dependence of G is presented. It is a simple consequence of the Virial Theorem and of the self-similarity and fractality of the Universe. The results suggest a Universe based on El Naschie's Cantorian space-time. Moreover, we show the importance of the Golden Mean in respect to the large scale structures. Thanks to this study the mass distribution at large scales and the correlation function are explained and are natural consequences of the evaluated varying G. We demonstrate the agreement between the present hypotheses of segregation with a size of astrophysical structures, by using a comparison between quantum quantities and astrophysical ones. It appears clear that the Universe has a memory of its quantum origin. This appears in the G dependence too. Moreover, we see that a G=G(t) in El Naschie's Cantorian space-time can imply an accelerated Universe.Comment: 15 pages, 2 figures, accepted by Chaos, Solitons & Fractal

Gravity from the entropy of light

The holographic principle, considered in a semiclassical setting, is shown to have direct consequences on physics at a fundamental level. In particular, a certain relation is pointed out to be the expression of holography in basic thermodynamics. It is argued moreover that through this relation holography can be recognized to induce gravity, and an expression for the gravitational lensing is obtained in terms of entropy over wavelength of black-body radiation, or, at a deeper level, in terms of maximum entropy over associated space to the elementary bit of information.Comment: 7 pages; v2: completion of the list of references; v3: the discussion is divided in Sections and the argument is described in more detail; v4: a statement is added (below eq.13) on what is the supposed difference between Jacobson's work in ref.21 and this attempt; addition of a paragraph in last Sectio

Lexical information from a minimalist point of view

Simplicity as a methodological orientation applies to linguistic theory just as to any other field of research: ‘Occam’s razor’ is the label for the basic heuristic maxim according to which an adequate analysis must ultimately be reduced to indispensible specifications. In this sense, conceptual economy has been a strict and stimulating guideline in the development of Generative Grammar from the very beginning. Halle’s (1959) argument discarding the level of taxonomic phonemics in order to unify two otherwise separate phonological processes is an early characteristic example; a more general notion is that of an evaluation metric introduced in Chomsky (1957, 1975), which relates the relative simplicity of alternative linguistic descriptions systematically to the quest for explanatory adequacy of the theory underlying the descriptions to be evaluated. Further proposals along these lines include the theory of markedness developed in Chomsky and Halle (1968), Kean (1975, 1981), and others, the notion of underspecification proposed e.g. in Archangeli (1984), Farkas (1990), the concept of default values and related notions. An important step promoting this general orientation was the idea of Principles and Parameters developed in Chomsky (1981, 1986), which reduced the notion of language particular rule systems to universal principles, subject merely to parametrization with restricted options, largely related to properties of particular lexical items. On this account, the notion of a simplicity metric is to be dispensed with, as competing analyses of relevant data are now supposed to be essentially excluded by the restrictive system of principles

And what if gravity is intrinsically quantic ?

Since the early days of search for a quantum theory of gravity the attempts have been mostly concentrated on the quantization of an otherwise classical system. The two most contentious candidate theories of gravity, sting theory and quantum loop gravity are based on a quantum field theory - the latter is a quantum field theory of connections on a SU(2) group manifold and former a quantum field theory in two dimensional spaces. Here we argue that there is a very close relation between quantum mechanics and gravity. Without gravity quantum mechanics becomes ambiguous. We consider this observation as the evidence for an intrinsic relation between these fundamental laws of nature. We suggest a quantum role and definition for gravity in the context of a quantum universe, and present a preliminary formulation for gravity in a system with a finite number of particles.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure. To appear in the proceedings of the DICE2008 conference, Castiglioncello, Tuscany, Italy, 22-26 Sep. 2008. V2: some typos remove

Instantiation and Characterization: Problems in Lowe's Four-Category Ontology

According to Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, the general nature of the entities belonging to the four fundamental categories is determined by the basic formal ontological relations (instantiation and characterization) that they bear to other entities. I argue that, in closer analysis, instead of one formal relation of characterization, this category system introduces two, one connecting particulars and another universals. With regard to the characterization relation connecting particulars, it remains an open issue whether it would need further analysis. By contrast, the status of instantiation as an internal relation is comparatively clear. Nevertheless, because of holding by virtue of the essences of particulars, the holding of instantiation between universals and particulars rules out the possibility of kind change and entails that particulars are essentially rigidly dependent on universals. Finally, Lowe’s analysis of necessary exemplification gives us some reasons to suspect that some property universals need not have any instances in order to exist