Neurons and symbols: a manifesto

We discuss the purpose of neural-symbolic integration including its principles, mechanisms and applications. We outline a cognitive computational model for neural-symbolic integration, position the model in the broader context of multi-agent systems, machine learning and automated reasoning, and list some of the challenges for the area of neural-symbolic computation to achieve the promise of effective integration of robust learning and expressive reasoning under uncertainty

A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

Natural Morphological Computation as Foundation of Learning to Learn in Humans, Other Living Organisms, and Intelligent Machines

The emerging contemporary natural philosophy provides a common ground for the integrative view of the natural, the artificial, and the human-social knowledge and practices. Learning process is central for acquiring, maintaining, and managing knowledge, both theoretical and practical. This paper explores the relationships between the present advances in understanding of learning in the sciences of the artificial (deep learning, robotics), natural sciences (neuroscience, cognitive science, biology), and philosophy (philosophy of computing, philosophy of mind, natural philosophy). The question is, what at this stage of the development the inspiration from nature, specifically its computational models such as info-computation through morphological computing, can contribute to machine learning and artificial intelligence, and how much on the other hand models and experiments in machine learning and robotics can motivate, justify, and inform research in computational cognitive science, neurosciences, and computing nature. We propose that one contribution can be understanding of the mechanisms of ‘learning to learn’, as a step towards deep learning with symbolic layer of computation/information processing in a framework linking connectionism with symbolism. As all natural systems possessing intelligence are cognitive systems, we describe the evolutionary arguments for the necessity of learning to learn for a system to reach human-level intelligence through evolution and development. The paper thus presents a contribution to the epistemology of the contemporary philosophy of nature

High level cognitive information processing in neural networks

Two related research efforts were addressed: (1) high-level connectionist cognitive modeling; and (2) local neural circuit modeling. The goals of the first effort were to develop connectionist models of high-level cognitive processes such as problem solving or natural language understanding, and to understand the computational requirements of such models. The goals of the second effort were to develop biologically-realistic model of local neural circuits, and to understand the computational behavior of such models. In keeping with the nature of NASA's Innovative Research Program, all the work conducted under the grant was highly innovative. For instance, the following ideas, all summarized, are contributions to the study of connectionist/neural networks: (1) the temporal-winner-take-all, relative-position encoding, and pattern-similarity association techniques; (2) the importation of logical combinators into connection; (3) the use of analogy-based reasoning as a bridge across the gap between the traditional symbolic paradigm and the connectionist paradigm; and (4) the application of connectionism to the domain of belief representation/reasoning. The work on local neural circuit modeling also departs significantly from the work of related researchers. In particular, its concentration on low-level neural phenomena that could support high-level cognitive processing is unusual within the area of biological local circuit modeling, and also serves to expand the horizons of the artificial neural net field

The Integration of Connectionism and First-Order Knowledge Representation and Reasoning as a Challenge for Artificial Intelligence

Intelligent systems based on first-order logic on the one hand, and on artificial neural networks (also called connectionist systems) on the other, differ substantially. It would be very desirable to combine the robust neural networking machinery with symbolic knowledge representation and reasoning paradigms like logic programming in such a way that the strengths of either paradigm will be retained. Current state-of-the-art research, however, fails by far to achieve this ultimate goal. As one of the main obstacles to be overcome we perceive the question how symbolic knowledge can be encoded by means of connectionist systems: Satisfactory answers to this will naturally lead the way to knowledge extraction algorithms and to integrated neural-symbolic systems.Comment: In Proceedings of INFORMATION'2004, Tokyo, Japan, to appear. 12 page

Fewer epistemological challenges for connectionism

Seventeen years ago, John McCarthy wrote the note Epistemological challenges for connectionism as a response to Paul Smolensky’s paper 'On the proper treatment of connectionism'. I will discuss the extent to which the four key challenges put forward by McCarthy have been solved, and what are the new challenges ahead. I argue that there are fewer epistemological challenges for connectionism, but progress has been slow. Nevertheless, there is now strong indication that neural-symbolic integration can provide effective systems of expressive reasoning and robust learning due to the recent developments in the field