Words and Subwords: Phonology in a Piece-Based Syntactic Morphology

The goal of this dissertation is to take generalizations made in a variety of phonological and morphological theories and account for them in a piece-based syntactic theory of morphology. The theories discussed are Cyclic phonology, Lexical Phonology (and Stratal Optimality Theory), Prosodic Hierarchy Theories, and Syntactic Spell-Out Only theories. Phonological and morphological generalizations from these theories include the cyclic/non-cyclic distinction of phonological blocks and morphemes, ``grammatical\u27\u27 words and phonological words (their equivalence and apparent mismatches), incorporation of clitics into word level phonology, morpheme-sensitive phonological processes, and the relationship between syntactic spell-out phases and phonological domains. I present a framework within the theory of Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz 1993, et seq.) in which I account for these generalizations in several ways. I relate as much phonological structure to morphosyntactic structure as possible. However, there are several phonological phenomena which cannot be accounted for by syntactic structure alone. To account for these phenomena, I propose that the syntax feeds information in chunks to PF (cyclic spell-out) but that the morphology and phonology may operate on that information, creating mismatches between syntactic structure and phonological domains. For the cyclic/non-cyclic distinction of phonology, there are mismatches between syntactic spell-out domains and phonological interactions at the subword level. I propose a ``phonocyclic buffer\u27\u27 into which phonologically cyclic exponents are added and over which the cyclic phonology is calculated. This is illustrated with data from yer lowering and yer deletion in Slovak and Polish, English stress and derivational affixes, and Spanish depalatalization. For the relationship between ``grammatical\u27\u27 words and phonological/prosodic words, I propose an interface function relating morphosyntactic words (M-Words; non-minimal complex heads of the syntax) and phonological words. The basic relationship is illustrated with data from English voicing assimilation and German devoicing. I argue against two types of apparent mismatches between M-Words and phonological words, such as those proposed for Japanese ``Aoyagi\u27\u27 prefixes, Vietnamese interleaving word order, Plains Cree polysynthetic verbs, and Spanish compounds. I find some of these apparent mismatches can be handled elsewhere in the phonological system, while others are examples of complex syntactic structure (but not of mismatches between syntactic and phonological structure). I also present an operation which can create phonological words out of non-M-Word configurations, dubbed Stray Terminal Grouping. This is illustrated with data from Bilua, Standard English, and African American Vernacular English. Regarding the behavior of clitics (independent syntactic pieces which are phonological dependent on a host), I find that their behavior is not predetermined or memorized, but is dependent on the morphosyntactic context in which they are derived. I show cases from Turkish, Maltese, and Makassarese in which morphemes variably behave like clitics or affixes depending on their context. I argue that this variable behavior may be determined either by syntactic or morphological operations. Finally, I investigate two types of morpheme-sensitive phonological processes, morphophonological rules and morpheme/morpheme readjustments, illustrated with data from Slavic derived imperfect raising, German umlaut, and Kashaya decrement and palatalization. I argue that these processes are underlyingly phonological in nature, but are activated by morphological diacritics. This activation can happen during two different stages of linearization; Morpheme/morpheme readjustments occur at the level of subword concatenation while morphophonological rules occur at the level of subword chaining. This division accounts for the difference in locality conditions between the two types of processes. The conclusion of this dissertation is that we can account for these phonological generalizations in a piece-based syntactic framework, but not by syntax alone. Rather, it must be a combination of syntactic, morphological, and phonological operations which combine to create the phonological output

Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory

The nature and purpose of relative terms in Plato

Relative terms are those such as ‘larger’, ‘smaller’, ‘parent’ and ‘offspring’. Questions concerning the nature of this type of term in Plato fall under three themes. First, logic: what is the syntax and semantics of relative terms? Second, metaphysics: what structures in the world constitute relative properties? Third, taxonomy: do relative terms form a distinguishable class? Questions concerning purpose ask what role these terms have in the wider economy of Plato’s thought. Only one existing approach addresses all of these themes and questions: it was put forward by G.E.L. Owen in 1957, although it was subsequently developed by others. The Owenian view holds that relatives are syntactically or semantically incomplete, that they are identical to metaphysically dyadic relations and that they do form a taxonomic class. According to Owen, Plato introduces relative terms to bolster a certain argument for the separation of forms and participants. Therefore, they have an ontological purpose. This thesis aims to offer a plausible, non–anachronistic alternative to the Owenian view. To give such an account I have to argue for a radically different logic, metaphysics and purpose for relatives in Plato. I call the view that I defend ‘conjunctivism’. I begin by characterising the logic of conjunctivism. Plato holds that relative terms have formal objects. These are exceptionlessly correct objects of the relative in question. A parent is always and only parent of offspring, so ‘offspring’ is the formal object of ‘parent’. I then demonstrate that the metaphysical problems for relatives which are not dyadic relations are avoided by Plato’s version of conjunctivism. Looking at Sophist 255c–d and Parmenides 133c–134e, I discuss the taxonomy of relative terms. I show that, under the conjunctive reading, they form a distinguishable class and, in contrast to Owenian relatives, each reciprocates with its correlative. So, just as a parent is relative to offspring, so offspring are relative to a parent. With the nature of relative terms established, I proceed to refute Owen’s account of their purpose, and give my own explanation. By looking at passages from the Euthydemus and Charmides, I argue that Plato introduced relative terms to articulate why some arguments are fallacies and others not. That is, relative terms have a dialectical purpose.This work was supported by a Doctoral Award from the Arts and Humanities Research Council

Metaontological Studies relating to the Problem of Universals

My dissertation deals with metaontology or metametaphysics. This is the subdiscipline of philosophy that is concerned with the investigation of metaphysical concepts, statements, theories and problems on the metalevel. It analyses the meaning of metaphysical statements and theories and discusses how they are to be justified. The name "metaontology" is recently coined, but the task of metaontology is the same as Immanuel Kant already dealt with in his Critique of Pure Reason. As methods I use both historical research and logical (or rather semantical) analysis. In order to understand clearly what metaphysical terms or theories mean or should mean we must both look at how they have been characterized in the course of the history of philosophy and then analyse the meanings that have historically been given to them with the methods of modern formal semantics. Metaontological research would be worthless if it could not in the end be applied to solving some substantive ontological questions. In the end of my dissertation, therefore, I give arguments for a solution to the substantively ontological problem of universals, a form of realism about universals called promiscuous realism. To prepare the way for that argument, I argue that the metaontological considerations most relevant to the problem of universals are considerations concerning ontological commitment, as the American philosophers Quine and van Inwagen have argued, not those concerning truthmakers as such philosophers as the Australian realist D. M. Armstrong have argued or those concerning verification conditions as such philosophers as Michael Dummett have argued. To justify this conclusion, I go first through well-known objections to verificationism, and show that they apply also to current verificationist theories such as Dummett's theory and Field's deflationist theory of truth. In the process I also respond to opponents of metaphysics who try to show with the aid of verificationism or structuralism that metaphysical questions would be meaningless or illegitimate in some other way. Having justified the central role of ontological commitment, I try to develop a detailed theory of it. The core of my work is a rigorous formal development of a theory of ontological commitment. I construct it by combining Alonzo Church's theory of ontological commitment with Tarski's theory of truth.Väitöskirjani käsittelee metaontologiaa eli metametafysiikkaa. Tämä on se metafilosofian osa-alue, joka tutkii metafyysisten väitteiden ja termien merkitystä ja sitä, miten metafyysiset väitteet ja teoriat voitaisiin oikeuttaa. Metafysiikka tai ontologia on taas tiede, joka tutkii olevaa yleensä tai kaikkeutta kokonaisuutena. Menetelminä käytän sekä historiallista tutkimusta että loogista (tai pikemminkin semanttista) analyysiä. On olemassa kolme pääasiallista teoriaa siitä, mikä on metaontologian keskeisin käsite. Sellaiset filosofit kuin australialainen Armstrong ovat väittäneet, että se on totuustekijöiden (truthmakers) käsite. Sellaiset anti-realistiset filosofit kuin englantilainen filosofi Michael Dummett ovat taas väittäneet että se on todennettavuusehtojen (verification conditions) käsite. Argumentoin näitä kahta käsitystä vastaan ja kolmannen puolesta, jonka mukaan keskeisin käsite on ontologisten sitoumusten käsite, kuten amerikkalainen filosofi Quine on väittänyt. Argumentoin, että Quinen ontologisten sitoumusten teoria voidaan erottaa hänen muista ontologisista näkemyksistään, kuten hänen semanttisesta holismistaan, ontologisesta relativismistaan tai strukturalismistaan, mitkä ovat mielestäni virheellisiä. Väitöskirjani ydin on täsmällinen teoria ontologisista sitoumuksista, jonka rakennan yhdistämällä Alonzo Churchin teoriaa ontologisista sitoumuksista Alfred Tarskin totuusteoriaan. Metaontologinen tutkimus olisi arvotonta, ellei sitä voisi lopulta käyttää substantiivisten ontologisten kysymysten ratkaisemiseen. Käsittelen siksi väitöskirjani loppupuolella yhtä perinteistä ontologian ongelmaa, universaalien ongelmaa. Jo Aristoteles määritteli teoksessaan Tulkinnasta universaalien olevan olioita, jotka (Lauri Carlsonin käännöksen mukaan) luonnostaan predikoidaan (sanotaan) monesta. Universaaliongelma koskee sitä, ovatko tällaiset universaalit vain kielellisiä ilmauksia, kuten yleisnimet, verbit ja adjektiivit, tai ihmismielestä riippuvia olioita, kuten yleiskäsitteet, vai voidaanko myös sanoa, että maailmassa itsessään olevia olioita voidaan predikoida jostakin. Realistin mukaan vastaus on myöntävä. Esitän väitöskirjan lopussa alustavan argumentin universaaleja koskevan realismin puolesta

A Stalnakerian Analysis of Metafictive Statements

Because Stalnaker’s common ground framework is focussed on cooperative information exchange, it is challenging to model fictional discourse. To this end, I develop an extension of Stalnaker’s analysis of assertion that adds a temporary workspace to the common ground. I argue that my framework models metafictive discourse better than competing approaches that are based on adding unofficial common grounds