An App Performance Optimization Advisor for Mobile Device App Marketplaces

On mobile phones, users and developers use apps official marketplaces serving as repositories of apps. The Google Play Store and Apple Store are the official marketplaces of Android and Apple products which offer more than a million apps. Although both repositories offer description of apps, information concerning performance is not available. Due to the constrained hardware of mobile devices, users and developers have to meticulously manage the resources available and they should be given access to performance information about apps. Even if this information was available, the selection of apps would still depend on user preferences and it would require a huge cognitive effort to make optimal decisions. Considering this fact we propose APOA, a recommendation system which can be implemented in any marketplace for helping users and developers to compare apps in terms of performance. APOA uses as input metric values of apps and a set of metrics to optimize. It solves an optimization problem and it generates optimal sets of apps for different user's context. We show how APOA works over an Android case study. Out of 140 apps, we define typical usage scenarios and we collect measurements of power, CPU, memory, and network usages to demonstrate the benefit of using APOA.Comment: 18 pages, 8 figure

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets

Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit with rather peculiar preferences of agents. These preferences can be described by piece-wise linear concave (PLC) functions, which however, are not separable (due to each agent only asking for one item), are not monotone, and do not satisfy the gross substitute property-- increase in price of an item can result in increased demand for the item. Devanur and Kannan in FOCS 08 showed that market clearing prices can be found in polynomial time in markets with fixed number of items and general PLC preferences. They also consider Fischer markets with fixed number of agents (instead of fixed number of items), and give a polynomial time algorithm for this case if preferences are separable functions of the items, in addition to being PLC functions. Our main result is a polynomial time algorithm for finding market clearing prices in matching markets with fixed number of different agent preferences, despite that the utility corresponding to matching markets is not separable. We also give a simpler algorithm for the case of matching markets with fixed number of different items

Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences

Approval-based committee (ABC) rules are voting rules that output a fixed-size subset of candidates, a so-called committee. ABC rules select committees based on dichotomous preferences, i.e., a voter either approves or disapproves a candidate. This simple type of preferences makes ABC rules widely suitable for practical use. In this book, we summarize the current understanding of ABC rules from the viewpoint of computational social choice. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results, and relevant applications.Comment: This is a draft of the upcoming book "Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences

Coverage Protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks: Review and Future Directions

The coverage problem in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can be generally defined as a measure of how effectively a network field is monitored by its sensor nodes. This problem has attracted a lot of interest over the years and as a result, many coverage protocols were proposed. In this survey, we first propose a taxonomy for classifying coverage protocols in WSNs. Then, we classify the coverage protocols into three categories (i.e. coverage aware deployment protocols, sleep scheduling protocols for flat networks, and cluster-based sleep scheduling protocols) based on the network stage where the coverage is optimized. For each category, relevant protocols are thoroughly reviewed and classified based on the adopted coverage techniques. Finally, we discuss open issues (and recommend future directions to resolve them) associated with the design of realistic coverage protocols. Issues such as realistic sensing models, realistic energy consumption models, realistic connectivity models and sensor localization are covered

Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment

We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal solution and time path of investment and consumption. We then consider alternative political mechanisms for deciding on the time path, and analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium of these mechanisms. One class of these mechanisms involves a legislature where representatives of each district bargain with each other to decide how to divide the current period's societal endowment between investment in the public good and transfers to each district. The second class of mechanisms involves the districts making independent decisions for how to divide their own share of the endowment between consumption and investment. We conduct an experiment to assess the performance of these mechanisms, and compare the observed allocations to the Markov perfect equilibrium.Dynamic political economy; voting; public goods; bargaining; experiments