Computing optimal strategies for a cooperative hat game

We consider a `hat problem' in which each player has a randomly placed stack of black and white hats on their heads, visible to the other player, but not the wearer. Each player must guess a hat position on their head with the goal of both players guessing a white hat. We address the question of finding the optimal strategy, i.e., the one with the highest probability of winning, for this game. We provide an overview of prior work on this question, and describe several strategies that give the best known lower bound on the probability of winning. Upper bounds are also considered here

An Algorithm for Probabilistic Alternating Simulation

In probabilistic game structures, probabilistic alternating simulation (PA-simulation) relations preserve formulas defined in probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with respect to the behaviour of a subset of players. We propose a partition based algorithm for computing the largest PA-simulation, which is to our knowledge the first such algorithm that works in polynomial time, by extending the generalised coarsest partition problem (GCPP) in a game-based setting with mixed strategies. The algorithm has higher complexities than those in the literature for non-probabilistic simulation and probabilistic simulation without mixed actions, but slightly improves the existing result for computing probabilistic simulation with respect to mixed actions.Comment: We've fixed a problem in the SOFSEM'12 conference versio

Iterated Regret Minimization in Game Graphs

Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games. For many games of interest, this new solution concept provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than solutions offered by traditional game concepts -- such as Nash equilibrium --. Although computing iterated regret on explicit matrix game is conceptually and computationally easy, nothing is known about computing the iterated regret on games whose matrices are defined implicitly using game tree, game DAG or, more generally game graphs. In this paper, we investigate iterated regret minimization for infinite duration two-player quantitative non-zero sum games played on graphs. We consider reachability objectives that are not necessarily antagonist. Edges are weighted by integers -- one for each player --, and the payoffs are defined by the sum of the weights along the paths. Depending on the class of graphs, we give either polynomial or pseudo-polynomial time algorithms to compute a strategy that minimizes the regret for a fixed player. We finally give algorithms to compute the strategies of the two players that minimize the iterated regret for trees, and for graphs with strictly positive weights only.Comment: 19 pages. Bug in introductive example fixed

Mean-field games of optimal stopping: a relaxed solution approach

We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game. We place ourselves in the framework of relaxed optimal stopping, which amounts to looking for the optimal occupation measure of the stopper rather than the optimal stopping time. This framework allows us to prove the existence of the relaxed Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent under mild assumptions. Further, we prove a rigorous relation between relaxed Nash equilibria and the notion of mixed solutions introduced in earlier works on the subject, and provide a criterion, under which the optimal strategies are pure strategies, that is, behave in a similar way to stopping times. Finally, we present a numerical method for computing the equilibrium in the case of potential games and show its convergence

Approximate Nash Equilibria via Sampling

We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(log(m) + log(n)) pure strategies. This result induces an $N^{\log \log N}$ algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in games where the number of actions is polynomial in the number of players (m=poly(n)), where $N=nm^n$ is the size of the game (the input size). In addition, we establish an inverse connection between the entropy of Nash equilibria in the game, and the time it takes to find such an approximate Nash equilibrium using the random sampling algorithm