The mind's eye in blindfold chess

Visual imagery plays an important role in problem solving, and research into blindfold chess has provided a wealth of empirical data on this question. We show how a recent theory of expert memory (the template theory, Gobet & Simon, 1996, 2000) accounts for most of these data. However, how the mind’s eye filters out relevant from irrelevant information is still underspecified in the theory. We describe two experiments addressing this question, in which chess games are presented visually, move by move, on a board that contains irrelevant information (static positions, semi-static positions, and positions changing every move). The results show that irrelevant information affects chess masters only when it changes during the presentation of the target game. This suggests that novelty information is used by the mind’s eye to select incoming visual information and separate “figure” and “ground.” Mechanisms already present in the template theory can be used to account for this novelty effect

The emergence of choice: Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies

Consider the chess game: When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) \ud how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario \ud may evolve

Structure and stimulus familiarity: A study of memory in chess-players with functional magnetic resonance imaging.

A grandmaster and an international chess master were compared with a group of novices in a memory task with chess and non-chess stimuli, varying the structure and familiarity of the stimuli, while functional magnetic resonance images were acquired. The pattern of brain activity in the masters was different from that of the novices. Masters showed no differences in brain activity when different degrees of structure and familiarity where compared; however, novices did show differences in brain activity in such contrasts. The most important differences were found in the contrast of stimulus familiarity with chess positions. In this contrast, there was an extended brain activity in bilateral frontal areas such as the anterior cingulate and the superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri; furthermore, posterior areas, such as posterior cingulate and cerebellum, showed great bilateral activation. These results strengthen the hypothesis that when performing a domain-specific task, experts activate different brain systems from that of novices. The use of the expertsversus- novices paradigm in brain imaging contributes towards the search for brain systems involved in cognitive processes

Modelling the relationship between visual short-term memory capacity and recall ability

Previous cognitive modelling work has suggested that the decline of short-term memory (STM) capacity is the dominant factor of age-related decline on recall ability. We report the results of a set of experiments investigating in further detail the effect of varying short-term memory capacity on the recall of chess positions using the CHREST cognitive architecture, and demonstrate a good qualitative match for human data. We then use these results to suggest a potential functional reason for the size of STM capacity in humans and go on to explore the relationships between STM capacity, ageing, knowledge, presentation time, and recall ability

Expertise and intuition: A tale of three theories

Several authors have hailed intuition as one of the defining features of expertise. In particular, while disagreeing on almost anything that touches on human cognition and artificial intelligence, Hubert Dreyfus and Herbert Simon agreed on this point. However, the highly influential theories of intuition they proposed differed in major ways, especially with respect to the role given to search and as to whether intuition is holistic or analytic. Both theories suffer from empirical weaknesses. In this paper, we show how, with some additions, a recent theory of expert memory (the template theory) offers a coherent and wide-ranging explanation of intuition in expert behaviour. It is shown that the theory accounts for the key features of intuition: it explains the rapid onset of intuition and its perceptual nature, provides mechanisms for learning, incorporates processes showing how perception is linked to action and emotion, and how experts capture the entirety of a situation. In doing so, the new theory addresses the issues problematic for Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories. Implications for research and practice are discussed

Creating Simplified 3D Models with High Quality Textures

This paper presents an extension to the KinectFusion algorithm which allows creating simplified 3D models with high quality RGB textures. This is achieved through (i) creating model textures using images from an HD RGB camera that is calibrated with Kinect depth camera, (ii) using a modified scheme to update model textures in an asymmetrical colour volume that contains a higher number of voxels than that of the geometry volume, (iii) simplifying dense polygon mesh model using quadric-based mesh decimation algorithm, and (iv) creating and mapping 2D textures to every polygon in the output 3D model. The proposed method is implemented in real-time by means of GPU parallel processing. Visualization via ray casting of both geometry and colour volumes provides users with a real-time feedback of the currently scanned 3D model. Experimental results show that the proposed method is capable of keeping the model texture quality even for a heavily decimated model and that, when reconstructing small objects, photorealistic RGB textures can still be reconstructed.Comment: 2015 International Conference on Digital Image Computing: Techniques and Applications (DICTA), Page 1 -

The emergence of choice: Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies

Consider the chess game: When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) \ud how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario \ud may evolve

Why good thoughts block better ones: The mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect.

The Einstellung (set) effect occurs when the first idea that comes to mind, triggered by familiar features of a problem, prevents a better solution being found. It has been shown to affect both people facing novel problems and experts within their field of expertise. We show that it works by influencing mechanisms that determine what information is attended to. Having found one solution, expert chess players reported that they were looking for a better one. But their eye movements showed that they continued to look at features of the problem related to the solution they had already thought of. The mechanism which allows the first schema activated by familiar aspects of a problem to control the subsequent direction of attention may contribute to a wide range of biases both in everyday and expert thought - from confirmation bias in hypothesis testing to the tendency of scientists to ignore results that do not fit their favoured theories