ABC-EBDI: A cognitive-affective framework to support the modeling of believable intelligent agents.

El Grupo de Investigación de Interfaces Avanzadas (AffectiveLab), es un grupo reconocido por el Gobierno de Aragón (T60-20R) cuya actividad se enmarca en el área de la Interacción Humano-Computadora (IHC). Su actividad investigadora se ha centrado, en los últimos años, en cuatro temas principales: interacción natural, informática afectiva, accesibilidad e interfaces basadas en agentes inteligentes, siendo esta última en la que se enmarca esta tesis doctoral. Más concretamente, la realización de esta tesis doctoral se enmarca dentro de los proyectos de investigación nacionales JUGUEMOS (TIN2015-67149-C3-1R) y PERGAMEX (RTI2018-096986-B-C31). Una de sus líneas de investigación se centra en el desarrollo de arquitecturas cognitivo-afectivas para apoyar el modelado afectivo de los agentes inteligentes. El AffectiveLab tiene una sólida experiencia en el uso de agentes de interfaz incorporados que exhiben expresiones afectivas corporales y faciales (Baldassarri et al., 2008). En los últimos años, se han centrado en el modelado del comportamiento de los agentes inteligentes (Pérez et al., 2017).La definición de agente inteligente es un tema controvertido, pero se puede decir que es una entidad autónoma que recibe información dinámica del entorno a través de sensores y actúa sobre el medio ambiente a través de actuadores, mostrando un comportamiento dirigido a un objetivo (Russell et al., 2003). El modelado de los procesos cognitivos en los agentes inteligentes se basa en diferentes teorías (Moore, 1980; Newell, 1994; Bratman, 1987) que explican, desde diferentes puntos de vista, el funcionamiento de la mente humana. Los agentes inteligentes implementados sobre la base de una teoría cognitiva se conocen como agentes cognitivos. Los más desarrollados son los que se basan en arquitecturas cognitivas, como Soar (Laird et al., 1987), ACT-R (Anderson, 1993) y BDI (Rao and Georgeff, 1995). Comparado con Soar y otras arquitecturas complejas, BDI se destaca por su simplicidad y versatilidad. BDI ofrece varias características que la hacen popular, como su capacidad para explicar el comportamiento del agente en cada momento, haciendo posible una interacción dinámica con el entorno. Debido a la creciente popularidad del marco BDI se ha utilizado para apoyar el modelado de agentes inteligentes (Larsen, 2019; (Cranefield and Dignum, 2019). En los últimos años, también han aparecido propuestas de BDI que integran aspectos afectivos. Los agentes inteligentes construidos en base a la arquitectura BDI que también incorporan capacidades afectivas, se conocen como agentes EBDI (Emotional BDI) y son el foco de esta tesis. El objetivo principal de esta tesis ha sido proponer un marco cognitivo-afectivo basado en el BDI que sustente el modelado cognitivo-afectivo de los agentes inteligentes. La finalidad es ser capaz de reproducir un comportamiento humano creíble en situaciones complejas donde el comportamiento humano es variado y bastante impredecible. El objetivo propuesto se ha logrado con éxito en los términos descritos a continuación:• Se ha elaborado un exhaustivo estado del arte relacionado con los modelos afectivos más utilizados para modelar los aspectos afectivos en los agentes inteligentes.• Se han estudiado las arquitecturas de BDI y las propuestas previas de EBDI. El estudio, que dio lugar a una publicación (Sánchez-López and Cerezo, 2019), permitió detectar las cuestiones abiertas en el área, y la necesidad de considerar todos los aspectos de la afectividad (emociones, estado de ánimo, personalidad) y su influencia en todas las etapas cognitivas. El marco resultante de este trabajo doctoral incluye también el modelado de la conducta y el comportamiento comunicativo, que no habían sido considerados hasta ahora en el modelado de los agentes inteligentes. Estos aspectos colocan al marco resultante entre EBDI los más avanzados de la literatura. • Se ha diseñado e implementado un marco basado en el BDI para soportar el modelado cognitivo, afectivo y conductual de los agentes inteligentes, denominado ABC-EBDI (Sanchez et al., 2020) (Sánchez et al., 2019). Se trata de la primera aplicación de un modelo psicológico muy conocido, el modelo ABC de Ellis, a la simulación de agentes inteligentes humanos realistas. Esta aplicación implica:o La ampliación del concepto de creencias. En el marco se consideran tres tipos de creencias: creencias básicas, creencias de contexto y comportamientos operantes. Las creencias básicas representan la información general que el agente tiene sobre sí mismo y el entorno. Las conductas operantes permiten modelar la conducta reactiva del agente a través de las conductas aprendidas. Las creencias de contexto, que se representan en forma de cogniciones frías y calientes, se procesan para clasificarlas en creencias irracionales y racionales siguiendo las ideas de Ellis. Es la consideración de creencias irracionales/racionales porque abre la puerta a la simulación de reacciones humanas realistas.o La posibilidad de gestionar de forma unificada las consecuencias de los acontecimientos en términos de consecuencias afectivas y de comportamiento (conducta). Las creencias de contexto racionales conducen a emociones funcionales y a una conducta adaptativa, mientras que las creencias de contexto irracionales conducen a emociones disfuncionales y a una conducta maladaptativa. Este carácter funcional/disfuncional de las emociones no se había utilizado nunca antes en el contexto del BDI. Además, el modelado conductual se ha ampliado con el modelado de estilos comunicativos, basado en el modelo Satir, tampoco aplicado previamente al modelado de agentes inteligentes. El modelo de Satir considera gestos corporales, expresiones faciales, voz, entonación y estructuras lingüísticas.• Se ha elegido un caso de uso, "I wish a had better news" para la aplicación del marco propuesto y se han realizado dos tipos de evaluaciones, por parte de expertos y de usuarios. La evaluación ha confirmado el gran potencial del marco propuesto para reproducir un comportamiento humano realista y creíble en situaciones complejas.<br /

From Affect Theoretical Foundations to Computational Models of Intelligent Affective Agents

[EN] The links between emotions and rationality have been extensively studied and discussed. Several computational approaches have also been proposed to model these links. However, is it possible to build generic computational approaches and languages so that they can be "adapted " when a specific affective phenomenon is being modeled? Would these approaches be sufficiently and properly grounded? In this work, we want to provide the means for the development of these generic approaches and languages by making a horizontal analysis inspired by philosophical and psychological theories of the main affective phenomena that are traditionally studied. Unfortunately, not all the affective theories can be adapted to be used in computational models; therefore, it is necessary to perform an analysis of the most suitable theories. In this analysis, we identify and classify the main processes and concepts which can be used in a generic affective computational model, and we propose a theoretical framework that includes all these processes and concepts that a model of an affective agent with practical reasoning could use. Our generic theoretical framework supports incremental research whereby future proposals can improve previous ones. This framework also supports the evaluation of the coverage of current computational approaches according to the processes that are modeled and according to the integration of practical reasoning and affect-related issues. This framework is being used in the development of the GenIA(3) architecture.This work is partially supported by the Spanish Government projects PID2020-113416RB-I00, GVA-CEICE project PROMETEO/2018/002, and TAILOR, a project funded by EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under GA No 952215.Alfonso, B.; Taverner-Aparicio, JJ.; Vivancos, E.; Botti, V. (2021). From Affect Theoretical Foundations to Computational Models of Intelligent Affective Agents. Applied Sciences. 11(22):1-29. https://doi.org/10.3390/app112210874S129112

An Architecture for Believable Socially Aware Agents

The main focus of this thesis is to solve the believability problem in video game agents by integrating necessary psychological and sociological foundations by means of role based architecture. Our design agent also has the capability to reason and predict the decisions of other actors by using its own mental model. The agent has a separate mental model for every actor

CernoCAMAL : a probabilistic computational cognitive architecture

This thesis presents one possible way to develop a computational cognitive architecture, dubbed CernoCAMAL, that can be used to govern artificial minds probabilistically. The primary aim of the CernoCAMAL research project is to investigate how its predecessor architecture CAMAL can be extended to reason probabilistically about domain model objects through perception, and how the probability formalism can be integrated into its BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) model to coalesce a number of mechanisms and processes. The motivation and impetus for extending CAMAL and developing CernoCAMAL is the considerable evidence that probabilistic thinking and reasoning is linked to cognitive development and plays a role in cognitive functions, such as decision making and learning. This leads us to believe that a probabilistic reasoning capability is an essential part of human intelligence. Thus, it should be a vital part of any system that attempts to emulate human intelligence computationally. The extensions and augmentations to CAMAL, which are the main contributions of the CernoCAMAL research project, are as follows: - The integration of the EBS (Extended Belief Structure) that associates a probability value with every belief statement, in order to represent the degrees of belief numerically. - The inclusion of the CPR (CernoCAMAL Probabilistic Reasoner) that reasons probabilistically over the goal- and task-oriented perceptual feedback generated by reactive sub-systems. - The compatibility of the probabilistic BDI model with the affect and motivational models and affective and motivational valences used throughout CernoCAMAL. A succession of experiments in simulation and robotic testbeds is carried out to demonstrate improvements and increased efficacy in CernoCAMAL’s overall cognitive performance. A discussion and critical appraisal of the experimental results, together with a summary, a number of potential future research directions, and some closing remarks conclude the thesis

Experience representation in information systems

This thesis looks into the ways subjective dimension of experience could be represented in artificial, non-biological systems, in particular information systems. The pivotal assumption is that experience as opposed to mainstream thinking in information science is not equal to knowledge, so that experience is a broader term which encapsulates both knowledge and subjective, affective component of experience, which so far has not been properly embraced by knowledge representation theories. This is the consequence of dominance of behaviourism and later cognitivism in the XXth-century science, which tended to reduce mind and experience respectively to behavioural expressions and discrete states relating mindful creature to external world, meanwhile the processes of knowing to manipulations with symbols. We support the view that traditional knowledge representation approaches will not suffice to embrace the entirety of mental phenomena. We propose that in order to understand, represent and model the thinking and behavioural processes of mindful entities in information systems we need to look into the phenomenon of experience beyond the boundaries of knowledge. At the same time we propose to look at experience in a more structured way and try to capture it in formal terms, making it amenable to symbolic representation, being aware at the same time of innate limitations of symbolic representations compared to the natural representations in biological bodies. Under the paradigm of mind intentionality, which assumes that minds have this special intrinsic feature that they can relate to external word and thus are about external world, it can be asserted that experience is one in all intentional mind state composed of knowledge that is the intentional contents of this state, the world-to-mind relation, meanwhile its inseparable subjective component is composed of subjective feelings of the mindful individual corresponding to this intentional mind states. If so, we propose that experience can be defined as two-dimensional mental phenomena consisting of mental states that have both knowledge and affective component. Consequently we suggest that experience can be represented as pairs of elements of sets K, and A, where K represents knowledge, hence contents of remembered intentional states of mind (i.e. intentional contents of experience), whereas A represents affect, i.e. the subjective qualitative component of experience. iii Importantly, it does not particularly matter if we define experience as a set of mind states or a mind state process for assessing if the overall relation between knowledge and subjective experience that we have outlined above is valid. Whether there is knowing rather then knowledge or experiencing rather than experience which seems increasingly a contemporary principle, remains a fascinating philosophical, ontological to be more specific, question, however it falls beyond the scope of the thesis and therefore we shall not concentrate on it herewith. Furthermore we propose that the subjective component of experience is also intrinsically intentionalistic, but meanwhile the intentionality in case of knowing is directed outward, to the external world, in case of feeling it is directed inwards to the within of the experiencing mindbody. We tap into the contemporary thinking in the philosophy of mind that the primordial, intrinsic intentionalistic capacity of mind is non-linguistic, as there must be other more primordial, non-linguistic form of intentionality that allows human children, as well as other language-capable animals, to learn language in first place. Contemporary cognitive neuroscience suggest that this capacity is tightly related to affect. We also embrace the theories of consciousness and self coming from brain scientists such as Damasio and Panksepp who believe that there is a primordial component of self, a so called protoself composed of the raw feelings coming from within the body, which are representations of bodily states in the mind, and have strictly subjective character. Therefore we can look at this compound of primordial feelings as a mirror in which external world reflects via the interface of the senses. This results in experience that has this conceptually dual, yet united within the conscious mindbody, composition of intentional contents that is knowledge and subjective component that is built up by feelings coming from within the experiencing mindbody. For it is problematic to state sharply either that this composition is dual or united we can refer to these two separately considered aspects of experience either as components or dimensions. In this thesis we pay particular attention to the role the affective component of experience plays in the behaviour of organisms, and we use the concept of rational agency to discuss the relations between agent experience and behaviour. This role is primarily about motivation and experience vividness, i.e. how easily experiential states can be retrieved from memory. The affective dimension of experience determines the drivers for agent action and influences the remembering and forgetting (memory) processes that experience is prone to. We reflect on how the above presented framework could enhance one of the most popular rational agency models: the Believes Desires Intentions model (BDI) based on Bratmann’s account of practical reason that has dominated information science and artificial intelligence literature. Inspired by Davidson, who opposing Hume’s account that the passions (desires) drive action while reason (belief) merely directs its force, concluded that iv “(...) belief and desire seem equally to be causal conditions of action. But (...) desire is more basic in that if we know enough about a person’s desires, we can work out what he believes, while the reverse does not hold.” (Davidson, 2004) we conclude that in so far as BDI model approaches them, desires are sort of beliefs. Indeed a desire in the above sense is a verbalised desire, i.e. in order for a proposition to be included in the deliberation an agent must have internally verbalize it and accept it by which he converts it into a belief. As a result an agent acquires a belief about its desire. Apart from desires made thus explicit and becoming beliefs there are implicit experiential states that directly influence behaviour, these are not embraced by the Desires set in the BDI and other instrumentalist rationality models as these currently do not have adequate forms of representation. If this is so, the BDI models looses its D creating a gap which must be filled in, which we try to do with the subjective dimension of experience. Under such an account each belief, either the proper one or about the desire, represented formally with a proposition should have an extra component added which would stand for the subjective affective state to this belief. Some preliminary suggestions how this could be implemented are proposed and discussed. The central proposition of this thesis states that experience, broadly understood as the entirety of contents and quality of a conscious mind state, can be satisfactorily represented in information systems, and any information system which objective is to emulate natural agent behaviour with satisfactory faithfulness cannot do without a sound experience representation framework. To achieve this it is necessary to realize and accept, based on convincing evidence from neuroscience, that the missing subjective component of experience is affect that forms and integral part of natural agent’s experience, and determines, or at least impacts profoundly the behaviour of natural agents. Relating affect to knowledge would result in a satisfactory approximation of experience. It is to realize as well that the subjective dimension of experience, classified as affect, is not entirely private, subjective epiphenomenal entity but rather can be studied in objective terms as neurological correlates in the brain following account of emotion and affect as fostered by contemporary neuroscience. By identifying affective correlates of intentional contents of states of mind, which build up knowledge, we can exploit a broader concept experience for the purpose of more accurate emulation of natural agents’ thinking process and behaviour in information systems. This thesis presents and discusses a bulk of evidence coming mainly from three fields: information science, philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience that led us to the above stated conclusions, as well as establishes a framework for experience representation in information systems

CernoCAMAL : a probabilistic computational cognitive architecture

This thesis presents one possible way to develop a computational cognitive architecture, dubbed CernoCAMAL, that can be used to govern artificial minds probabilistically. The primary aim of the CernoCAMAL research project is to investigate how its predecessor architecture CAMAL can be extended to reason probabilistically about domain model objects through perception, and how the probability formalism can be integrated into its BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) model to coalesce a number of mechanisms and processes.The motivation and impetus for extending CAMAL and developing CernoCAMAL is the considerable evidence that probabilistic thinking and reasoning is linked to cognitive development and plays a role in cognitive functions, such as decision making and learning. This leads us to believe that a probabilistic reasoning capability is an essential part of human intelligence. Thus, it should be a vital part of any system that attempts to emulate human intelligence computationally.The extensions and augmentations to CAMAL, which are the main contributions of the CernoCAMAL research project, are as follows:- The integration of the EBS (Extended Belief Structure) that associates a probability value with every belief statement, in order to represent the degrees of belief numerically.- The inclusion of the CPR (CernoCAMAL Probabilistic Reasoner) that reasons probabilistically over the goal- and task-oriented perceptual feedback generated by reactive sub-systems.- The compatibility of the probabilistic BDI model with the affect and motivational models and affective and motivational valences used throughout CernoCAMAL.A succession of experiments in simulation and robotic testbeds is carried out to demonstrate improvements and increased efficacy in CernoCAMAL’s overall cognitive performance. A discussion and critical appraisal of the experimental results, together with a summary, a number of potential future research directions, and some closing remarks conclude the thesis

Agents with Affective Traits for Decision-Making in Complex Environments

Recent events have probably lead us to wonder why people make decisions that seem to be irrational, and that go against any easily understandable logic. The fact that these decisions are emotionally driven often explains what, at first glance, does not have a plausible explanation. Evidence has been found that proves that emotions and other affective characteristics guide decisions beyond a purely rational deliberation. Understanding the way emotions take place, the way emotions change, and/or the way emotions influence behavior, has traditionally been a concern of several fields including psychology and neurology. Moreover, other sciences such as behavioral economics, artificial intelligence, and in general, all sciences that aim to understand, explain, or simulate human behavior, acknowledge the important role of affective characteristics in this task. Specifically, artificial intelligence uses psychological findings in order to create agents that simulate human behavior. Nevertheless, individual research efforts in modeling affective characteristics are often overlapped, short of integration, and they lack of a common conceptual system. This deprives individual researches of the exchange and cooperation's inherent benefits, and makes the task of computationally simulating affective characteristics more difficult. Although much individual effort has been put in classifying, formalizing and modeling emotions and emotion theories on some fields, recognized researchers of emotions' and affective processes' modeling report that a common formal language, an informal conceptual system, and a general purpose affective agent architecture will greatly improve the interdisciplinary exchange and the intradisciplinary coordination. The research literature proposes a wide amount of affective models that deal with some of: relationship between emotions and cognition, relationship between emotions and behavior, emotions and their evolutionary account, emotions for appraising situations, emotion regulation, etc. These models are useful tools for addressing particular emotion-related issues. Furthermore, computational approaches that are based on particular psychological theories have also been proposed. They often address domain specific issues starting from a specific psychological theory. In such solutions, the absence of a common conceptual system and/or platform, makes difficult the feedback between psychological theories and computational approaches. This thesis systematizes and formalizes affect-related theories, what can benefit the interdisciplinary exchange, the intradisciplinary coordination, and hence, allows the improvement of involved disciplines. Specifically this thesis makes the following contributions: (1) a theoretical framework that includes the main processes and concepts that a model of an affective agent with practical reasoning should have; (2) a general-purpose affective agent architecture that shares the concepts of the proposed theoretical framework; (3) an implementation-independent formal language for designing affective agents that have the proposed architecture; and (4) a specific agent language for implementing affective agents which is an extension of a BDI language. Some studies with human participants have helped to validate the contributions of this thesis. They include classical games of game theory, and an study with 300 participants, which have provided the necessary information to evaluate the contributions. The validation has been performed in three directions: determine whether the proposed computational approach represents better the human behavior than traditional computational approaches; determine whether this approach allows to improve psychological theories used by default; and determine whether the proposed affective agents' behavior is closer to human behavior than the behavior of a purely rational agent.Probablemente algunos eventos recientes nos han conducido a preguntarnos por qué las personas toman decisiones aparentemente irracionales y en contra de alguna lógica fácilmente comprensible. El hecho de que estas decisiones estén bajo la influencia de las emociones a menudo explica lo que, a primera vista, parece no tener una explicación aceptable. En este sentido, se han encontrado evidencias que prueban que las emociones y otras características afectivas condicionan las decisiones más allá de una deliberación meramente racional. Entender cómo las emociones tienen lugar, cómo cambian y cómo influyen en el comportamiento, ha sido tradicionalmente de interés para muchos campos de investigación, incluyendo la psicología y la neurología. Además, otras ciencias como la economía conductual o la inteligencia artificial reconocen el importante papel de las características afectivas en esta tarea. Específicamente, la inteligencia artificial utiliza los resultados obtenidos en psicología para crear agentes que simulan el comportamiento humano. Sin embargo, a menudo los esfuerzos individuales de investigación en el modelado del afecto se solapan, carecen de la suficiente integración y de un sistema conceptual común. Esto limita a las investigaciones individuales para disponer de los beneficios que ofrecen el intercambio y la cooperación, y hace más compleja la tarea de simular los procesos afectivos. Las emociones y teorías relacionadas han sido clasificadas, formalizadas y modeladas. No obstante, reconocidos investigadores argumentan que un lenguaje formal común, un sistema conceptual informal y una arquitectura de agentes de propósito general, mejorarán significativamente el intercambio interdisciplinar y la coordinación intradisciplinar. En la literatura se propone una amplia cantidad de modelos afectivos que modelan: la relación entre las emociones y la cognición, la relación entre las emociones y el comportamiento, las emociones para evaluar las situaciones, la regulación de emociones, etc. Estos modelos son herramientas útiles para abordar aspectos particulares relacionados con las emociones. Además, se han realizado propuestas computacionales que abordan aspectos específicos sobre la base de teorías psicológicas específicas. En éstas soluciones, la ausencia de una plataforma y/o sistema conceptual dificulta la retroalimentación entre las teorías psicológicas y las propuestas computacionales. Esta tesis sistematiza y formaliza teorías relacionadas con el afecto, lo cual beneficia el intercambio interdisciplinar y la coordinación intradisciplinar, y por tanto, permite el desarrollo de las disciplinas correspondientes. Específicamente esta tesis realiza las siguientes contribuciones: (1) una plataforma teórica que incluye los conceptos y procesos principales que debería poseer un modelo de agentes afectivos con razonamiento práctico; (2) una arquitectura de agentes de propósito general que comparte los conceptos de la plataforma teórica propuesta; (3) un lenguaje formal independiente de la implementación, para diseñar agentes afectivos que poseen la arquitectura propuesta; y (4) un lenguaje de agentes específico para implementar agentes afectivos el cual es un extensión de un lenguaje BDI. Algunos estudios con participantes humanos han ayudado a validar las contribuciones de esta tesis. Estos incluyen juegos clásicos de teoría de juegos y un estudio con 300 participantes, los cuales han proporcionado la información necesaria para evaluar las contribuciones. La validación se ha realizado en tres direcciones: determinar si la propuesta computacional que se ha realizado representa mejor el comportamiento humano que propuestas computacionales tradicionales; determinar si esta propuesta permite mejorar las teorías psicológicas empleadas por defecto; y determinar si el comportamiento de los agentes afectivos propuestos se acerca más al comportamiento humano que el comporProbablement alguns esdeveniments recents ens han conduït a preguntar-nos per què les persones prenen decisions que aparentment són irracionals i que van en contra d'algun tipus de lògica fàcilment comprensible. El fet que aquestes decisions estiguin sota la influència de les emocions sovint explica el que, a primera vista, sembla no tenir una explicació acceptable. En aquest sentit, s'han trobat evidències que proven que les emocions i altres característiques afectives condicionen les decisions més enllà d'una deliberació merament racional. Entendre com les emocions tenen lloc, com canvien i com influeixen en el comportament, ha estat tradicionalment d'interès per a molts camps d'investigació, incloent la psicologia i la neurologia. A més, altres ciències com l'economia conductual, la intel·ligència artificial i, en general, totes les ciències que intenten entendre, explicar o simular el comportament humà, reconeixen l'important paper de les característiques afectives en aquesta tasca. Específicament, la intel·ligència artificial utilitza els resultats obtinguts en psicologia per crear agents que simulen el comportament humà. No obstant això, sovint els esforços individuals d'investigació en el modelatge de l'afecte es solapen, no tenen la suficient integració ni compten amb un sistema conceptual comú. Això limita a les investigacions individuals, que no poden disposar dels beneficis que ofereixen l'intercanvi i la cooperació, i fa més complexa la tasca de simular els processos afectius. Les emocions i teories relacionades han estat classificades, formalitzades i modelades. No obstant això reconeguts investigadors argumenten que un llenguatge formal comú, un sistema conceptual informal i una arquitectura d'agents de propòsit general, milloraran significativament l'intercanvi interdisciplinar i la coordinació intradisciplinar. En la literatura es proposa una àmplia quantitat de models afectius que modelen: la relació entre les emocions i la cognició, la relació entre les emocions i el comportament, les emocions per avaluar les situacions, la regulació d'emocions, etc. Aquests models són eines útils per abordar aspectes particulars relacionats amb les emocions. A més, s'han realitzat propostes computacionals que aborden aspectes específics sobre la base de teories psicològiques específiques. En aquestes solucions, l'absència d'una plataforma i/o sistema conceptual dificulta la retroalimentació entre les teories psicològiques i les propostes computacionals. Aquesta tesi sistematitza i formalitza teories relacionades amb l'afecte, la qual cosa beneficia l'intercanvi interdisciplinar i la coordinació intradisciplinar, i per tant, permet el desenvolupament de les disciplines corresponents. Específicament aquesta tesi realitza les següents contribucions: (1) una plataforma teòrica que inclou els conceptes i processos principals que hauria de posseir un model d'agents afectius amb raonament pràctic; (2) una arquitectura d'agents de propòsit general que comparteix els conceptes de la plataforma teòrica proposta; (3) un llenguatge formal independent de la implementació, per dissenyar agents afectius que posseeixen l'arquitectura proposada; i (4) un llenguatge d'agents específic per implementar agents afectius el qual és un extensió d'un llenguatge BDI. Alguns estudis amb participants humans han ajudat a validar les contribucions d'aquesta tesi. Aquests inclouen jocs clàssics de teoria de jocs i un estudi amb 300 participants, els quals han proporcionat la informació necessària per avaluar les contribucions. La validació s'ha realitzat en tres direccions: determinar si la proposta computacional que s'ha realitzat representa millor el comportament humà que propostes computacionals tradicionals; determinar si aquesta proposta permet millorar les teories psicològiques emprades per defecte; i determinar si el comportament dels agents afectius proposats s'acosta més alAlfonso Espinosa, B. (2017). Agents with Affective Traits for Decision-Making in Complex Environments [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/90497TESI

Agents for educational games and simulations

This book consists mainly of revised papers that were presented at the Agents for Educational Games and Simulation (AEGS) workshop held on May 2, 2011, as part of the Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS) conference in Taipei, Taiwan. The 12 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from various submissions. The papers are organized topical sections on middleware applications, dialogues and learning, adaption and convergence, and agent applications

An Agent-Based Model of Collective Emotions in Online Communities

We develop a agent-based framework to model the emergence of collective emotions, which is applied to online communities. Agents individual emotions are described by their valence and arousal. Using the concept of Brownian agents, these variables change according to a stochastic dynamics, which also considers the feedback from online communication. Agents generate emotional information, which is stored and distributed in a field modeling the online medium. This field affects the emotional states of agents in a non-linear manner. We derive conditions for the emergence of collective emotions, observable in a bimodal valence distribution. Dependent on a saturated or a superlinear feedback between the information field and the agent's arousal, we further identify scenarios where collective emotions only appear once or in a repeated manner. The analytical results are illustrated by agent-based computer simulations. Our framework provides testable hypotheses about the emergence of collective emotions, which can be verified by data from online communities.Comment: European Physical Journal B (in press), version 2 with extended introduction, clarification