9,493 research outputs found
A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links
Computing the shapley value in allocation problems: Approximations and bounds, with an application to the Italian VQR research assessment program
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximized, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money compensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathematical framework to model such problems, in particular the Shapley value is a solution concept widely used for assigning worths to agents in a fair way. Unfortunately, computing this value is a #P-hard problem, so that applying this good theoretical notion is often quite difficult in real-world problems. In this paper, we first review the application of the Shapley value to an allocation problem that models the evaluation of the Italian research structures with a procedure known as VQR. For large universities, the problem involves thousands of agents and goods (here, researchers and their research products). We then describe some useful properties that allow us to greatly simplify many such large instances. Moreover, we propose new algorithms for computing lower bounds and upper bounds of the Shapley value, which in some cases provide the exact result and that can be combined with approximation algorithms. The proposed techniques have been tested on large real-world instances of the VQR research evaluation problem
Allocation Rules for Network Games
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.networks, network games, allocation rules
Effort and synergies in network formation
The aim of this paper is to understand the interactions between productive effort and the creation of synergies that are the sources of technological collaboration agreements, agglomeration, social stratification, etc. We model this interaction in a way that allows us to characterize how agents devote resources to both activities. This permits a fullfledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous investment efforts and to derive unambiguous comparative statics results. In spite of its parsimony that ensures tractability, the model retains enough richness to replicate a (relatively) broad range of empirical regularities displayed by social and economic networks, and is directly estimable to recover is structural parameters.
On stochastic imitation dynamics in large-scale networks
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks,
encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator
dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about
the game structure: they only know their own current utility and the one of
neighbor players contacted through pairwise interactions in a network. In
response to this information, players update their state according to some
stochastic rules. For potential population games and complete interaction
networks, we prove convergence and long-lasting permanence close to the
evolutionary stable strategies of the game. These results refine and extend the
ones known for deterministic imitation dynamics as they account for new
emerging behaviors including meta-stability of the equilibria. Finally, we
discuss extensions of our results beyond the fully mixed case, studying
imitation dynamics where agents interact on complex communication networks.Comment: Extended version of conference paper accepted at ECC 201
Effort and synergies in network formation
The aim of this paper is to understand the interactions between productive effort and the
creation of synergies that are the sources of technological collaboration agreements,
agglomeration, social stratification, etc. We model this interaction in a way that allows
us to characterize how agents devote resources to both activities. This permits a fullfledged
equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous investment
efforts and to derive unambiguous comparative statics results. In spite of its parsimony
that ensures tractability, the model retains enough richness to replicate a (relatively)
broad range of empirical regularities displayed by social and economic networks, and is
directly estimable to recover is structural parameters
Allocation Rules for Network Games
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.Networks, Network Games, Allocation Rules, Cooperative Games
Computing the Shapley value in allocation problems: approximations and bounds, with an application to the Italian VQR research assessment program
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money compensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathematical framework to model such problems, in particular the Shapley value is a solution concept widely used for assigning worths to agents in a fair way. Unfortunately, computing this value is a #P-hard problem, so that applying this good theoretical notion is often quite difficult in real-world problems.
We describe useful properties that allow us to greatly simplify the instances of allocation problems,
without affecting the Shapley value of any player. Moreover, we propose algorithms for computing lower bounds and upper bounds of the Shapley value, which in some cases provide the exact result and that can be combined with approximation algorithms.
The proposed techniques have been implemented and tested on a real-world application of allocation problems, namely, the Italian research assessment program known as VQR (Verifica della Qualità della Ricerca, or Research Quality Assessment)1. For the large university considered in the experiments, the
problem involves thousands of agents and goods (here, researchers and their research products). The
algorithms described in the paper are able to compute the Shapley value for most of those agents, and to
get a good approximation of the Shapley value for all of the
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