1,760 research outputs found
Equilibria, Fixed Points, and Complexity Classes
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium
or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market
equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games
(stochastic and other games); stable configurations of neural networks;
analysing basic stochastic models for evolution like branching processes and
for language like stochastic context-free grammars; and models that incorporate
the basic primitives of probability and recursion like recursive Markov chains.
It is not known whether these problems can be solved in polynomial time. There
are certain common computational principles underlying different types of
equilibria, which are captured by the complexity classes PLS, PPAD, and FIXP.
Representative complete problems for these classes are respectively, pure Nash
equilibria in games where they are guaranteed to exist, (mixed) Nash equilibria
in 2-player normal form games, and (mixed) Nash equilibria in normal form games
with 3 (or more) players. This paper reviews the underlying computational
principles and the corresponding classes
Polynomial-time Computation of Exact Correlated Equilibrium in Compact Games
In a landmark paper, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden described a
polynomial-time algorithm ("Ellipsoid Against Hope") for computing sample
correlated equilibria of concisely-represented games. Recently, Stein, Parrilo
and Ozdaglar showed that this algorithm can fail to find an exact correlated
equilibrium, but can be easily modified to efficiently compute approximate
correlated equilibria. Currently, it remains unresolved whether the algorithm
can be modified to compute an exact correlated equilibrium. We show that it
can, presenting a variant of the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm that
guarantees the polynomial-time identification of exact correlated equilibrium.
Our new algorithm differs from the original primarily in its use of a
separation oracle that produces cuts corresponding to pure-strategy profiles.
As a result, we no longer face the numerical precision issues encountered by
the original approach, and both the resulting algorithm and its analysis are
considerably simplified. Our new separation oracle can be understood as a
derandomization of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden's original separation oracle
via the method of conditional probabilities. Also, the equilibria returned by
our algorithm are distributions with polynomial-sized supports, which are
simpler (in the sense of being representable in fewer bits) than the mixtures
of product distributions produced previously; no tractable algorithm has
previously been proposed for identifying such equilibria.Comment: 15 page
Bounded Rationality
The observation of the actual behavior by economic decision makers in the lab and in the field justifies that bounded rationality has been a generally accepted assumption in many socio-economic models. The goal of this paper is to illustrate the difficulties involved in providing a correct definition of what a rational (or irrational) agent is. In this paper we describe two frameworks that employ different approaches for analyzing bounded rationality. The first is a spatial segregation set-up that encompasses two optimization methodologies: backward induction and forward induction. The main result is that, even under the same state of knowledge, rational and non-rational agents may match their actions. The second framework elaborates on the relationship between irrationality and informational restrictions. We use the beauty contest (Nagel, 1995) as a device to explain this relationship.Behavioral economics, bounded rationality, partial information
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