Increasing the power of the verifier in Quantum Zero Knowledge

In quantum zero knowledge, the assumption was made that the verifier is only using unitary operations. Under this assumption, many nice properties have been shown about quantum zero knowledge, including the fact that Honest-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge (HVQSZK) is equal to Cheating-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge (QSZK) (see [Wat02,Wat06]). In this paper, we study what happens when we allow an honest verifier to flip some coins in addition to using unitary operations. Flipping a coin is a non-unitary operation but doesn't seem at first to enhance the cheating possibilities of the verifier since a classical honest verifier can flip coins. In this setting, we show an unexpected result: any classical Interactive Proof has an Honest-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge proof with coins. Note that in the classical case, honest verifier SZK is no more powerful than SZK and hence it is not believed to contain even NP. On the other hand, in the case of cheating verifiers, we show that Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge where the verifier applies any non-unitary operation is equal to Quantum Zero-Knowledge where the verifier uses only unitaries. One can think of our results in two complementary ways. If we would like to use the honest verifier model as a means to study the general model by taking advantage of their equivalence, then it is imperative to use the unitary definition without coins, since with the general one this equivalence is most probably not true. On the other hand, if we would like to use quantum zero knowledge protocols in a cryptographic scenario where the honest-but-curious model is sufficient, then adding the unitary constraint severely decreases the power of quantum zero knowledge protocols.Comment: 17 pages, 0 figures, to appear in FSTTCS'0

The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited

We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions". The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.Comment: 31 page

Cast-as-Intended Mechanism with Return Codes Based on PETs

We propose a method providing cast-as-intended verifiability for remote electronic voting. The method is based on plaintext equivalence tests (PETs), used to match the cast ballots against the pre-generated encrypted code tables. Our solution provides an attractive balance of security and functional properties. It is based on well-known cryptographic building blocks and relies on standard cryptographic assumptions, which allows for relatively simple security analysis. Our scheme is designed with a built-in fine-grained distributed trust mechanism based on threshold decryption. It, finally, imposes only very little additional computational burden on the voting platform, which is especially important when voters use devices of restricted computational power such as mobile phones. At the same time, the computational cost on the server side is very reasonable and scales well with the increasing ballot size

An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols

Coercion resistance is an important and one of the most intricate security requirements of electronic voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the literature, including definitions based on symbolic models. However, existing definitions in such models are rather restricted in their scope and quite complex. In this paper, we therefore propose a new definition of coercion resistance in a symbolic setting, based on an epistemic approach. Our definition is relatively simple and intuitive. It allows for a fine-grained formulation of coercion resistance and can be stated independently of a specific, symbolic protocol and adversary model. As a proof of concept, we apply our definition to three voting protocols. In particular, we carry out the first rigorous analysis of the recently proposed Civitas system. We precisely identify those conditions under which this system guarantees coercion resistance or fails to be coercion resistant. We also analyze protocols proposed by Lee et al. and Okamoto.Comment: An extended version of a paper from IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 200

Dining Cryptographers with 0.924 Verifiable Collision Resolution

The dining cryptographers protocol implements a multiple access channel in which senders and recipients are anonymous. A problem is that a malicious participant can disrupt communication by deliberately creating collisions. We propose a computationally secure dining cryptographers protocol with collision resolution that achieves a maximum stable throughput of 0.924 messages per round and which allows to easily detect disruptors.Comment: 11 pages, 3 figure