3,283 research outputs found

    Complete tree subset difference broadcast encryption scheme and its analysis

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    The subset difference (SD) method proposed by Naor, Naor and Lotspiech is the most popular broadcast encryption (BE) scheme. It is suitable for real-time applications like Pay-TV and has been suggested for use by the AACS standard for digital rights management in Blu-Ray and HD-DVD discs. The SD method assumes the number of users to be a power of two. We propose the complete tree subset difference (CTSD) method that allows the system to support an arbitrary number of users. In particular, it subsumes the SD method and all results proved for the CTSD method also hold for the SD method. Recurrences are obtained for the CTSD scheme to count the number, N(n, r, h), of possible ways r users in the system of n users can be revoked to result in a transmission overhead or header length of h. The recurrences lead to a polynomial time dynamic programming algorithm for computing N(n, r, h). Further, they provide bounds on the maximum possible header length. A probabilistic analysis is performed to obtain an O(r log n) time algorithm to compute the expected header length in the CTSD scheme. Further, for the SD scheme we obtain an explicit limiting upper bound on the expected header length

    Complete Tree Subset Difference Broadcast Encryption Scheme and its Analysis

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    The Subset Difference (SD) method proposed by Naor, Naor and Lotspiech is the most popular broadcast encryption (BE) scheme. It is suitable for real-time applications like Pay-TV and has been suggested for use by the AACS standard for digital rights management in Blu-Ray and HD-DVD discs. The SD method assumes the number of users to be a power of two. We propose the Complete Tree Subset Difference (CTSD) method that allows the system to support an arbitrary number of users. In particular, it subsumes the SD method and all results proved for the CTSD method also hold for the SD method. Recurrences are obtained for the CTSD scheme to count the number, N(n,r,h)N(n,r,h), of possible ways rr users in the system of nn users can be revoked to result in a transmission overhead or header length of hh. The recurrences lead to a polynomial time dynamic programming algorithm for computing N(n,r,h)N(n,r,h). Further, they provide bounds on the maximum possible header length. A probabilistic analysis is performed to obtain an O(rlogn)O(r \log{n}) time algorithm to compute the expected header length in the CTSD scheme. Further, for the SD scheme we obtain an explicit limiting upper bound on the expected header length

    A Survey on Wireless Sensor Network Security

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    Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently attracted a lot of interest in the research community due their wide range of applications. Due to distributed nature of these networks and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their proper functioning. This problem is more critical if the network is deployed for some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical battlefield. Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life deployment scenarios. Due to resource constraints in the sensor nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large overhead of computation and communication are infeasible in WSNs. Security in sensor networks is, therefore, a particularly challenging task. This paper discusses the current state of the art in security mechanisms for WSNs. Various types of attacks are discussed and their countermeasures presented. A brief discussion on the future direction of research in WSN security is also included.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figures, 2 table

    On the mean number of encryptions for tree-based broadcast encryption schemes

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    AbstractThe challenge of stateless-receiver broadcast encryption lies in minimizing storage and the number of encryptions while maintaining system security. Tree-based key distribution schemes offer the best known trade-off between the two parameters. Examples include the complete subtree scheme [D. Wallner, et al., Internet draft, http://www.ietf.org/ID.html [10]; C.K. Wong, et al., in: Proc. SIGCOMM, 1998, pp. 68–79 [11]], the subset difference scheme [D. Naor, et al., in: CRYPTO 2001, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2139, 2001, pp. 41–62 [7]], and the layered subset difference scheme [D. Halevy, A. Shamir, in: CRYPTO 2002, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2442, 2002, pp. 47–60 [5]]. We introduce generating functions for this family of schemes, which lead to analysis of the mean number of encryptions over all privileged sets of users. We also derive the mean number of encryptions when the number of privileged users is fixed. We expect that the techniques introduced as well as the results in this work will find applications in related areas

    Optimal subset-difference broadcast encryption with free riders

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    Cataloged from PDF version of article.Broadcast encryption (BE) deals with secure transmission of a message to a group of receivers such that only an authorized subset of receivers can decrypt the message. The transmission cost of a BE system can be reduced considerably if a limited number of free riders can be tolerated in the system. in this paper, we study the problem of how to optimally place a given number of free riders in a subset-difference (SD)-based BE system, which is currently the most efficient BE scheme in use and has also been incorporated in standards, and we propose a polynomial-time optimal placement algorithm and three more efficient heuristics for this problem. Simulation experiments show that SD-based BE schemes can benefit significantly from the proposed algorithms. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved

    Distribution of the Number of Encryptions in Revocation Schemes for Stateless Receivers

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    We study the number of encryptions necessary to revoke a set of users in the complete subtree scheme (CST) and the subset-difference scheme (SD). These are well-known tree based broadcast encryption schemes. Park and Blake in: Journal of Discrete Algorithms, vol. 4, 2006, pp. 215--238, give the mean number of encryptions for these schemes. We continue their analysis and show that the limiting distribution of the number of encryptions for these schemes is normal. This implies that the mean numbers of Park and Blake are good estimates for the number of necessary encryptions used by these schemes

    Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

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    This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio
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