Playing Stackelberg Opinion Optimization with Randomized Algorithms for Combinatorial Strategies

From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We furthermore define a two-player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by letting the player under study as the first-mover minimize the sum of expressed opinions by doing so-called "internal opinion design", knowing that the other adversarial player as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also conducting her own internal opinion design. We propose for the min player to play the "follow-the-perturbed-leader" algorithm in such Stackelberg game, obtaining losses depending on the other adversarial player's play. Since our strategy of subset selection is combinatorial in nature, the probabilities in a distribution over all the strategies would be too many to be enumerated one by one. Thus, we design a randomized algorithm to produce a (randomized) pure strategy. We show that the strategy output by the randomized algorithm for the min player is essentially an approximate equilibrium strategy against the other adversarial player

Effects of Time Horizons on Influence Maximization in the Voter Dynamics

In this paper we analyze influence maximization in the voter model with an active strategic and a passive influencing party in non-stationary settings. We thus explore the dependence of optimal influence allocation on the time horizons of the strategic influencer. We find that on undirected heterogeneous networks, for short time horizons, influence is maximized when targeting low-degree nodes, while for long time horizons influence maximization is achieved when controlling hub nodes. Furthermore, we show that for short and intermediate time scales influence maximization can exploit knowledge of (transient) opinion configurations. More in detail, we find two rules. First, nodes with states differing from the strategic influencer's goal should be targeted. Second, if only few nodes are initially aligned with the strategic influencer, nodes subject to opposing influence should be avoided, but when many nodes are aligned, an optimal influencer should shadow opposing influence.Comment: 22 page

Holistic Influence Maximization: Combining Scalability and Efficiency with Opinion-Aware Models

The steady growth of graph data from social networks has resulted in wide-spread research in finding solutions to the influence maximization problem. In this paper, we propose a holistic solution to the influence maximization (IM) problem. (1) We introduce an opinion-cum-interaction (OI) model that closely mirrors the real-world scenarios. Under the OI model, we introduce a novel problem of Maximizing the Effective Opinion (MEO) of influenced users. We prove that the MEO problem is NP-hard and cannot be approximated within a constant ratio unless P=NP. (2) We propose a heuristic algorithm OSIM to efficiently solve the MEO problem. To better explain the OSIM heuristic, we first introduce EaSyIM - the opinion-oblivious version of OSIM, a scalable algorithm capable of running within practical compute times on commodity hardware. In addition to serving as a fundamental building block for OSIM, EaSyIM is capable of addressing the scalability aspect - memory consumption and running time, of the IM problem as well. Empirically, our algorithms are capable of maintaining the deviation in the spread always within 5% of the best known methods in the literature. In addition, our experiments show that both OSIM and EaSyIM are effective, efficient, scalable and significantly enhance the ability to analyze real datasets.Comment: ACM SIGMOD Conference 2016, 18 pages, 29 figure

Optimal Multiphase Investment Strategies for Influencing Opinions in a Social Network

We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, where two camps aim to maximize adoption of their opinions by the population. In particular, we consider the possibility of campaigning in multiple phases, where the final opinion of a node in a phase acts as its initial biased opinion for the following phase. Using an extension of the popular DeGroot-Friedkin model, we formulate the utility functions of the camps, and show that they involve what can be interpreted as multiphase Katz centrality. Focusing on two phases, we analytically derive Nash equilibrium investment strategies, and the extent of loss that a camp would incur if it acted myopically. Our simulation study affirms that nodes attributing higher weightage to initial biases necessitate higher investment in the first phase, so as to influence these biases for the terminal phase. We then study the setting in which a camp's influence on a node depends on its initial bias. For single camp, we present a polynomial time algorithm for determining an optimal way to split the budget between the two phases. For competing camps, we show the existence of Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions, and that they can be computed in polynomial time

Opinion dynamics with varying susceptibility to persuasion

A long line of work in social psychology has studied variations in people's susceptibility to persuasion -- the extent to which they are willing to modify their opinions on a topic. This body of literature suggests an interesting perspective on theoretical models of opinion formation by interacting parties in a network: in addition to considering interventions that directly modify people's intrinsic opinions, it is also natural to consider interventions that modify people's susceptibility to persuasion. In this work, we adopt a popular model for social opinion dynamics, and we formalize the opinion maximization and minimization problems where interventions happen at the level of susceptibility. We show that modeling interventions at the level of susceptibility lead to an interesting family of new questions in network opinion dynamics. We find that the questions are quite different depending on whether there is an overall budget constraining the number of agents we can target or not. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding the optimal target-set to optimize the sum of opinions when there are no budget constraints on the size of the target-set. We show that this problem is NP-hard when there is a budget, and that the objective function is neither submodular nor supermodular. Finally, we propose a heuristic for the budgeted opinion optimization and show its efficacy at finding target-sets that optimize the sum of opinions compared on real world networks, including a Twitter network with real opinion estimates

Maximizing the Diversity of Exposure in a Social Network

Social-media platforms have created new ways for citizens to stay informed and participate in public debates. However, to enable a healthy environment for information sharing, social deliberation, and opinion formation, citizens need to be exposed to sufficiently diverse viewpoints that challenge their assumptions, instead of being trapped inside filter bubbles. In this paper, we take a step in this direction and propose a novel approach to maximize the diversity of exposure in a social network. We formulate the problem in the context of information propagation, as a task of recommending a small number of news articles to selected users. We propose a realistic setting where we take into account content and user leanings, and the probability of further sharing an article. This setting allows us to capture the balance between maximizing the spread of information and ensuring the exposure of users to diverse viewpoints. The resulting problem can be cast as maximizing a monotone and submodular function subject to a matroid constraint on the allocation of articles to users. It is a challenging generalization of the influence maximization problem. Yet, we are able to devise scalable approximation algorithms by introducing a novel extension to the notion of random reverse-reachable sets. We experimentally demonstrate the efficiency and scalability of our algorithm on several real-world datasets

Defensive Resource Allocation in Social Networks

In this work, we are interested on the analysis of competing marketing campaigns between an incumbent who dominates the market and a challenger who wants to enter the market. We are interested in (a) the simultaneous decision of how many resources to allocate to their potential customers to advertise their products for both marketing campaigns, and (b) the optimal allocation on the situation in which the incumbent knows the entrance of the challenger and thus can predict its response. Applying results from game theory, we characterize these optimal strategic resource allocations for the voter model of social networks.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1402.538