We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a
competitive setting, where two camps aim to maximize adoption of their opinions
by the population. In particular, we consider the possibility of campaigning in
multiple phases, where the final opinion of a node in a phase acts as its
initial biased opinion for the following phase. Using an extension of the
popular DeGroot-Friedkin model, we formulate the utility functions of the
camps, and show that they involve what can be interpreted as multiphase Katz
centrality. Focusing on two phases, we analytically derive Nash equilibrium
investment strategies, and the extent of loss that a camp would incur if it
acted myopically. Our simulation study affirms that nodes attributing higher
weightage to initial biases necessitate higher investment in the first phase,
so as to influence these biases for the terminal phase. We then study the
setting in which a camp's influence on a node depends on its initial bias. For
single camp, we present a polynomial time algorithm for determining an optimal
way to split the budget between the two phases. For competing camps, we show
the existence of Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions, and that they
can be computed in polynomial time