Low Size-Complexity Inductive Logic Programming: The East-West Challenge Considered as a Problem in Cost-Sensitive Classification

The Inductive Logic Programming community has considered proof-complexity and model-complexity, but, until recently, size-complexity has received little attention. Recently a challenge was issued "to the international computing community" to discover low size-complexity Prolog programs for classifying trains. The challenge was based on a problem first proposed by Ryszard Michalski, 20 years ago. We interpreted the challenge as a problem in cost-sensitive classification and we applied a recently developed cost-sensitive classifier to the competition. Our algorithm was relatively successful (we won a prize). This paper presents our algorithm and analyzes the results of the competition

Thinking about Attention in Games: Backward and Forward Induction

Behavioral economics improves economic analysis by using psychological regularity to suggest limits on rationality and self-interest (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein 2003). Expressing these regularities in formal terms permits productive theorizing, suggests new experiments, can contribute to psychology, and can be used to shape economic policies which make normal people better off

Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac

Mining State-Based Models from Proof Corpora

Interactive theorem provers have been used extensively to reason about various software/hardware systems and mathematical theorems. The key challenge when using an interactive prover is finding a suitable sequence of proof steps that will lead to a successful proof requires a significant amount of human intervention. This paper presents an automated technique that takes as input examples of successful proofs and infers an Extended Finite State Machine as output. This can in turn be used to generate proofs of new conjectures. Our preliminary experiments show that the inferred models are generally accurate (contain few false-positive sequences) and that representing existing proofs in such a way can be very useful when guiding new ones.Comment: To Appear at Conferences on Intelligent Computer Mathematics 201

Correlated Equilibria in Competitive Staff Selection Problem

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.Comment: The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Los(1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 200