An Efficient Algorithm for Monitoring Practical TPTL Specifications

We provide a dynamic programming algorithm for the monitoring of a fragment of Timed Propositional Temporal Logic (TPTL) specifications. This fragment of TPTL, which is more expressive than Metric Temporal Logic, is characterized by independent time variables which enable the elicitation of complex real-time requirements. For this fragment, we provide an efficient polynomial time algorithm for off-line monitoring of finite traces. Finally, we provide experimental results on a prototype implementation of our tool in order to demonstrate the feasibility of using our tool in practical applications

Runtime Verification of Temporal Properties over Out-of-order Data Streams

We present a monitoring approach for verifying systems at runtime. Our approach targets systems whose components communicate with the monitors over unreliable channels, where messages can be delayed or lost. In contrast to prior works, whose property specification languages are limited to propositional temporal logics, our approach handles an extension of the real-time logic MTL with freeze quantifiers for reasoning about data values. We present its underlying theory based on a new three-valued semantics that is well suited to soundly and completely reason online about event streams in the presence of message delay or loss. We also evaluate our approach experimentally. Our prototype implementation processes hundreds of events per second in settings where messages are received out of order.Comment: long version of the CAV 2017 pape

LTLf and LDLf Monitoring: A Technical Report

Runtime monitoring is one of the central tasks to provide operational decision support to running business processes, and check on-the-fly whether they comply with constraints and rules. We study runtime monitoring of properties expressed in LTL on finite traces (LTLf) and in its extension LDLf. LDLf is a powerful logic that captures all monadic second order logic on finite traces, which is obtained by combining regular expressions and LTLf, adopting the syntax of propositional dynamic logic (PDL). Interestingly, in spite of its greater expressivity, LDLf has exactly the same computational complexity of LTLf. We show that LDLf is able to capture, in the logic itself, not only the constraints to be monitored, but also the de-facto standard RV-LTL monitors. This makes it possible to declaratively capture monitoring metaconstraints, and check them by relying on usual logical services instead of ad-hoc algorithms. This, in turn, enables to flexibly monitor constraints depending on the monitoring state of other constraints, e.g., "compensation" constraints that are only checked when others are detected to be violated. In addition, we devise a direct translation of LDLf formulas into nondeterministic automata, avoiding to detour to Buechi automata or alternating automata, and we use it to implement a monitoring plug-in for the PROM suite

A UML-based static verification framework for security

Secure software engineering is a new research area that has been proposed to address security issues during the development of software systems. This new area of research advocates that security characteristics should be considered from the early stages of the software development life cycle and should not be added as another layer in the system on an ad-hoc basis after the system is built. In this paper, we describe a UML-based Static Verification Framework (USVF) to support the design and verification of secure software systems in early stages of the software development life-cycle taking into consideration security and general requirements of the software system. USVF performs static verification on UML models consisting of UML class and state machine diagrams extended by an action language. We present an operational semantics of UML models, define a property specification language designed to reason about temporal and general properties of UML state machines using the semantic domains of the former, and implement the model checking process by translating models and properties into Promela, the input language of the SPIN model checker. We show that the methodology can be applied to the verification of security properties by representing the main aspects of security, namely availability, integrity and confidentiality, in the USVF property specification language