The Computational Power of Beeps

In this paper, we study the quantity of computational resources (state machine states and/or probabilistic transition precision) needed to solve specific problems in a single hop network where nodes communicate using only beeps. We begin by focusing on randomized leader election. We prove a lower bound on the states required to solve this problem with a given error bound, probability precision, and (when relevant) network size lower bound. We then show the bound tight with a matching upper bound. Noting that our optimal upper bound is slow, we describe two faster algorithms that trade some state optimality to gain efficiency. We then turn our attention to more general classes of problems by proving that once you have enough states to solve leader election with a given error bound, you have (within constant factors) enough states to simulate correctly, with this same error bound, a logspace TM with a constant number of unary input tapes: allowing you to solve a large and expressive set of problems. These results identify a key simplicity threshold beyond which useful distributed computation is possible in the beeping model.Comment: Extended abstract to appear in the Proceedings of the International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2015

Scalable and Secure Aggregation in Distributed Networks

We consider the problem of computing an aggregation function in a \emph{secure} and \emph{scalable} way. Whereas previous distributed solutions with similar security guarantees have a communication cost of $O(n^3)$, we present a distributed protocol that requires only a communication complexity of $O(n\log^3 n)$, which we prove is near-optimal. Our protocol ensures perfect security against a computationally-bounded adversary, tolerates $(1/2-\epsilon)n$ malicious nodes for any constant $1/2 > \epsilon > 0$ (not depending on $n$), and outputs the exact value of the aggregated function with high probability

Breaking the O(n^2) Bit Barrier: Scalable Byzantine agreement with an Adaptive Adversary

We describe an algorithm for Byzantine agreement that is scalable in the sense that each processor sends only $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ bits, where $n$ is the total number of processors. Our algorithm succeeds with high probability against an \emph{adaptive adversary}, which can take over processors at any time during the protocol, up to the point of taking over arbitrarily close to a 1/3 fraction. We assume synchronous communication but a \emph{rushing} adversary. Moreover, our algorithm works in the presence of flooding: processors controlled by the adversary can send out any number of messages. We assume the existence of private channels between all pairs of processors but make no other cryptographic assumptions. Finally, our algorithm has latency that is polylogarithmic in $n$. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement against an adaptive adversary, while requiring $o(n^{2})$ total bits of communication