17 research outputs found

    Universal Forgery and Key Recovery Attacks on ELmD Authenticated Encryption Algorithm

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    In this paper, we provide a security analysis of ELmD: a block cipher based Encrypt-Linear-mix-Decrypt authentication mode. As being one of the second-round CAESAR candidate, it is claimed to provide misuse resistant against forgeries and security against block-wise adaptive adversaries as well as 128-bit security against key recovery attacks. We scrutinize ElmD in such a way that we provide universal forgery attacks as well as key recovery attacks. First, based on the collision attacks on similar structures such as Marble, AEZ, and COPA, we present universal forgery attacks. Second, by exploiting the structure of ELmD, we acquire ability to query to the block cipher used in ELmD. Finally, for one of the proposed versions of ELmD, we mount key recovery attacks reducing the effective key strength by more than 60 bits

    Can Caesar Beat Galois?

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    The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability and Robustness (CAESAR) has as its official goal to “identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer advantages over [the Galois-Counter Mode with AES]” and are suitable for widespread adoption.” Each of the 15 candidate schemes competing in the currently ongoing 3rd round of CAESAR must clearly declare its security claims, i.e. whether it can tolerate nonce misuse, and what is the maximal data complexity for which security is guaranteed. These claims appear to be valid for all 15 candidates. Interpreting “Robustness” in CAESAR as the ability to mitigate damage when security guarantees are void, we describe attacks with 64-bit complexity or above, and/or with nonce reuse for each of the 15 candidates. We then classify the candidates depending on how powerful does an attacker need to be to mount (semi-)universal forgeries, decryption attacks, or key recoveries. Rather than invalidating the security claims of any of the candidates, our results provide an additional criterion for evaluating the security that candidates deliver, which can be useful for e.g. breaking ties in the final CAESAR discussions

    Under Pressure: Security of Caesar Candidates beyond their Guarantees

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    The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability and Robustness (CAESAR) has as its official goal to ``identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer advantages over AES-GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption.\u27\u27 Each of the 15 candidate schemes competing in the currently ongoing 3rd round of CAESAR must clearly declare its security claims, i.a. whether or not it can tolerate nonce misuse, and what is the maximal data complexity for which security is guaranteed. These claims appear to be valid for all 15 candidates. Interpreting Robustness in CAESAR as the ability to mitigate damage even if security guarantees are void, we describe attacks with birthday complexity or beyond, and/or with nonce reuse for each of the 15 candidates. We then sort the candidates into classes depending on how powerful does an attacker need to be to mount (semi-)universal forgeries, decryption attacks, or key recoveries. Rather than invalidating the security claims of any of the candidates, our results provide an additional criterion for evaluating the security that candidates deliver, which can be useful for e.g. breaking ties in the final CAESAR discussions

    General Classification of the Authenticated Encryption Schemes for the CAESAR Competition

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    An Authenticated encryption scheme is a scheme which provides privacy and integrity by using a secret key. In 2013, CAESAR (the ``Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness\u27\u27) was co-founded by NIST and Dan Bernstein with the aim of finding authenticated encryption schemes that offer advantages over AES-GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption. The first round started with 57 candidates in March 2014; and nine of these first-round candidates where broken and withdrawn from the competition. The remaining 48 candidates went through an intense process of review, analysis and comparison. While the cryptographic community benefits greatly from the manifold different submission designs, their sheer number implies a challenging amount of study. This paper provides an easy-to-grasp overview over functional aspects, security parameters, and robustness offerings by the CAESAR candidates, clustered by their underlying designs (block-cipher-, stream-cipher-, permutation-/sponge-, compression-function-based, dedicated). After intensive review and analysis of all 48 candidates by the community, the CAESAR committee selected only 30 candidates for the second round. The announcement for the third round candidates was made on 15th August 2016 and 15 candidates were chosen for the third round

    Universal Forgery with Birthday Paradox: Application to Blockcipher-based Message Authentication Codes and Authenticated Encryptions

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    An universal forgery attack means that for any given message MM, an adversary without the key can forge the corresponding Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag τ\tau, and the pair (M,τ)(M,\tau) can be verified with probability 1. For a idea MAC, the universal forgery attack should be infeasible to be implemented, whose complexity is believed to be min{(2n,2k)(2^n, 2^k)} queries in the classic setting, where nn is the tag length and kk is the key length of the MAC, respectively. In this paper, we launch a general universal forgery attack to some blockcipher-based MACs and authenticated encryptions (AEs) using birthday attack, whose complexity is about O(2n/2)O(2^{n/2}) queries in the classic setting. The attack shows that such MACs and AEs are totally insecure. However, this attack is not applicable in the quantum model, since no inclusion of period in the input messages is guaranteed. We also propose other generic universal forgery attacks using collision finding with structural input messages with complexity of O(2n/2)O(2^{n/2}), by birthday paradox in the classic setting. Since our attacks are based on the collision finding with fixed but unknown differences (or period), such attacks can also be implemented with only O(n)O(n) queries using \textit{Simon\u27s} algorithm in the quantum model, which shows that such MACs and AEs are completely broken in the quantum model. Our attacks can be applied to CBC-MAC, XCBC, EMAC, OMAC, CMAC, PC-MAC, MT-MAC, PMAC, PMAC with parity, LightMAC and some of their variants. Moreover, such attacks are also applicable to the authenticated encryptions of the third round of the CAESAR candidates: CLOC, SILC, AEZ, COLM (including COPA and ELmD) and Deoxys

    Quantum Key-Recovery on full AEZ

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    International audienceAEZ is an authenticated encryption algorithm, submitted to the CAESAR competition. It has been selected for the third round of the competition. While some classical analysis on the algorithm have been published, the cost of these attacks is beyond the security claimed by the designers. In this paper, we show that all the versions of AEZ are completely broken against a quantum adversary. For this, we propose a generalisation of Simon's algorithm for quantum period finding that allows to build efficient attacks

    Reforgeability of Authenticated Encryption Schemes

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    This work pursues the idea of multi-forgery attacks as introduced by Ferguson in 2002. We recoin reforgeability for the complexity of obtaining further forgeries once a first forgery has succeeded. First, we introduce a security notion for the integrity (in terms of reforgeability) of authenticated encryption schemes: j-Int-CTXT, which is derived from the notion INT-CTXT. Second, we define an attack scenario called j-IV-Collision Attack (j-IV-CA), wherein an adversary tries to construct j forgeries provided a first forgery. The term collision in the name stems from the fact that we assume the first forgery to be the result from an internal collision within the processing of the associated data and/or the nonce. Next, we analyze the resistance to j-IV-CAs of classical nonce-based AE schemes (CCM, CWC, EAX, GCM) as well as all 3rd-round candidates of the CAESAR competition. The analysis is done in the nonce-respecting and the nonce-ignoring setting. We find that none of the considered AE schemes provides full built-in resistance to j-IV-CAs. Based on this insight, we briefly discuss two alternative design strategies to resist j-IV-CAs

    Universal Forgery Attack against GCM-RUP

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    International audienceAuthenticated encryption (AE) schemes are widely used to secure communications because they can guarantee both confidentiality and authenticity of a message. In addition to the standard AE security notion, some recent schemes offer extra robustness, i.e. they maintain security in some misuse scenarios. In particular, Ashur, Dunkelman and Luykx proposed a generic AE construction at CRYPTO'17 that is secure even when releasing unverified plaintext (the RUP setting), and a concrete instantiation, GCM-RUP. The designers proved that GCM-RUP is secure up to the birthday bound in the nonce-respecting model. In this paper, we perform a birthday-bound universal forgery attack against GCM-RUP, matching the bound of the proof. While there are simple distinguishing attacks with birthday complexity on GCM-RUP, our attack is much stronger: we have a partial key recovery leading to universal forgeries. For reference, the best known universal forgery attack against GCM requires 2 2n/3 operations, and many schemes do not have any known universal forgery attacks faster than 2 n. This suggests that GCM-RUP offers a different security trade-off than GCM: stronger protection in the RUP setting, but more fragile when the data complexity reaches the birthday bound. In order to avoid this attack, we suggest a minor modification of GCM-RUP that seems to offer better robustness at the birthday bound

    Provably Secure Authenticated Encryption

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    Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive that ensures confidentiality and authenticity of processed messages at the same time. The research of AE as a primitive in its own right started in 2000. The security goals of AE were captured in formal definitions in the tradition in the tradition of provable security (such as NAE, MRAE, OAE, RAE or the RUP), where the security of a scheme is formally proven assuming the security of an underlying building block. The prevailing syntax moved to nonce-based AE with associated data (which is an additional input that gets authenticated, but not encrypted). Other types of AE schemes appeared as well, e.g. ones that supported stateful sessions. Numerous AE schemes were designed; in the early years, these were almost exclusively blockcipher modes of operation, most notably OCB in 2001, CCM in 2003 and GCM in 2004. At the same time, issues were discovered both with the security and applicability of the most popular AE schemes, and other applications of symmetric key cryptography. As a response, the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) was started in 2013. Its goals were to identify a portfolio of new, secure and reliable AE schemes that would satisfy the needs of practical applications, and also to boost the research in the area of AE. Prompted by CAESAR, 57 new schemes were designed, new types of constructions that gained popularity appeared (such as the Sponge-based AE schemes), and new notions of security were proposed (such as RAE). The final portfolio of the CAESAR competition should be announced in 2018. In this thesis, we push the state of the art in the field of AE in several directions. All of them are related to provable security, in one way, or another. We propose OMD, the first provably secure dedicated AE scheme that is based on a compression function. We further modify OMD to achieve nonce misuse-resistant security (MRAE). We also propose another provably secure variant of OMD called pure OMD, which enjoys a great improvement of performance over OMD. Inspired by the modifications that gave rise to pure OMD, we turn to the popular Sponge-based AE schemes and prove that similar measures can also be applied to the keyed Sponge and keyed Duplex (a variant of the Sponge), allowing a substantial increase of performance without an impact on security. We then address definitional aspects of AE. We critically evaluate the security notion of OAE, whose authors claimed that it provides the best possible security for online schemes under nonce reuse. We challenge these claims, and discuss what are the meaningful requirements for online AE schemes. Based on our findings, we formulate a new definition of online AE security under nonce-reuse, and demonstrate its feasibility. We next turn our attention to the security of nonce-based AE schemes under stretch misuse; i.e. when a scheme is used with varying ciphertext expansion under the same key, even though it should not be. We argue that varying the stretch is plausible, and formulate several notions that capture security in presence of variable stretch. We establish their relations to previous notions, and demonstrate the feasibility of security in this setting. We finally depart from provable security, with the intention to complement it. We compose a survey of universal forgeries, decryption attacks and key recovery attacks on 3rd round CAESAR candidates

    Key Committing Security of AEZ and More

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    For an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) scheme, the key committing security refers to the security notion of whether the adversary can produce a pair of distinct input tuples, including the key, that result in the same output. While the key committing security of various nonce-based AEAD schemes is known, the security analysis of Robust AE (RAE) is largely unexplored. In particular, we are interested in the key committing security of AEAD schemes built on the Encode-then-Encipher (EtE) approach from a wide block cipher. We first consider AEZ v5, the classical and the first dedicated RAE that employs the EtE approach. We focus our analysis on the core part of AEZ to show our best attacks depending on the length of the ciphertext expansion. In the general case where the Tweakable Block Cipher (TBC) is assumed to be ideal, we show a birthday attack and a matching provable security result. AEZ adopts a simpler key schedule and the prove-then-prune approach in the full specification, and we show a practical attack against it by exploiting the simplicity of the key schedule. The complexity is 227, and we experimentally verify the correctness with a concrete example. We also cover two AEAD schemes based on EtE. One is built on Adiantum, and the other one is built on HCTR2, which are two wide block ciphers that are used in real applications. We present key committing attacks against these schemes when used in EtE and matching proofs for particular cases
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