Lessons From the Debt-Deflation Theory of Sudden Stops

This paper reports results for a class of dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models with credit constraints that can account for some of the empirical regularities of the Sudden Stop phenomenon of recent emerging markets crises. In these models, credit constraints set in motion Irving Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism and they bind as an endogenous equilibrium outcome when agents are highly indebted. The quantitative predictions of these models yield three key lessons: (1) Sudden Stops can occur as an endogenous response to typical realizations of adverse shocks to fundamentals, in environments in which agents plan their actions taking credit constraints and expectations of Sudden Stops into account. (2) Credit constraints cause output declines during Sudden Stops when collateral constraints limit debt to a fraction of the market value of capital, when there are limits on access to working capital, or when debt-deflation lowers the value of the marginal product of factors of production. (3) The debt-deflation mechanism has significant quantitative effects in terms of the amplification, asymmetry and persistence of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to standard shocks, and in the occurrence of Sudden Stops as infrequent events nested within regular business cycles. Precautionary saving rules out the largest Sudden Stops from the stochastic stationary state, but Sudden Stops remain a positive-probability event in the long run.

Financial amplification mechanisms and the Federal Reserve’s supply of liquidity during the crisis

New York Fed economists Asani Sarkar and Jeffrey Shrader examine the Federal Reserve’s recent liquidity actions in the context of studies on financial amplification mechanisms, whereby an initial financial sector shock triggers substantially larger shocks elsewhere in the sector and in the broader economy. Presented at "Central Bank Liquidity Tools and Perspectives on Regulatory Reform" a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 19-20, 2009.Federal Reserve System ; Liquidity (Economics) ; Financial crises

Quantitative Implication of A Debt-Deflation Theory of Sudden Stops and Asset Prices

This paper shows that the quantitative predictions of an equilibrium asset pricing model with financial frictions are consistent with the large consumption and current-account reversals and asset-price collapses observed in the "Sudden Stops" of emerging markets crises. Margin requirements set a collateral constraint on foreign borrowing by domestic agents. Foreign traders incur costs in trading assets with domestic agents. Margin constraints bind occasionally depending on equilibrium portfolios and asset prices. When the constraints do not bind, productivity shocks cause standard real-business-cycle effects. When the constraints bind, shocks of the same magnitude cause strikingly different effects that vary with the leverage ratio and the liquidity of asset markets. With high leverage and liquid markets, the shocks trigger margin calls forcing "fire sales" of assets. Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism causes subsequent rounds of margin calls, a fall in asset prices and large consumption and current account reversals. The size of the price decline depends on trading costs parameters because these parameters determine the price elasticity of the foreign traders' asset demand function. Price declines of the magnitude observed in the data require a less-than-unitary price elasticity. Precautionary saving makes Sudden Stops infrequent in the long run so that the model can explain both regular business cycles and the unusually large reversals of consumption and current accounts associated with Sudden Stops.

Is Private Leverage Excessive?

I examine whether a benevolent government can improve on the free market allocation by setting capital requirements for private borrowers in a stochastic model with collateral constraints. Previous theoretical studies have found that when asset prices enter into bor- rowing constraints, pecuniary externalities between atomistic agents can make the laissez faire equilibrium constrained ine¢ cient. For reasonable parameter values, I find that, quan- titatively, the answer is 'no', private and government leverage choices coincide. Limiting private leverage by imposing capital requirements has the beneficial e¤ect of dampening the effects of the collateral amplification mechanism. This reduces fire sales in recessions and limits the negative externality that individual asset sales have on other credit constrained borrowers. However, we find that capital requirements are a blunt tool. They tax the activities of highly productive entrepreneurs and reduce the amount they produce in equilibrium. This reduces total factor productivity and steady state consumption. In the end, society faces a choice between high but unstable consumption in the free borrowing world and low but stable consumption in the regulated world. The government chooses the former.Collateral constraints, Capital Requirements

On the amplification role of collateral constraints

Following the seminal contribution of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the role of collateral constraints for business cycle fluctuations has been highlighted by several authors and collateralized debt is becoming a popular feature of business cycle models. In contrast, Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) demonstrate that collateral constraints per se are unable to propagate and amplify exogenous shocks, unless unorthodox assumptions on preferences and production technologies are made. The aim of this paper is to examine the contribution of costly debt enforcement procedures in the amplification of business cycle fluctuations through collateral constraints. We show that for realistic degrees of inefficiency, collateral constraints can significantly amplify the effects of productivity shocks on output even under standard assumptions on preferences and technology.business cycle, debt enforcement procedures, credit frictions

Putting the Brakes on Sudden Stops: The Financial Frictions-Moral Hazard Tradeoff of Asset Price Guarantees

The hypothesis that Sudden Stops to capital inflows in emerging economies may be caused by global capital market frictions, such as collateral constraints and trading costs, suggests that Sudden Stops could be prevented by offering price guarantees on the emerging-markets asset class. Providing these guarantees is a risky endeavor, however, because they introduce a moral-hazard-like incentive similar to those that are also viewed as a cause of emerging markets crises. This paper studies this financial frictions-moral hazard tradeoff using an equilibrium asset-pricing model in which margin constraints, trading costs, and ex-ante price guarantees interact in the determination of asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics. In the absence of guarantees, margin calls and trading costs create distortions that produce Sudden Stops driven by occasionally binding credit constraints and Irving Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism. Price guarantees contain the asset deflation by creating another distortion that props up the foreign investors' demand for emerging markets assets. Quantitative simulation analysis shows the strong interaction of these two distortions in driving the dynamics of asset prices, consumption and the current account. Price guarantees are found to be effective for containing Sudden Stops but at the cost of introducing potentially large distortions that could lead to 'overvaluation' of emerging markets assets.

Bank Lending, Housing and Spreads

The framework presented in this paper takes its cue from recent financial events and attempts to develop a tractable framework for policy analysis of macro-linkages, in particular a first attempt at the integration of an independent profit-maximising banking sector that lends to and borrows from agents in the economy, and through which changes in the monetary policy rate by the central bank are transmitted. The inter-linkages between housing and the role of the banking sector in the transmission of monetary policy is emphasized. Two competing effects are highlighted: (i) a financial accelerator channel, due to the presence of collateralized borrowers, and (ii) a banking attenuator effect, which crucially arises from the spread in interest rates caused by the introduction of monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries. We show how the classical amplification mechanism explored in models of private borrowing between collaterally-constrained 'impatient' households and unconstrained 'patient' households, such as those put forward by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), is counteracted by the banking attenuator effect, given an endogenous steady state spread between loan and savings rates. Attenuation occurs therefore even under the assumption of flexible interest rates. This effect is further magnified when sluggishness in the interest rate-setting mechanism is introduced.bank lending; housing; liquidity; credit; staggered interest rate-setting; collateral constraints

Do credit constraints amplify macroeconomic fluctuations?

Previous studies on financial frictions have been unable to establish the empirical significance of credit constraints in macroeconomic fluctuations. This paper argues that the muted impact of credit constraints stems from the absence of a mechanism to explain the observed persistent comovements between housing prices and business investment. We develop such a mechanism by incorporating two key features into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model: We identify shocks that shift the demand for collateral assets and allow productive agents to be credit-constrained. A combination of these two features enables our model to successfully generate an empirically important mechanism that amplifies and propagates macroeconomic fluctuations through credit constraints.