37,750 research outputs found
Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms
I go deep into the biology of the human organism to argue that the psychological features and functions of persons are realized by cellular and molecular parallel distributed processing networks dispersed throughout the whole body. Persons supervene on the computational processes of nervous, endocrine, immune, and genetic networks. Persons do not go with brains
Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in
building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from
using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object
recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or
even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and
performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in
crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly
human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current
engineering trends in both what they learn, and how they learn it.
Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of
the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely
solving pattern recognition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories
of physics and psychology, to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned;
and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and
generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete
challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the
strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive
models.Comment: In press at Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Open call for commentary
proposals (until Nov. 22, 2016).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/information/calls-for-commentary/open-calls-for-commentar
Training neural networks to encode symbols enables combinatorial generalization
Combinatorial generalization - the ability to understand and produce novel
combinations of already familiar elements - is considered to be a core capacity
of the human mind and a major challenge to neural network models. A significant
body of research suggests that conventional neural networks can't solve this
problem unless they are endowed with mechanisms specifically engineered for the
purpose of representing symbols. In this paper we introduce a novel way of
representing symbolic structures in connectionist terms - the vectors approach
to representing symbols (VARS), which allows training standard neural
architectures to encode symbolic knowledge explicitly at their output layers.
In two simulations, we show that neural networks not only can learn to produce
VARS representations, but in doing so they achieve combinatorial generalization
in their symbolic and non-symbolic output. This adds to other recent work that
has shown improved combinatorial generalization under specific training
conditions, and raises the question of whether specific mechanisms or training
routines are needed to support symbolic processing
The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement
A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained to deal with. After sketching the history of the movement, we explore the relationships between neuroscience and philosophy and introduce some of the specific issues that have arise
Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms
A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic:
with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that
the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains
how computing this function constitutes (in the systemâs normal environment) the
exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ânew mechanistâ
approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is
explanatory only to the extent that it reveals the causal structure of the mechanism
underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent
mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a functiontheoretic
characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even
absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware
The Narrow Conception of Computational Psychology
One particularly successful approach to modeling within cognitive science is computational psychology. Computational psychology explores psychological processes by building and testing computational models with human data. In this paper, it is argued that a specific approach to understanding computation, what is called the ânarrow conceptionâ, has problematically limited the kinds of models, theories, and explanations that are offered within computational psychology. After raising two problems for the narrow conception, an alternative, âwide approachâ to computational psychology is proposed
Take another little piece of my heart: a note on bridging cognition and emotions
Science urges philosophy to be more empirical and philosophy urges science to be more reflective. This markedly occurred along the âdiscovery of the artificialâ (CORDESCHI 2002): in the early days of Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers aimed at making machines more cognizant while setting up a framework to better understand human intelligence.
By and large, those genuine goals still hold today, whereas AI has become more concerned with specific aspects of intelligence, such as (machine) learning, reasoning, vision, and action. As a matter of fact, the field suffers from a chasm between two formerly integrated aspects. One is the engineering endeavour involving the development of tools, e.g., autonomous systems for driving cars as well as software for semantic information retrieval. The other is the philosophical debate that tries to answer questions concerning the nature of intelligence. Bridging these two levels can indeed be crucial in developing a deeper understanding of minds.
An opportunity might be offered by the cogent theme of emotions. Traditionally, computer science, psychological and philosophical research have been compelled to investigate mental processes that do not involve mood, emotions and feelings, in spite of Simonâs early caveat (SIMON 1967) that a general theory of cognition must incorporate the influences of emotion.
Given recent neurobiological findings and technological advances, the time is ripe to seriously weigh this promising, albeit controversial, opportunity
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