23 research outputs found
Coercion, Contract and the Limits of the Market
It is a widely accepted principle of economics that if two or more adults voluntarily agree to a contract or an exchange that has no negative fall-out on others, then the government should not stop such a contract. This is often called the 'principle of free contract' (PFC). There is a body of writing in economics which upholds the PFC. Yet, this ubiquitous principle is ill-defined and full of ambiguities. For instance, since it refers to voluntary choice, its proper use presumes an understanding of what is 'voluntary' and, therefore, also, of what is coercive. What is ironic is that, while philosophers and legal scholars have debated and analyzed these concepts and the validity of the principle of free contract, there is very little discussion of these in economics, even though so much of economics is founded on this principle. This has caused a lot of policy confusion. The aim of this paper is to construct general rules for when we may violate the PFC. The argument is constructed within the Paretian framework. Hence, the violation of the PFC is not justified by appeal to deontological ethics or non-welfarist criteria. This is not an easy task since the principle of free contract is often viewed as a rule that is a derivative of the Pareto principle.
Crime and Sport Participation in Itay: Evidence from Panel Data Regional Analysis over the Period 1997-2003.\
What is the broad impact of sport participation and sport activities in a society? The first aim of this paper is tackling this crucial point by studying whether or not there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian regions over the period 1997-2003. The impact of spot participation on different type of crimes has been studied. Results show that: (i) there is a robust negative association between sport participation and property crime; (ii) There is a robust negative association between sport participation and juvenile crime; (iii) There is a positive association between sport participation and violent crime, but it is only weakly significant.Sport participation, relational goods, crime
Smallholder Participation in Agricultural Value Chains: Comparative Evidence from Three Continents
Supermarkets, specialized wholesalers, and processors and agro-exporters’ agricultural value chains have begun to transform the marketing channels into which smallholder farmers sell produce in low-income economies. We develop a conceptual framework through which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity-processing firm. We then conduct an empirical meta-analysis of agricultural value chains in five countries across three continents (Ghana, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua). We document patterns of participation, the welfare gains associated with participation, reasons for non-participation, the significant extent of contract non-compliance, and the considerable dynamism of these value chains, as farmers and firms enter and exit frequently.
Identity and altruism: The Moral basis of prosperity and oppression
Much of economics is built on the assumption of individuals being driven by self-interest and economic development as an outcome of the free play of such individuals. On the few occasions that economics recognizes the role of altruism and trust, the tendency is to build these from the axiom of individually selfishness. The aim of this paper is to break away from this individualistic tradition and to treat as a primitive that individuals have hard-wired in them the `cooperative spirit', which allows them often to work in their collective interest, even when that may not be in their self-interest. The main objective of the paper is to track the interface between altruism and group identity. By using the basic structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma game among randomly picked individuals and building into it assumptions of general or in-group altruism, the paper demonstrates how our selfish rationality interacts with our innate sense of cooperation. The model is used to outline circumstances under which cooperation will occur and circumstances where it will break down. The paper also studies how sub-groups of a society can form cooperative blocks, whether to simply do better for themselves or exploit others.cooperative spirit, altruism, identity, development, Prisoner's Dilemma
Smallholder Participation in Agricultural Value Chains: Comparative Evidence from Three Continents
Supermarkets, specialized wholesalers, and processors and agro-exporters’ agricultural value chains have begun to transform the marketing channels into which smallholder farmers sell produce in low-income economies. We develop a conceptual framework through which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity-processing firm. We then conduct an empirical meta-analysis of agricultural value chains in five countries across three continents (Ghana, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua). We document patterns of participation, the welfare gains associated with participation, reasons for non-participation, the significant extent of contract non-compliance, and the considerable dynamism of these value chains, as farmers and firms enter and exit frequently.Agricultural Value Chains, Contract Farming, Africa, Asia, Latin America
Altruism, Other-Regarding Behavior and Identity: The Moral Basis of Prosperity and Oppression
Much of economics is built on the assumption that individuals are driven by self-interest and economic development is an outcome of the free play of such individuals. On the few occasions that the existence of altruism is recognized in economics, the tendency is to build this from the axiom of individual selfishness. The aim of this paper is to break from this tradition and to treat as a primitive that individuals are endowed with the 'cooperative spirit', which allows them to work in their collective interest, even when that may not be in their self-interest. The paper tracks the interface between altruism and group identity. By using the basic structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma game among randomly picked individuals and building into it assumptions of general or in-group altruism, the paper demonstrates how our selfish rationality interacts with our innate sense of cooperation. The model is used to outline circumstances under which cooperation will occur and circumstances where it will break down. The paper also studies how sub-groups of a society can form cooperative blocks, whether to simply do better for themselves or exploit others.
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More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant?
IRBs can disallow high incentives they deem coercive. A vignette study on MTurk concerning participation in medical trials shows that a substantial minority of subjects concurs. They think high incentives cause more regret, and that more people would be better off without the opportunity to participate. We model observers as judging the ethicality of incentives by partially using their own utility. The model predicts that payments are repugnant only to the extent that they affect the participation decision, and more so for larger transactions. Incentivizing poorer participants is more repugnant, and in-kind incentives are less repugnant than monetary incentives.Economic
Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘conflict management’ - labelled as ‘talks’. It will be demonstrated that, under some conditions, an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one agent to the other. In particular, the agent with the higher evaluation of the stake would make a concession, proportional to the optimal choice of ‘talks’ . The existence of a concession paves the way for establishing a feasible settlement region (FSR) given that both parties can be better off while expending resources in ‘talks’. Eventually the basic model is extended in order to consider the existence of asymmetries in technological capabilities. Whenever the agents exhibit sufficiently asymmetric productive characteristics a FSR can be established even if a concession is not ensured. However a concession can enlarge the FSR. Finally, throughout the paper, the concept of entropy is applied as a tool for the measurement and evaluation of conflict andConflict; Contest; Conflict management; Asymmetry in evaluation; Entropy; Returns to Scale; Concession; Guns; Talks
Recirpcity in the shadow of Threat
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two
asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a
contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the
option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the
conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments
in ‘conflict management’ - labelled as ‘talks’. It will be demonstrated that
the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake does constitute a powerful
force influencing agents’ behaviour. In particular, (a) whenever the
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is extremely large there is no
room for cooperation and a conflict trap emerges; (b) whenever the
degree of asymmetry falls within a critical interval cooperation seems to
emerge even if only the agent with the higher evaluation of the stake
makes a concession, proportional to the optimal choice of ‘talks’; (c) as the
evaluations of the stake converge only reciprocal concessions (capturing a
kind of strong reciprocity) made by both agents can pave the way for
cooperation. In such a case, the existence of reciprocal concessions paves
the way for establishing a potential settlement region (PSR) given that
both parties can be better off while expending resources in ‘talks’. Finally,
throughout the paper, the concept of entropy is applied as a tool for the
measurement and evaluation of conflict and conflict management