Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium

Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and evolutionary game theory.Comment: 14 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in European Physical Journal

The Development of Network Relations of MNC Subsidiaries: How Internal MNC and External (Local) Relations Evolve

Managing relations is a complex task for internationalizing firms and their subsidiaries: MNC subsidiaries are not only part of the MNC network but they also develop relations with network actors in their local environment.This paper investigates conceptually how MNC subsidiaries established through generic expansion build relations within the MNC and with external market and non-market actors as they evolve through stages of start-up, growth and maturity.The paper develops propositions, grounded in institutional theory, resource dependency theory and network approaches, on the changing strength and importance of a subsidiary's relations depending on its dependence or interdependence in these relations, with five groups of actors (MNC headquarters, other subsidiaries within the MNC, local business actors, local government and non-government organizations).The paper ends with drawing directions for future work that will enhance understanding of the dynamics of relationship management in MNC subsidiaries.multinational companies;MNC management;HQ-subsidiary relations;networks;institutional theory

Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments

In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest "equal distribution" scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes.Comment: 19 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscienc

The Mirroring Hypothesis: Theory, Evidence and Exceptions

The mirroring hypothesis predicts that the organizational patterns of a development project (e.g. communication links, geographic collocation, team and firm co-membership) will correspond to the technical patterns of dependency in the system under development. Scholars in a range of disciplines have argued that mirroring is either necessary or a highly desirable feature of development projects, but evidence pertaining to the hypothesis is widely scattered across fields, research sites, and methodologies. In this paper, we formally define the mirroring hypothesis and review 102 empirical studies spanning three levels of organization: within a single firm, across firms, and in open community-based development projects. The hypothesis was supported in 69% of the cases. Support for the hypothesis was strongest in the within-firm sample, less strong in the across-firm sample, and relatively weak in the open collaborative sample. Based on a detailed analysis of the cases in which the mirroring hypothesis was not supported, we introduce the concept of actionable transparency as a means of achieving coordination without mirroring. We present examples from practice and describe the more complex organizational patterns that emerge when actionable transparency allows designers to 'break the mirror.'Modularity, innovation, product and process development, organization design, design structure, organizational structure, organizational ties

Symbiotic Cell Differentiation and Cooperative Growth in Multicellular Aggregates

As cells grow and divide under a given environment, they become crowded and resources are limited, as seen in bacterial biofilms and multicellular aggregates. These cells often show strong interactions through exchanging chemicals, as in quorum sensing, to achieve mutualism. Here, to achieve stable division of labor, three properties are required. First, isogenous cells differentiate into several types. Second, this aggregate of distinct cell types shows better growth than that of isolated cells, by achieving division of labor. Third, this cell aggregate is robust in the number distribution of differentiated cell types. We here address how cells acquire the ability of cell differentiation and division of labor simultaneously, which is also connected with the robustness of a cell society. For this purpose, we developed a dynamical-systems model of cells consisting of chemical components with intracellular catalytic reaction dynamics. The reactions convert external nutrients into internal components for cellular growth, and the divided cells interact via chemical diffusion. We found that cells sharing an identical catalytic network spontaneously differentiate via induction from cell-cell interactions, and then achieve division of labor, enabling a higher growth rate than that in the unicellular case. This symbiotic differentiation emerged for a class of reaction networks with limited resources and strong cell-cell interactions. Then, robustness in the cell type distribution was achieved, while instability of collective growth could emerge even among the cooperative cells when the internal reserves of products were dominant. The present mechanism is simple and general as a natural result of interacting cells with resource limitation, and is consistent with the observed behaviors and forms of several aggregates of unicellular organisms.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figure

Co-evolution and networks adaptation.

What is the role of co-evolution in the adaptation of a population of firms to a hostile environment ? To answer this question, we revisit network sociology starting from Kauffman s biological computer model. We apply a qualitative methodology to update exploitation and exploration mechanisms in nine Japanese interfirm networks. From these results, this article draws a typology of the adaptation forms, distinguishing pack, migratory, herd and colony networks.Sociologie des organisations; Réseaux d’entreprises;

Assessing the EU pressure for rules change: perception by southern Mediterranean energy regulators

This paper analyses the perception of the EU as rules promoter of energy regulatory agencies in four southern Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Turkey and Jordan. The restructuring of the energy sector, as promoted by the EU in the southern Mediterranean region, is considered as the main criteria to evaluate the EU modes of external governance. EU modes of governance are assessed in a comparative way through a perception survey. The case studies have been selected due to their relevance in terms of energy sector restructuring and energy exchanges, Among the modes of governance considered, the top-down approach appears as the most promising mode of rules diffusio