317 research outputs found
Smart Card Fault Injections with High Temperatures
Power and clock glitch attacks on smart cards can help an attacker to discover some internal
secrets or bypass certain security checks. Also, an attacker can manipulate the temperature and supply voltage
of the device, thus making the device glitch more easily. If these manipulations are within the device operating
conditions, it becomes harder to distinguish between an extreme condition from an attacker. To demonstrate
temperature and power supply effect on fault attacks, we perform several tests on an Atmega 163 microcontroller
in different conditions. Our results show that this kind of attacks are still a serious threat to small devices,
whilst maintaining the manufacturer recommendations
Implications of Physical Fault Injections on Single Chip Motes
Single-chip motes are wireless sensor nodes that integrate computation, communication, power and sensing on a single chip. We consider the security threats these novel devices are subject to when employed in safety-critical applications. Fault injection attacks are a prominent form of physical attacks that pose a threat to the normal and secure functioning of targeted devices, potentially compromising their intended behavior. These attacks have been studied mainly on commercial off-the-shelf devices which rely on external components such as crystal oscillators and passives. Such external components are absent from single-chip motes, resulting in a uniquely different attack surface compared to commercial systems. In this paper, we first survey the features of the common fault injection methods, and then study and compare their implications on single-chip motes
Physical Fault Injection and Side-Channel Attacks on Mobile Devices:A Comprehensive Analysis
Today's mobile devices contain densely packaged system-on-chips (SoCs) with
multi-core, high-frequency CPUs and complex pipelines. In parallel,
sophisticated SoC-assisted security mechanisms have become commonplace for
protecting device data, such as trusted execution environments, full-disk and
file-based encryption. Both advancements have dramatically complicated the use
of conventional physical attacks, requiring the development of specialised
attacks. In this survey, we consolidate recent developments in physical fault
injections and side-channel attacks on modern mobile devices. In total, we
comprehensively survey over 50 fault injection and side-channel attack papers
published between 2009-2021. We evaluate the prevailing methods, compare
existing attacks using a common set of criteria, identify several challenges
and shortcomings, and suggest future directions of research
FPGA-Based Testbed for Fault Injection on SHA-256
In real world applications, cryptographic algorithms are implemented in hardware or software on specific devices. An active attacker may inject faults during the computation process and careful analysis of faulty results can potentially leak secret information. These kinds of attacks known as fault injection attacks may have devastating effects in the field of hardware and embedded cryptography. This research proposes a partial implementation of SHA-256 along with an onboard fault injection circuit implemented on an FPGA. The proposed fault injection circuit is used to generate glitches in the clock to induce a setup time violation in the circuit and thereby produce error(s) in the output. The main objective of this research is to study the viability of fault injection using the clock glitches on the SHA-256
Hardware security, vulnerabilities, and attacks: a comprehensive taxonomy
Information Systems, increasingly present in a world that goes towards complete digitalization, can be seen as complex systems at the base of which is the hardware. When dealing with the security of these systems to stop possible intrusions and malicious uses, the analysis must necessarily include the possible vulnerabilities that can be found at the hardware level, since their exploitation can make all defenses implemented at web or software level ineffective. In this paper, we propose a meaningful and comprehensive taxonomy for the vulnerabilities affecting the hardware and the attacks that exploit them to compromise the system, also giving a definition of Hardware Security, in order to clarify a concept often confused with other domains, even in the literature
Analysis and Design of Clock-glitch Fault Injection within an FPGA
In modern cryptanalysis, an active attacker may induce errors during the computation of a cryptographic algorithm and exploit the faulty results to extract information about
the secret key in embedded systems. This kind of attack is called a fault attack. There have been various attack mechanisms with diff erent fault models proposed in the literature. Among them, clock glitch faults support practically dangerous fault attacks on cryptosystems. This thesis presents an FPGA-based practical testbed for characterizing exploitable clock glitch faults and uniformly evaluating cryptographic systems against them. Concentrating on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), simulation and experimental results illustrates proper features for the clock glitches generated by the implemented on-chip glitch generator. These glitches can be injected reliably with acceptably accurate timing. The produced faults are random but their eff ect domain is finely controllable by the attacker. These features makes clock glitch faults practically suitable for future possible complete fault attacks on AES. This research is important for investigating the viability and analysis of fault injections on various cryptographic functions in future embedded systems
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EFFICIENT HARDWARE PRIMITIVES FOR SECURING LIGHTWEIGHT SYSTEMS
In the era of IoT and ubiquitous computing, the collection and communication of sensitive data is increasingly being handled by lightweight Integrated Circuits. Efficient hardware implementations of crytographic primitives for resource constrained applications have become critical, especially block ciphers which perform fundamental operations such as encryption, decryption, and even hashing. We study the efficiency of block ciphers under different implementation styles. For low latency applications that use unrolled block cipher implementations, we design a glitch filter to reduce energy consumption. For lightweight applications, we design a novel architecture for the widely used AES cipher. The design eliminates inefficiencies in data movement and clock activity, thereby significantly improving energy efficiency over state-of-the-art architectures. Apart from efficiency, vulnerability to implementation attacks are a concern, which we mitigate by our randomization capable lightweight AES architecture. We fabricate our designs in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology and present measured testchip data on energy consumption and side channel resistance. Finally, we address the problem of supply chain security by using image processing techniques to extract fingerprints from surface texture of plastic IC packages for IC authentication and counterfeit prevention. Collectively these works present efficient and cost effective solutions to secure lightweight systems
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