984 research outputs found
The Rise of Certificate Transparency and Its Implications on the Internet Ecosystem
In this paper, we analyze the evolution of Certificate Transparency (CT) over
time and explore the implications of exposing certificate DNS names from the
perspective of security and privacy. We find that certificates in CT logs have
seen exponential growth. Website support for CT has also constantly increased,
with now 33% of established connections supporting CT. With the increasing
deployment of CT, there are also concerns of information leakage due to all
certificates being visible in CT logs. To understand this threat, we introduce
a CT honeypot and show that data from CT logs is being used to identify targets
for scanning campaigns only minutes after certificate issuance. We present and
evaluate a methodology to learn and validate new subdomains from the vast
number of domains extracted from CT logged certificates.Comment: To be published at ACM IMC 201
Passive Observations of a Large DNS Service:2.5 Years in the Life of Google
In 2009 Google launched its Public DNS service, with its characteristic IP address 8.8.8.8. Since then, this service has grown to be the largest and most well-known DNS service in existence. The popularity of public DNS services has been disruptive for Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). CDNs rely on IP information to geo-Iocate clients. This no longer works in the presence of public resolvers, which led to the introduction of the EDNSO Client Subnet extension. ECS allows resolvers to reveal part of a client's IP address to authoritative name servers and helps CDNs pinpoint client origin. A useful side effect of ECS is that it can be used to study the workings of public DNS resolvers. In this paper, we leverage this side effect of ECS to study Google Public DNS. From a dataset of 3.7 billion DNS queries spanning 2.5 years, we extract ECS information and perform a longitudinal analysis of which clients are served from which Point-of-Presence. Our study focuses on two aspects of GPDNS. First, we show that while GPDNS has PoPs in many countries, traffic is frequently routed out of country, even if that was not necessary. Often this reduces performance, and perhaps more importantly, exposes DNS requests to state-level surveillance. Second, we study how GPDNS is used by clients. We show that end-users switch to GPDNS en masse when their ISP's DNS service is unresponsive, and do not switch back. We also find that many e-mail providers configure GPDNS as the resolver for their servers. This raises serious privacy concerns, as DNS queries from mail servers reveal information about hosts they exchange mail with. Because of GPDNS's use of ECS, this sensitive information is not only revealed to Google, but also to any operator of an authoritative name server that receives ECS-enabled queries from GPDNS during the lookup process
Entropy/IP: Uncovering Structure in IPv6 Addresses
In this paper, we introduce Entropy/IP: a system that discovers Internet
address structure based on analyses of a subset of IPv6 addresses known to be
active, i.e., training data, gleaned by readily available passive and active
means. The system is completely automated and employs a combination of
information-theoretic and machine learning techniques to probabilistically
model IPv6 addresses. We present results showing that our system is effective
in exposing structural characteristics of portions of the IPv6 Internet address
space populated by active client, service, and router addresses.
In addition to visualizing the address structure for exploration, the system
uses its models to generate candidate target addresses for scanning. For each
of 15 evaluated datasets, we train on 1K addresses and generate 1M candidates
for scanning. We achieve some success in 14 datasets, finding up to 40% of the
generated addresses to be active. In 11 of these datasets, we find active
network identifiers (e.g., /64 prefixes or `subnets') not seen in training.
Thus, we provide the first evidence that it is practical to discover subnets
and hosts by scanning probabilistically selected areas of the IPv6 address
space not known to contain active hosts a priori.Comment: Paper presented at the ACM IMC 2016 in Santa Monica, USA
(https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2987445). Live Demo site available at
http://www.entropy-ip.com
Data security in theory and practice Possibile security holes
There are no enterprises which would not use computers to fulfill their administrative tasks. Computers became part of everyday administration, or, better to say: they became part of everyday life. This is why our age is called 'information age'. Both the amount of digital data and our dependency from these data has been growing intensively so digital data is high-valued as resource. Data owners and/or managers must, or at least ought to, protect their data from stealing or tampering with. Luckily standard communication protocols and methods have been developed for this purpose, they only ought to be used. If not, that will result in a high level of risk. We, at Óbuda University, have been using a computer based system called Neptun for about ten years to manage the scholar records of the students. In this paper I show some possible motivations and technical solutions why and how one could gain unauthorized access to such a system.
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