Assentication: User Deauthentication and Lunchtime Attack Mitigation with Seated Posture Biometric

Biometric techniques are often used as an extra security factor in authenticating human users. Numerous biometrics have been proposed and evaluated, each with its own set of benefits and pitfalls. Static biometrics (such as fingerprints) are geared for discrete operation, to identify users, which typically involves some user burden. Meanwhile, behavioral biometrics (such as keystroke dynamics) are well suited for continuous, and sometimes more unobtrusive, operation. One important application domain for biometrics is deauthentication, a means of quickly detecting absence of a previously authenticated user and immediately terminating that user's active secure sessions. Deauthentication is crucial for mitigating so called Lunchtime Attacks, whereby an insider adversary takes over (before any inactivity timeout kicks in) authenticated state of a careless user who walks away from her computer. Motivated primarily by the need for an unobtrusive and continuous biometric to support effective deauthentication, we introduce PoPa, a new hybrid biometric based on a human user's seated posture pattern. PoPa captures a unique combination of physiological and behavioral traits. We describe a low cost fully functioning prototype that involves an office chair instrumented with 16 tiny pressure sensors. We also explore (via user experiments) how PoPa can be used in a typical workplace to provide continuous authentication (and deauthentication) of users. We experimentally assess viability of PoPa in terms of uniqueness by collecting and evaluating posture patterns of a cohort of users. Results show that PoPa exhibits very low false positive, and even lower false negative, rates. In particular, users can be identified with, on average, 91.0% accuracy. Finally, we compare pros and cons of PoPa with those of several prominent biometric based deauthentication techniques

Touchalytics: On the Applicability of Touchscreen Input as a Behavioral Biometric for Continuous Authentication

We investigate whether a classifier can continuously authenticate users based on the way they interact with the touchscreen of a smart phone. We propose a set of 30 behavioral touch features that can be extracted from raw touchscreen logs and demonstrate that different users populate distinct subspaces of this feature space. In a systematic experiment designed to test how this behavioral pattern exhibits consistency over time, we collected touch data from users interacting with a smart phone using basic navigation maneuvers, i.e., up-down and left-right scrolling. We propose a classification framework that learns the touch behavior of a user during an enrollment phase and is able to accept or reject the current user by monitoring interaction with the touch screen. The classifier achieves a median equal error rate of 0% for intra-session authentication, 2%-3% for inter-session authentication and below 4% when the authentication test was carried out one week after the enrollment phase. While our experimental findings disqualify this method as a standalone authentication mechanism for long-term authentication, it could be implemented as a means to extend screen-lock time or as a part of a multi-modal biometric authentication system.Comment: to appear at IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security; Download data from http://www.mariofrank.net/touchalytics

Privacy-Preserving Facial Recognition Using Biometric-Capsules

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)In recent years, developers have used the proliferation of biometric sensors in smart devices, along with recent advances in deep learning, to implement an array of biometrics-based recognition systems. Though these systems demonstrate remarkable performance and have seen wide acceptance, they present unique and pressing security and privacy concerns. One proposed method which addresses these concerns is the elegant, fusion-based Biometric-Capsule (BC) scheme. The BC scheme is provably secure, privacy-preserving, cancellable and interoperable in its secure feature fusion design. In this work, we demonstrate that the BC scheme is uniquely fit to secure state-of-the-art facial verification, authentication and identification systems. We compare the performance of unsecured, underlying biometrics systems to the performance of the BC-embedded systems in order to directly demonstrate the minimal effects of the privacy-preserving BC scheme on underlying system performance. Notably, we demonstrate that, when seamlessly embedded into a state-of-the-art FaceNet and ArcFace verification systems which achieve accuracies of 97.18% and 99.75% on the benchmark LFW dataset, the BC-embedded systems are able to achieve accuracies of 95.13% and 99.13% respectively. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that the BC scheme outperforms or performs as well as several other proposed secure biometric methods

Active User Authentication for Smartphones: A Challenge Data Set and Benchmark Results

In this paper, automated user verification techniques for smartphones are investigated. A unique non-commercial dataset, the University of Maryland Active Authentication Dataset 02 (UMDAA-02) for multi-modal user authentication research is introduced. This paper focuses on three sensors - front camera, touch sensor and location service while providing a general description for other modalities. Benchmark results for face detection, face verification, touch-based user identification and location-based next-place prediction are presented, which indicate that more robust methods fine-tuned to the mobile platform are needed to achieve satisfactory verification accuracy. The dataset will be made available to the research community for promoting additional research.Comment: 8 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. Best poster award at BTAS 201

Biometric Authentication System on Mobile Personal Devices

We propose a secure, robust, and low-cost biometric authentication system on the mobile personal device for the personal network. The system consists of the following five key modules: 1) face detection; 2) face registration; 3) illumination normalization; 4) face verification; and 5) information fusion. For the complicated face authentication task on the devices with limited resources, the emphasis is largely on the reliability and applicability of the system. Both theoretical and practical considerations are taken. The final system is able to achieve an equal error rate of 2% under challenging testing protocols. The low hardware and software cost makes the system well adaptable to a large range of security applications

Keystroke Biometrics in Response to Fake News Propagation in a Global Pandemic

This work proposes and analyzes the use of keystroke biometrics for content de-anonymization. Fake news have become a powerful tool to manipulate public opinion, especially during major events. In particular, the massive spread of fake news during the COVID-19 pandemic has forced governments and companies to fight against missinformation. In this context, the ability to link multiple accounts or profiles that spread such malicious content on the Internet while hiding in anonymity would enable proactive identification and blacklisting. Behavioral biometrics can be powerful tools in this fight. In this work, we have analyzed how the latest advances in keystroke biometric recognition can help to link behavioral typing patterns in experiments involving 100,000 users and more than 1 million typed sequences. Our proposed system is based on Recurrent Neural Networks adapted to the context of content de-anonymization. Assuming the challenge to link the typed content of a target user in a pool of candidate profiles, our results show that keystroke recognition can be used to reduce the list of candidate profiles by more than 90%. In addition, when keystroke is combined with auxiliary data (such as location), our system achieves a Rank-1 identification performance equal to 52.6% and 10.9% for a background candidate list composed of 1K and 100K profiles, respectively.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2004.0362