What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter Requirement

On its face, the connection between insider trading regulation and the state of mind of the trader or tipper seems intuitive. Insider trading is a form of market abuse: taking advantage of a secret to which one is not entitled, generally in breach of some kind of fiduciary-like duty. This chapter examines both the legal doctrine and the psychology associated with this pursuit. There is much conceptual confusion in how we define unlawful insider trading—the quixotic effort to build a coherent theory of insider trading by reference to the law of fraud, rather than a more expansive market abuse standard—which leads to interesting psychological questions as to the required state of mind. Is it always simple greed? What if there is an element of unconscious misperception—or rationalization—at work? My sense is that the causal explanations for what is charged as insider trading are sometimes quite murky and not easily explained as pure greed. The chapter thus tries to connect the law of insider trading to a more sophisticated approach to state of mind, motivation and causation

Conspiracy and the Fantasy Defense: The Strange Case of the Cannibal Cop

In the notorious Cannibal Cop case, New York police officer Gilberto Valle was accused of conspiring to kidnap, kill, and eat various women of his acquaintance. Valle claimed a fantasy defense, arguing that his expression represented not conspiracy agreement, but fantasy role-play. His conviction and subsequent acquittal raised questions about the freedom of speech, thoughtcrime, and the nature of conspiracy law. Because the essence of conspiracy is agreement, it falls into the category of crimes in which pure speech is the actus reus of the offense. This Note argues that as a result, conspiracy cases in which the fantasy defense is implicated pose special due-process and First Amendment dangers, and concludes that these dangers can be mitigated by a strengthened overt-act requirement

Making sense: dopamine activates conscious self-monitoring through medial prefrontal cortex

When experiences become meaningful to the self, they are linked to synchronous activity in a paralimbic network of self-awareness and dopaminergic activity. This network includes medial prefrontal and medial parietal/posterior cingulate cortices, where transcranial magnetic stimulation may transiently impair self-awareness. Conversely, we hypothesize that dopaminergic stimulation may improve self-awareness and metacognition (i.e., the ability of the brain to consciously monitor its own cognitive processes). Here, we demonstrate improved noetic (conscious) metacognition by oral administration of 100 mg dopamine in minimal self-awareness. In a separate experiment with extended self-awareness dopamine improved the retrieval accuracy of memories of self-judgment (autonoetic, i.e., explicitly self-conscious) metacognition. Concomitantly, magnetoencephalography (MEG) showed increased amplitudes of oscillations (power) preferentially in the medial prefrontal cortex. Given that electromagnetic activity in this region is instrumental in self-awareness, this explains the specific effect of dopamine on explicit self-awareness and autonoetic metacognition

An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards

Presumptions have an important role in antitrust jurisprudence. This article suggests that a careful formulation of the relevant presumptions and associated evidentiary rebuttal burdens can provide the “enquiry meet for the case” across a large array of narrow categories of conduct confronted in antitrust to create a type of “meta” rule of reason. The article begins this project by using decision theory to analyze the types and properties of antitrust presumptions and evidentiary rebuttal burdens and the relationship between them. Depending on the category of conduct and market structure conditions, antitrust presumptions lie along a continuum from conclusive (irrebuttable) anticompetitive, to rebuttable anticompetitive, to competitively neutral, and on to rebuttable procompetitive and conclusive (irrebuttable) procompetitive presumptions. A key source of these presumptions is the likely competitive effects inferred from market conditions. Other sources are policy-based -- deterrence policy concerns and overarching policies involving the goals and premises of antitrust jurisprudence. Rebuttal evidence can either undermine the facts on which the presumptions are based or can provide other evidence to offset the competitive effects likely implied by the presumption. The evidentiary burden to rebut a presumption depends on the strength of the presumption and the availability and reliability of further case-specific evidence. These twin determinants can be combined and understood through the lens of Bayesian decision theory to explain how “the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.” The stronger the presumption and less reliable the case-specific evidence in signaling whether the conduct is anticompetitive versus procompetitive, the more difficult it will be for the disfavored party to satisfy the evidentiary burden to rebut the presumption. The evidentiary rebuttal burden generally is a burden of production, but also can involve the burden of persuasion, as with the original Philadelphia National Bank structural presumption, or typical procompetitive presumptions. If a presumption is rebutted with sufficient offsetting evidence to avoid an initial judgment, the presumption generally continues to carry some weakened weight in the post-rebuttal phase of the decision process. That is, a thumb remains on the scale. However, if the presumption is undermined, it is discredited and it carries no weight in the post-rebuttal decision process. The article uses this methodology to analyze various antitrust presumptions. It also analyzes the, burden-shifting rule of reason and suggests that the elements should not be rigidly sequenced in the decision process. The article also begins the project of reviewing, revising and refining existing antitrust presumptions with proposed revisions and refinements in a number of areas. The article invites other commentators to join the project by criticizing these proposals and suggesting others. These presumptions then could be applied by appellate courts and relied upon by lower court, litigants and business planners

A closer look at the Test of Personal Intelligence (TOPI)

Personal intelligence involves the capacity to reason about personality and personality-related information. Studying ability-based measures of personal intelligence creates a virtuous cycle of better measurement and better theoretical understanding. In Study 1 (N = 10,318), we conduct an item-level analysis of the Test of Personal Intelligence (TOPI) to explore people\u27s problem-solving abilities in the area. Personal intelligence divided into a Consistency-Congruency factor that concerned understanding traits and their associated behaviors, and a Dynamic-Analytic factor that involved understanding personality processes and goals. The finding cross-validated in Study 2 (N = 8,459). In Study 3 (N = 384), we examined correlates of the two factors. Understanding the abilities involved in personal intelligence may help us to educate people about how to better solve problems about personality

Assessing customer satisfaction and loyalty in the retail sector

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

“Best Practice” without Evidence – Agile Software Methodology as Example

Despite the essentiality of education, and the widely known unscientific nature of expert opinion, education in general appears to be based on expert opinion. The example analyzed herein is of Agile software methodology, which is deemed a best practice and therefore taught in most IT studies, in Norway and most probably internationally. This is despite that it appears to be a well known fact within its respective field that the Agile methodology lacks scientific justification. A tertiary analysis was conducted to test this well known fact and to serve as basis for exploring what should be considered sufficient evidence for inclusion within official education. The result of the tertiary study is that, indeed, the evidence for the Agile methodology is scarce at best. A method to avoid such mistake is suggested, which could be valuable to science in general. This method entails employing philosophers of science, epistemologists, to counteract potential expert biases and verify the curriculum before it is accepted in official education