Blockchain for supply chain traceability and anticounterfeiting: the oracles’ enabling role

Blockchain and physical oracles in the Collectible Industry. Supply chain fairness and bargaining power in agriculture supply chain: the blockchain effect. Unlocking the Blockchain Potentials through Oracles: Empirical Evidences on Supply Chain Challenges and Performance

External financing, channel power structure and product green R&D decisions in supply chains

Purpose – This study aims to focus on the optimal green R&D of a capital-constrained supply chain under different channel power structures as well as the impact of capital constraint, financing cost, channel power structure and cost-reducing efficiency on green R&D and supply chain profitability. Design/methodology/approach – A two-echelon supply chain is considered. The upstream firm engages in green R&D but has capital constraints that can be overcome by external financing. Green R&D is beneficial to reduce production costs and increase consumer demand. Based on whether or not the upstream firm is capital constrained and dominates the supply chain, four models are developed. Findings – Capital constraints significantly lower green R&D and supply chain profitability. Transferring leadership from the upstream to the downstream firms leads to higher green R&D levels and downstream firm profitability, whereas the upstream firm's profitability is increased (decreased) if green R&D investment efficiency is high (low) enough. Greater financing costs reduce green R&D and downstream firm profitability; however, the upstream firm's profitability under the model in which it functions as the follower increases if the initial capital is sufficient. More importantly, empirical analysis based on practice data is used to verify the theoretical results reported above. Practical implications – This study reveals how upstream firms in supply chains decide green R&D decisions in situations with capital constraints, providing managers and governments with an understanding of the impact of capital constraint, channel power structure, financing cost and cost-reducing efficiency on supply chain green R&D and profitability. Originality/value – The major contributions are the exploration of supply chain green R&D by taking into consideration channel power structures and cost-reducing efficiency and the validation of theoretical results using practice data

Firm’s Intangible Assets and Multinational Activity: Joint-Venture Versus FDI

This paper provides a theoretical formalisation of the joint-venture contract, as an alternative to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), within a Dissipation of Intangible Assets framework. In a two-period, two-country equilibrium model, we discuss how the threat of knowledge spillover shapes the boundaries of a Multinational Enterprise. Similarly to the theoretical findings on the FDI-licensing trade off, we show that Foreign Direct Investment is more likely to emerge when know-how easily spills over – i.e. when firms are endowed with more intangible assets or they belong to high tech industries. Probit estimates, from an entirely new firm-level dataset, constructed by the author, show that the experience of Italian multinationals in Asia is in line with our theoretical predictions.Intangible assets, Internalisation, FDI, Joint-venture, Asia

Structural market changes and strategic adaptation along the value chain:theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence

Strukturelle Veränderungen der Wettbewerbslandschaft, insbesondere die Deregulierung von Märkten und der rasante technologische Fortschritt, nehmen Einfluss auf die optimale Gestaltung von Wertschöpfungsprozessen. Zwei wesentliche Trends sind beobachtbar: die zunehmende Desintegration von Produktionsprozessen und die Neuinterpretation der Rolle des Kunden im Wertschöpfungsprozess. Im Rahmen von drei empirischen und einer konzeptionellen Analyse werden wesentliche Implikationen für die erfolgreiche Gestaltung von Wertschöpfungsprozessen abgeleitet und erwartete Erfolgswirkungen struktureller Veränderungen entlang der Wertschöpfungskette kritisch reflektiert

Power play in television: a political economy analysis of power balances in broadcasting markets

In this dissertation, the focus is on the (evolving) configurations of power and control in broadcaster-to-distributor markets. Technological developments, as well as changes in the institutional framework, are in the process of fundamentally transforming legacy TV business models and have transferred power to ‘gatekeepers’ which derive a dominant position by controlling competitive bottlenecks. Since technology shocks might disrupt established power relationships in television, interactions between TV broadcasters and distributors incur tensions and conflicts of interests. It is argued that each party controls crucial platform resources and that the broadcaster-to-distributor market is organized around two converging TV platforms that unfold enveloping strategies and thus provoke power conflicts. One of the major assumptions of this dissertation is the mutual dependency between broadcasters and distributors, which leads to the conclusion that the market is marked by bilateral bargaining power, and needs to deal with double-marginalisation problems. Although both parties may have bargaining power, relationships between broadcasters and distributors are often characterised by power asymmetries, either in favour of the broadcaster or distributor. In the ever-increasing complex TV ecosystem, broadcasters as well as distributors are looking for outside opportunities to lessen dependence on their counterparty, and build strategic advantage during carriage negotiations. However, pricing power usually remains with the distributors, which eventually decide about the possible carriage and the package (basic or upgraded), and the position of the channel in that package (or in the electronic programming guide). A gatekeeping position allows distributors to pressure broadcasters to demand lower wholesale (input) prices. On top, distributors leverage bargaining power through the ownership of affiliated channels that directly compete access-seeking broadcasters. In a similar vein, owners of premium rights or must-have channels leverage their popularity and exclusivity in order to bargain higher retransmission payments from distributors. Whereas existing frameworks hold that competitive advantage essentially rests on the activities a firm performs within the value chain, it is claimed here that a firm’s position in the value chain does not adequately explain why different firms with similar activities have different levels of bargaining power. Rather than sticking to hollow aphorisms like ‘Content is King, but Distribution is King Kong’, it is assumed that the allocation of power between broadcasters and distributors crucially depends on the politico-economic context of broadcasting and its distribution, including the set of complex relationships between different parties in the business ecosystem. Since bargaining power in the broadcaster-to-distributor market tends to be context-specific and varies between different local settings, it is determined by the allocation of scarce resources in the industry, the individual nature of the broadcaster-to-distributor relationship and potential path dependencies in media and telecommunication policies. Hence, the major research objective is to study the interactions between broadcasters and distributors, and identify, in a qualitative way, those contextual variables that define bargaining power in broadcaster-to-distributor relationships. Although Porter’s model is still relevant for analysing the industry environment, the complexity of broadcasting and distribution markets and the speciality of carriage negotiations demands for a more specific framework to examine relationships and power conflicts between broadcasters and distribution. Following a resource-centric perspective, the ownership and control of strategic assets are considered determinants of bargaining power. Based on a literature review and interviews with 36 media managers and experts, it was possible to come up with a multidimensional and multilevel approach to bargaining power and to construct a complex of interrelated power attributes (clustered in five dimensions) that influence a firm’s competitive position in carriage negotiations. On the macro level, a number of legal provisions and regulatory requirements strongly affect the carriage negotiations. Reference is made to telecommunications rules, competition law, media-specific regulation and copyright law. On the meso level, the model suggests that the market structure forms an important factor in the creation of bargaining power. Industry concentration, number of business partners, entry barriers and the threat of technological progress are identified as critical parameters. On the micro level, the structure of the negotiating firms needs to be taken into account to assess bargaining power. Hence, firm-specific characteristics of broadcasters and distributors involved in a carriage negotiation include relative firm size, conglomerateness, vertical integration and financial resilience. Next to firm characteristics, emphasis is put on product differentiation as a source of a bargaining power. Product characteristics are related to the market and industry structure, and predominantly refer to product differentiation, exclusivity, bundling and switching costs. On the individual level, psychological, emotional and interpersonal issues play a decisive role in carriage negotiations

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics

The most fundamental questions of economics are often philosophical in nature, and philosophers have, since the very beginning of Western philosophy, asked many questions that current observers would identify as economic. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is an outstanding reference source for the key topics, problems, and debates at the intersection of philosophical and economic inquiry. It captures this field of countless exciting interconnections, affinities, and opportunities for cross-fertilization. Comprising 35 chapters by a diverse team of contributors from all over the globe, the Handbook is divided into eight sections: I. Rationality II. Cooperation and Interaction III. Methodology IV. Values V. Causality and Explanation VI. Experimentation and Simulation VII. Evidence VIII. Policy The volume is essential reading for students and researchers in economics and philosophy who are interested in exploring the interconnections between the two disciplines. It is also a valuable resource for those in related fields like political science, sociology, and the humanities.</p

Processes of International Negotiations

Negotiations are essential mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes and for maintaining stability in international relations. Negotiations can and should contribute to predictability, equity, and security among states. In achieving these goals, negotiations become important confidence-building measures. The increasing role of negotiations and of international organizations for managing the system of international order and for pursuing/achieving states' interests/policies through peaceful means has produced a fundamental evolution in the agenda, functions, and intensity of international negotiations. In the view of both researchers and negotiators over the recent past, the negotiations process that is organized along traditional lines is becoming more complex, difficult, and less effective. The processes of negotiations are in general taking more and more time and lagging behind the evolution of the international environment. Not only are the issues themselves more complex, but also, in the implementation of any agreements reached, the resolution of the issues involved will need to take place over a longer time and therefore to be managed jointly or multilaterally. Because of the increasing complexity of issues and the fast pace of changes affecting both national and international interests, it has become essential for international agreements to contain sufficient flexibility in certain of their provisions to permit dealing with uncertainty and the needs of the parties to adapt to new and changing circumstances. In this sense, international negotiations and agreements must be not only reactive but also anticipatory. These considerations indicate that a much-needed approach is one which is concerned specifically with bringing about a multinational, multicultural, and multidisciplinary understanding of and perspective on international negotiations and which also bridges the gap between practitioners and researchers. A specific objective and unique aspect of the IIASA Project on the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN Project), which started in April 1986 and was funded by the Carnegie Corporation, is the international, multidisciplinary approach brought to bear on all of the Project's activities. This was especially evident at the IIASA Conference on the Processes of International Negotiations, held in May 1987. The PIN networks in IIASA's member countries played an essential role in this Conference. To keep the focus of the work on substantive issues and on relevant applications-oriented results, while taking into account the importance and impact of different cultural and political systems in the various national approaches to negotiations, both practitioners and researchers involved in the processes of negotiations made presentations at the PIN Conference and took part in the panel discussions. These presentations form the basis for the chapters of this book. The goals of the Conference were to foster increased communication and understanding between practitioners and researchers and among various research disciplines, to present and discuss research results, and to identify possible future research activities. The participation and interaction of both high-level negotiations practitioners and researchers were considered especially valuable and unique aspects of the Conference. All of the subjects dealt with at the Conference have direct and obvious relevance to improving negotiations outcomes on, and the ability to deal effectively with, such issues as the transboundary effects (environmental, economic, etc.) of technological risk, security and confidence-building measures, and international economic cooperation -- all of which are high on the negotiations agenda of many countries