Ten Conversations about Identity Preservation: Implications for Cooperatives

Motivation: While it appears the modern economy demands ever increasing amounts of differentiation, opportunities for grain producers to create and capture significant new sources of value remains elusive. Opportunities appear to loom large to help remove risk and improve quality in the grain supply chain through preservation of product identity, producers, producer groups, and cooperatives are frustrated at the low level of value available to them from IP demand. Why do premiums remain low? And, what is the role of group action in these new differentiated markets? Objectives: This research report helps to explain this apparent paradox underlying the economics of the value proposition for IP grains. Methodology: Needs assessments were conducted on procurement executives using a semi-structured instrument. Results: The study demonstrates that understanding identity preservation business opportunities requires an understanding of the buy-side proposition. Respondents described how they balance the risk mitigation and market uplift features of a supply offering with the risks of narrowing the supply base. A model of the buyer's calculus is constructed. The results show how for producers and producer groups to drive value up the chain they need to shift away from solely a new product focus. Instead attention needs to be directed towards technologies, delivery systems, and organizational models that when bundled with new products make end-users more competitive. A second insight was the limited role of group action in meeting end-user needs. Where value markets existed, internalized groups rather than "arm's length" group transactions were the norm. Plan for Discussion: The cooperative movement was grounded in group action giving individual producers power in the market. The motivation to unite was very clear. In the post-industrial agrifood system though, why do buyers want to purchase from a group? What is the role of the group, from a buy-side perspective, in the modern economy? How should effective groups be structured? Key Words: identity preservation, supply chain management, value creation, group actionidentity preservation, supply chain management, value creation, group action, Agribusiness,

Impact of Back up Quantity Contract on Two-level Supply Chain: A Simulation Approach

In this new era of Supply chain coordination contracts are offered and accepted according to the varying need and specification of the industry and business in discussion. The contract variations arise according to the circumstances and adaptability by both manufacturer and retailer. An important challenge faced by the contracts being offered is the adaptability and robustness when demand observed is different from the forecast. Because of stochastic and uncertain demand, retailer faces lost sales and eventually loses revenue within the same horizon. This paper discusses a back up quantity contract for a single season in which retailer orders for one-shot inventory ordering. Manufacturer retains some part of the ordered inventory as backup and provides the units at first stage. If stock at retailer lags behind the demand, he gets the backup quantity otherwise he pays some agreed upon nominal price to manufacturer in case that inventory is not at all required. We assumed the case of single manufacturer and single retailer. If units are not required, the risk of holding inventory lies with manufacturer and salvaged at zero. The strategy is suitable for businesses having short seasonal products and high demand variability. We used Monte Carlo simulation for analyzing lost sales and supply chain profit scenario and used worst case distribution and normal distribution to validate the Pareto improving contractual relationship

A review of non-cooperative newsvendor games with horizontal inventory interactions

There are numerous applications of game theory in the analysis of supply chains where multiple actors interact with each other in order to reach their own objectives. In this paper we review the use of non-cooperative game theory in inventory management within the newsvendor framework describing a single period inventory control model with the focus on horizontal interactions among multiple independent newsvendors. We develop a framework for identifying these types of horizontal interactions including, for example, the models with the possibility of inventory sharing via transshipments, and situations with substitutable products sold by multiple newsvendors. Based on this framework, we discuss and relate the results of prior research and identify future research opportunities

Trust and Risk in Business Networks: Towards a Due Diligence for Electronic Commerce

This paper develops a due diligence for electronic transactions with new partners in business networks with complex goods such as food products to enable the use of e-commerce potentials in first time transactions. The e-commerce due diligence is a means to reduce perceived risks and uncertainties for businesses and create trust and confidence in the electronic transaction with appropriate information. The paper presents a conceptual framework for the due diligence integrating the principles of transaction decision making and the four phases of a transaction process. The operationalization of the framework assigns trust signals and control elements to the four process phases to be communicated during the process.Trust, risk, electronic commerce, first time transactions, due diligence, food networks, Agribusiness, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Marketing,

Leveraging Open-standard Interorganizational Information Systems for Process Adaptability and Alignment: An Empirical Analysis

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to understand the value creation mechanisms of open-standard inter-organizational information system (OSIOS), which is a key technology to achieve Industry 4.0. Specifically, this study investigates how the internal assimilation and external diffusion of OSIOS help manufactures facilitate process adaptability and alignment in supply chain network.Design/methodology/approachA survey instrument was designed and administrated to collect data for this research. Using three-stage least squares estimation, the authors empirically tested a number of hypothesized relationships based on a sample of 308 manufacturing firms in China.FindingsThe results of the study show that OSIOS can perform as value creation mechanisms to enable process adaptability and alignment. In addition, the impact of OSIOS internal assimilation is inversely U-shaped where the positive effect on process adaptability will become negative after an extremum point is reached.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the existing literature by providing insights on how OSIOS can improve supply chain integration and thus promote the achievement of industry 4.0. By revealing a U-shaped relationship between OSIOS assimilation and process adaptability, this study fills previous research gap by advancing the understanding on the value creation mechanisms of information systems deployment

Digital supply chain through dynamic inventory and smart contracts

This paper develops a digital supply chain game, modeling marketing and operation interactions between members. The main novelty of the paper concerns a comparison between static and dynamic solutions of the supply chain game achieved when moving from traditional to digital platforms. Therefore, this study proposes centralized and decentralized versions of the game, comparing their solutions under static and dynamic settings. Moreover, it investigates the decentralized supply chain by evaluating two smart contracts: Revenue sharing and wholesale price contracts. In both cases, the firms use an artificial intelligence system to determine the optimal contract parameters. Numerical and qualitative analyses are used for comparing configurations (centralized, decentralized), settings (static, dynamic), and contract schemes (revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract). The findings identify the conditions under which smart revenue sharing mechanisms are worth applying

Testing Theories of Cooperative Arrangements in Agricultural Markets: Results from Producer Groups in Poland

The main question posed in the paper asks why do some cooperative arrangements in agricultural markets survive and succeed and others fail? We define success and factors affecting success of cooperation using transaction costs theory and game theory. Transaction costs theory provides insights on comparative advantage of one form of organization versus others and proposes, while game theory focuses on interdependencies between partners entering the arrangements. Data were collected from 62 Polish farmer cooperative organizations called producer groups. The main aim of those organizations was to organize joint sales of output produced individually by their members. Some of the groups were functioning effectively while others that had disbanded or were no longer performing their essential functions. Variables such as the leaders strength, previous business acquaintances, initial selection of members, and number of members have a significant positive impact on the likelihood of success of the researched organizations.Cooperation, agricultural markets, producer groups, Poland, Agribusiness, Marketing,

Sustainable tourism modelling: pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs

Information Sharing in a Long-Term Supply Chain Relationship: The Role of Customer Review Strategy

In this paper, we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game-theoretical model. We find that in a one-shot version of the game, forecasts are not shared truthfully by the customer. The supplier will rationally discount the forecast information in her capacity allocation. This results in Pareto suboptimality for both supply chain parties. However, we show that a more efficient, truth-sharing outcome can emerge as an equilibrium from a long-term relationship. In this equilibrium, forecast information is transmitted truthfully and trusted by the supplier, who in turn allocates the system-optimal capacity. This leaves both the customer and the supplier better-off, compared to the nontruthful-sharing equilibrium. We identify a multiperiod review strategy profile that supports the truthful-sharing equilibrium. The key element of this strategy is that the supplier computes a scoring index of the customer\u27s behavior that is updated over time and used to evaluate if the customer has sufficient incentive to share his private information truthfully in each transaction of the repeated game. Compared to trigger strategies, review strategies are more tolerant but require diligence and more monitoring effort