Hiddleston’s Causal Modeling Semantics and the Distinction between Forward-Tracking and Backtracking Counterfactuals

Some cases show that counterfactual conditionals (‘counterfactuals’ for short) are inherently ambiguous, equivocating between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactu- als. Elsewhere, I have proposed a causal modeling semantics, which takes this phenomenon to be generated by two kinds of causal manipulations. (Lee 2015; Lee 2016) In an important paper (Hiddleston 2005), Eric Hiddleston offers a different causal modeling semantics, which he claims to be able to explain away the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. In this paper, I discuss these two semantic treatments and argue that my (bifurcated) semantics is theoretically more promising than Hiddleston’s (unified) semantics

Processes, pre-emption and further problems

In this paper I will argue that what makes our ordinary judgements about token causation true can be explicated in terms of interferences into quasi-inertial processes. These interferences and quasi-inertial processes can in turn be fully explicated in scientific terms. In this sense the account presented here is reductive. I will furthermore argue that this version of a process-theory of causation can deal with the traditional problems that process theories have to face, such as the problem of misconnection and the problem of disconnection as well as with a problem concerning the mis-classification of pre-emption cases

Universality caused: the case of renormalization group explanation

Recently, many have argued that there are certain kinds of abstract mathematical explanations that are noncausal. In particular, the irrelevancy approach suggests that abstracting away irrelevant causal details can leave us with a noncausal explanation. In this paper, I argue that the common example of Renormalization Group explanations of universality used to motivate the irrelevancy approach deserves more critical attention. I argue that the reasons given by those who hold up RG as noncausal do not stand up to critical scrutiny. As a result, the irrelevancy approach and the line between casual and noncausal explanation deserves more scrutiny

The metaphysics of Machian frame-dragging

The paper investigates the kind of dependence relation that best portrays Machian frame-dragging in general relativity. The question is tricky because frame-dragging relates local inertial frames to distant distributions of matter in a time-independent way, thus establishing some sort of non-local link between the two. For this reason, a plain causal interpretation of frame-dragging faces huge challenges. The paper will shed light on the issue by using a generalized structural equation model analysis in terms of manipulationist counterfactuals recently applied in the context of metaphysical enquiry by Schaffer (2016) and Wilson (2017). The verdict of the analysis will be that frame-dragging is best understood in terms of a novel type of dependence relation that is half-way between causation and grounding

If Metrical Structure Were Not Dynamical, Counterfactuals in General Relativity Would Be Easy

General relativity poses serious problems for counterfactual propositions peculiar to it as a physical theory. Because these problems arise solely from the dynamical nature of spacetime geometry, they are shared by all schools of thought on how counterfactuals should be interpreted and understood. Given the role of counterfactuals in the characterization of, inter alia, many accounts of scientific laws, theory confirmation and causation, general relativity once again presents us with idiosyncratic puzzles any attempt to analyze and understand the nature of scientific knowledge must face.Comment: 10 page

Causal Inference When Counterfactuals Depend on the Proportion of All Subjects Exposed

The assumption that no subject's exposure affects another subject's outcome, known as the no-interference assumption, has long held a foundational position in the study of causal inference. However, this assumption may be violated in many settings, and in recent years has been relaxed considerably. Often this has been achieved with either the aid of a known underlying network, or the assumption that the population can be partitioned into separate groups, between which there is no interference, and within which each subject's outcome may be affected by all the other subjects in the group via the proportion exposed (the stratified interference assumption). In this paper, we instead consider a complete interference setting, in which each subject affects every other subject's outcome. In particular, we make the stratified interference assumption for a single group consisting of the entire sample. This can occur when the exposure is a shared resource whose efficacy is modified by the number of subjects among whom it is shared. We show that a targeted maximum likelihood estimator for the i.i.d.~setting can be used to estimate a class of causal parameters that includes direct effects and overall effects under certain interventions. This estimator remains doubly-robust, semiparametric efficient, and continues to allow for incorporation of machine learning under our model. We conduct a simulation study, and present results from a data application where we study the effect of a nurse-based triage system on the outcomes of patients receiving HIV care in Kenyan health clinics.Comment: 23 pages main article, 23 pages supplementary materials + references, 4 tables, 1 figur

Drift and evolutionary forces: scrutinizing the Newtonian analogy

This article analyzes the view of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. The analogy with Newtonian mechanics has been challenged due to the alleged mismatch between drift and the other evolutionary forces. Since genetic drift has no direction several authors tried to protect its status as a force: denying its lack of directionality, extending the notion of force and looking for a force in physics which also lacks of direction. I analyse these approaches, and although this strategy finally succeeds, this discussion overlooks the crucial point on the debate between causalists and statisticalists: the causal status of evolutionary theory

A Neglected Route to Realism About Quantum Mechanics

Bell's Theorem assumes that hidden variables are not influenced by future measurement settings. The assumption has sometimes been questioned, but the suggestion has been thought outlandish, even by the taxed standards of the discipline. (Bell thought that it led to fatalism.) The case for this reaction turns out to be surprisingly weak, however. We show that QM easily evades the standard objections to advanced action. And the approach has striking advantages, especially in avoiding the apparent conflict between Bell's Theorem and special relativity. The second part of the paper considers the broader question as to why advanced action seems so counterintuitive. We investigate the origins of our ordinary intuitions about causal asymmetry. It is argued that the view that the past does not depend on the future is largely anthropocentric, a kind of projection of our own temporal asymmetry. Many physicists have also reached this conclusion, but have thought that if causation has no objective direction, there is no objective content to an advanced action interpretation of QM. This turns out to be a mistake. From the ordinary subjective perspective, we can distinguish two sorts of objective world: one "looks as if" it contains only forward causation, the other ``looks as if'' it involves a mix of backward and forward causation. This clarifies the objective core of an advanced action interpretation of QM, and shows that there is an independent symmetry argument in favour of the approach.Comment: 35 pages, LaTex (forthcoming in MIND, July 1994; written for a philosophical audience, but perhaps of some interest here