A versatile infinite-state Markov reward model to study bottlenecks in 2-hop ad hoc networks

In a 2-hop IEEE 801.11-based wireless LAN, the distributed coordination function (DCF) tends to equally share the available capacity among the contending stations. Recently alternative capacity sharing strategies have been made possible. We propose a versatile infinite-state Markov reward model to study the bottleneck node in a 2-hop IEEE 801.11-based ad hoc network for different adaptive capacity sharing strategies. We use infinite-state stochastic Petri nets (iSPNs) to specify our model, from which the underlying QBD-type Markov-reward models are automatically derived. The impact of the different capacity sharing strategies is analyzed by CSRL model checking of the underlying infinite-state QBD, for which we provide new techniques. Our modeling approach helps in deciding under which circumstances which adaptive capacity sharing strategy is most appropriate

Knowledge sharing capability, absorptive capacity, and innovation capability: an empirical study of Indonesia's information and communication technology industry

This research investigates the relationships between knowledge sharing capability, absorptive capacity, and innovation capability. This research proposed and tested three hypotheses. The data was collected by conducting a survey on 114 companies of Indonesia’s information and communication technology industry, including a telecommunication service provider, a support service provider,network vendors, and consumer devices vendors. This study finds that absorptive capacity is the intervening factor between knowledge sharing capability and innovation capability. It also shows that potential absorptive capacity has a positive influence on realized absorptive capacity, and realized absorptive capacity has a positive influence on product and process innovation capability

A Neo-Kaleckian Model of Profit Sharing, Capacity Utilization and Economic Growth

This paper sets forth a Neo-Kaleckian model of capacity utilization and growth with distribution featuring a profit-sharing arrangement. While a given proportion of firms compensate workers with only a base wage, the remaining proportion do so with a base wage and a share of profits. Consistent with the empirical evidence, workers hired by profit-sharing firms have a higher productivity than their counterparts in base-wage firms. While a higher profit-sharing coefficient raises capacity utilization and growth irrespective of the distribution of compensation strategies across firms, a higher frequency of profit-sharing firms does likewise only if the profit-sharing coefficient is sufficiently high.profit sharing, productivity, capacity utilization, growth

On alternative approach for verifiable secret sharing

Secret sharing allows split/distributed control over the secret (e.g. master key). Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is the secret sharing extended by verification capacity. Usually verification comes at the price. We propose "free lunch", the approach that allows to overcome this inconvenience.Comment: This is poster that was presented on ESORICS2002 conference in Zurich. It consists of 4 color pages, with proposal and flowchart

A study of set-sharing analysis via cliques

We study the problem of efficient, scalable set-sharing analysis of logic programs. We use the idea of representing sharing information as a pair of abstract substitutions, one of which is a worst-case sharing representation called a clique set, which was previously proposed for the case of inferring pair-sharing. We use the clique-set representation for (1) inferring actual set-sharing information, and (2) analysis within a top-down framework. In particular, we define the abstract functions required by standard top-down analyses, both for sharing alone and also for the case of including freeness in addition to sharing. Our experimental evaluation supports the conclusion that, for inferring set-sharing, as it was the case for inferring pair-sharing, precision losses are limited, while useful efficiency gains are obtained. At the limit, the clique-set representation allowed analyzing some programs that exceeded memory capacity using classical sharing representations.Comment: 15 pages, 0 figure

Capacity Choice and Duopoly Incentives for Information Sharing

We examine a three-stage game in which duopolists face a random demand intercept. The firms first choose capacities, then decide whether to commit to share the private information they will receive about the intercept. After the private information is observed, firms choose output levels. Comparing the results to an alternative model without capacity choice or capacity constraints, we show the existence of a capacity choice stage may reverse the incentives to share information, and lead to equilibria in which information sharing occurs. We use binary uncertainty since the common linearnormal model cannot handle capacity constraints. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Kapazitätsentscheidungen und Duopolanreize bei Informationsaustausch) In dem Beitrag wird ein dreistufiges Spiel vorgestellt, in dem sich Duopolisten einer Nachfrage gegenübersehen, die eine Zufallsgröße ist. Die Unternehmen entscheiden auf der ersten Stufe über Kapazitäten, dann können sie sich freiwillig verpflichten, ihre privaten Information auszutauschen, die sie über das Marktvolumen erhalten werden. Nach der Beobachtung der privaten Information entscheiden die Unternehmen über die Angebotsmenge. Ein Vergleich der Ergebnisse dieses Spiels mit einem alternativen Modell ohne Kapazitätsentscheidung oder Kapazitätsbeschränkungen zeigt, daß die Existenz einer Kapazitätsentscheidungsstufe die Anreize zum Austausch von Informationen umkehren und zu Gleichgewichten führen kann, in denen Informationsaustausch stattfindet. In dem Spiel wird Unsicherheit binär modelliert, da das übliche linear-normalverteilte Modell keine Kapazitätsbeschränkungen erfassen kann.oligopoly and other forms of market imperfection; asymmetric and private information