Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome

We introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where firms first build capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choose a reservation price at which they are willing to supply their capacities. This model describes many markets more realistically than the model of Kreps and Scheinkman [Kreps, D., Scheinkman, J., 1983. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes. Bell J. Econ. 14, 326–337]. We show that in this new model every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.Publicad

Excess burden of taxation and environmental policy mix with a consumer-friendly firm

This study examines environmental policy mix of tradable emission permits and emission taxes in a duopoly model with a consumer-friendly firm. In the presence of excess burden of taxation, we analyze the interplay of the two policies in the non-equivalent conditions for welfare consequences. We show that emission tax can be redundant and thus policy mix is degenerated when both the excess burden of taxation and the degree of consumer-friendliness are insignificant. However, when the excess burden of taxation is significant, tradable permits policy with tax treatment should be accompanied to enhance welfare in the presence of a consumer-friendly firm. Finally, under the tax revenue-neutral case where the excess burden of taxation does not matter, environmental policy mix is also efficient if the degree of consumer-friendliness is sufficiently high

The effect of a dedicated terminal on vertical relations between the port authority and terminals

Debido al crecimiento en los últimos años del sector del transporte marítimo, surgen nuevas formas de gestión y nuevas formas de interactuar entre las Autoridades Portuarias, las empresas que operan en los puertos y las líneas navieras. Estas últimas, han logrado obtener la suficiente fuerza para, en algunos casos, integrar en su cadena de producción una terminal portuaria. En este trabajo tratamos de ver qué sucede con estos agentes cuando una línea naviera adquiere el control de una terminal, comprobando el efecto que produce en las cantidades ofertadas por el resto de empresas, así como en las tarifas portuarias. Para ello, nos hemos basado en el trabajo de Kaselimi et al. (2011) en el que modelizan una situación en la que hay, dos puertos idénticos, salvo por el número de operadores multiusuario que hay en cada uno de ellos. Los puertos se encuentran compitiendo entre ellos, y a su vez, las empresas que hay en ellos, también compiten entre sí, en un modelo de competencia de Cournot. Con los resultados del modelo de Kaselimi et al.(2011) hemos realizado una simulación del número de TOs en cada puerto, para comprobar cómo varían las cantidades ofertadas por las TOs, las tarifas de servicio, y las tarifas de navegación, cuando en el Puerto 1 una terminal pasa a ser dedicada. Concluimos que las terminales dedicadas pueden llegar a ser beneficiosas para el entorno portuario, siempre en función del número de empresas multiusuario que operen en el puerto. En cuanto a las aportaciones de otros autores al tema de estudio y temas relacionados podemos ver que la mayoría afirma que las terminales dedicadas suelen ser siempre beneficiosas, al menos, para la industria.Abstract: Due to the growth in recent years of the maritime transport sector, new forms of management and new ways of interacting between Port Authorities, companies that operate in ports and shipping lines emerge. The latter have managed to obtain sufficient strength to, in some cases, integrate a port terminal into their production chain. In this work we try to see what happens to these agents when a shipping line acquires control of a terminal, checking the effect it produces on the quantities offered by other companies, as well as on port rates. For this, we have based ourselves on the work of Kaselimi et al. (2011) in which they model a situation in which there are two identical ports, except for the number of multi-user operators that exist in each of them. The ports are competing with each other, and in turn, the companies that are in them, also compete with each other, in a Cournot competition model. With the results of the model by Kaselimi et al. (2011), we have simulated the number of TOs in each port, to check how the quantities offered by the TOs, service fees, and navigation fees vary, when in the Port 1 a terminal becomes dedicated. We conclude that dedicated terminals can be beneficial for the port environment, always depending on the number of multi-user companies that operate in the port. Regarding the contributions of other authors to the study topic and related topics, we can see that the majority affirm that dedicated terminals are always beneficial, at least for the industry.Grado en Economí

Games in the Eurasian gas supply network: Multinational bargaining, Strategic investment, and Hold-up

The paper analyzes multilateral relations and distortions of investments in the Eurasian gas network, supplying gas from countries of the Former Soviet Union to Western Europe. We use a two stage model of endogenous coalition formation to study cooperation among gas producers and transiters, some lacking the ability to make long-term commitments. In the first stage, the players cooperate to invest in pipelines and contract the sharing of rents. In the second stage, players form supply chains and bargain over supply profit sharing. Since competing supply chains can be formed, cooperation involves externalities. Our quantitative analysis predicts overinvestment as well as underinvestment in the network as an attempt to create countervailing power. Among other things we explain why Russia invests in the expensive pipeline through the Baltic sea and why Caspian gas producers are eager to build expensive bypasses around Russia

Glasfaserausbau im deutschen Telekommunikationsmarkt: Theorien und Evidenz zu Wettbewerb, Kooperationen und Regulierung

Der zügige Ausbau von hochbreitbandigen Glasfasernetzen gilt als wesentlich für die Zukunftsfähigkeit Deutschlands. Doch auch wenn die Politik ihn nachdrücklich fordert, kommt dieser Ausbau nur langsam voran. Das liegt zum einen an den sehr hohen Investitionsaufwänden. Um diese Hürde zu überwinden, bringt die Politik Subventionen im Milliardenbereich über Förderprogramme in Stellung. Zum anderen liegt es aber auch – und damit befasst sich diese Arbeit – an der bestehenden Marktstruktur und dem Wettbewerb mit konkurrierenden Breitbandnetzen. Dieser Infrastrukturwettbewerb stellt eine weitere wesentliche Hürde auf dem Weg zu einem flächendeckenden Glasfasernetzausbau dar. Woran dies im Detail liegt, wird in dieser Arbeit analysiert. Zusätzlich werden Werkzeuge zur Abschwächung dieser Problematik entwickelt