A Two-Player Game of Life

We present a new extension of Conway's game of life for two players, which we call p2life. P2life allows one of two types of token, black or white, to inhabit a cell, and adds competitive elements into the birth and survival rules of the original game. We solve the mean-field equation for p2life and determine by simulation that the asymptotic density of p2life approaches 0.0362.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figure

Group-Oriented Values, Rules and Cooperation

collectivism, cooperation, economic development, game theory, individualism, institutions, conflicts

The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation

When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the interaction between a learner and agents in a world where all agents are equally able to manipulate their features in an attempt to "trick" a published classifier. In cases of real world classification, however, an agent's ability to adapt to an algorithm is not simply a function of her personal interest in receiving a positive classification, but is bound up in a complex web of social factors that affect her ability to pursue certain action responses. In this paper, we adapt models of strategic manipulation to capture dynamics that may arise in a setting of social inequality wherein candidate groups face different costs to manipulation. We find that whenever one group's costs are higher than the other's, the learner's equilibrium strategy exhibits an inequality-reinforcing phenomenon wherein the learner erroneously admits some members of the advantaged group, while erroneously excluding some members of the disadvantaged group. We also consider the effects of interventions in which a learner subsidizes members of the disadvantaged group, lowering their costs in order to improve her own classification performance. Here we encounter a paradoxical result: there exist cases in which providing a subsidy improves only the learner's utility while actually making both candidate groups worse-off--even the group receiving the subsidy. Our results reveal the potentially adverse social ramifications of deploying tools that attempt to evaluate an individual's "quality" when agents' capacities to adaptively respond differ.Comment: 29 pages, 4 figure

Lenia and Expanded Universe

We report experimental extensions of Lenia, a continuous cellular automata family capable of producing lifelike self-organizing autonomous patterns. The rule of Lenia was generalized into higher dimensions, multiple kernels, and multiple channels. The final architecture approaches what can be seen as a recurrent convolutional neural network. Using semi-automatic search e.g. genetic algorithm, we discovered new phenomena like polyhedral symmetries, individuality, self-replication, emission, growth by ingestion, and saw the emergence of "virtual eukaryotes" that possess internal division of labor and type differentiation. We discuss the results in the contexts of biology, artificial life, and artificial intelligence.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, 1 table; submitted to ALIFE 2020 conferenc

Spartan Daily, October 19, 1950

Volume 39, Issue 16https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/11437/thumbnail.jp

Localization dynamics in a binary two-dimensional cellular automaton: the Diffusion Rule

We study a two-dimensional cellular automaton (CA), called Diffusion Rule (DR), which exhibits diffusion-like dynamics of propagating patterns. In computational experiments we discover a wide range of mobile and stationary localizations (gliders, oscillators, glider guns, puffer trains, etc), analyze spatio-temporal dynamics of collisions between localizations, and discuss possible applications in unconventional computing.Comment: Accepted to Journal of Cellular Automat

Spartan Daily, April 29, 1959

Volume 46, Issue 115https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/3894/thumbnail.jp

Bad politicians

We present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials. Quality has (at least) two dimensions: competence and honesty. Voters prefer competent and honest policymakers, so high-quality citizens have a greater chance of being elected to office. But low-quality citizens have a “comparative advantage” in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than the market wages of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). In the political equilibrium, the average quality of the elected body depends on the structure of rewards from holding public office. Under the assumption that the rewards from office are increasing in the average quality of office holders there can be multiple equilibria in quality. Under the assumption that incumbent policymakers set the rewards for future policymakers there can be path dependence in quality.Corruption

Ariel - Volume 6 Number 2

Editors Mark Dembert J.D. Kanofsky Frank Chervenak John Lammie Curt Cummings Entertainment Robert Breckenridge Joe Conti Gary Kaskey Photographer Larry Glazerman Overseas Editor Mike Sinason Humorist Jim McCann Staff Ken Jaffe Bob Skarloff Halley Faust Jim Burk