Conditioning prices on search behaviour

We consider a market in which �firms can partially observe each consumer's search behavior in the market. In our main model, a �firm knows whether a consumer is visiting it for the �first time or whether she is returning after a previous visit. Firms have an incentive to offer a lower price on a �first visit than a return visit, so that new consumers are offered a "buy-now" discount. The ability to offer such discounts acts to raise all prices in the market. If �firms cannot commit to their buy-later price, in many cases �firms make "exploding" offers, and consumers never return to a previously sampled �rm. Likewise, if �firms must charge the same price to all consumers, regardless of search history, we show that they sometimes have the incentive to make exploding offers. We also consider other ways in which �firms could use information about search behaviour to determine their prices

Definition, Measurement and Determinants of the Consumer's Willingness to Pay: a Critical Synthesis and Directions for Further Research

Differentiated prices, bundling, Web auctions : firms' pricing practices are evolving. When there is no market or for customised pricing, the willingness-to-pay concept seems to be interesting. This article aims at presenting a synthesis of the marketing research stream relative to willingness to pay. First, a definition of the concept is given and compared to other similar concepts, notably reference price and acceptable price. Then the methods of measurement are presented, compared to those used to measure elasticity and criticized. Furthermore, the research on external determinants of willingness to pay is commented. Finally, numerous directions for further research are proposed.willingness to pay, price elasticity, reference price, acceptable price, conjoint analysis, contingent valuation, Vickrey auctions, BDM lottery, prices

Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law

This Article is about “big data” and antitrust law. Big data, for my purposes, refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of consumer data by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct but to economies of scale. This Article discusses three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require a reform of the antitrust laws. Some are described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v. American Express Co., should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law. I. Introduction II. Platforms III. Competition Issues ... A. Kill Zone Expropriation ... B. Acquisition of Nascent Rivals ... C. Denial of Access to Data IV. Antitrust Law V. Conclusio

Conditioning prices on search behaviour

We consider a market in which firms can partially observe each consumer's search behavior in the market. In our main model, a firm knows whether a consumer is visiting it for the first time or whether she is returning after a previous visit. Firms have an incentive to offer a lower price on a first visit than a return visit, so that new consumers are offered a "buy-now" discount. The ability to offer such discounts acts to raise all prices in the market. If firms cannot commit to their buy-later price, in many cases firms make "exploding" offers, and consumers never return to a previously sampled firm. Likewise, if firms must charge the same price to all consumers, regardless of search history, we show that they sometimes have the incentive to make exploding offers. We also consider other ways in which firms could use information about search behaviour to determine their prices.Consumer search; oligopoly; price discrimination; high-pressure selling; exploding offers; costly recall

Supermarket Competition through Price Promotions: A Cross Category Analysis

This study takes an important first step at quantifying the nature of competition between major supermarket chains through price promotions. Using data that covers virtually the entire product menus of supermarkets representing two major chains in 18 cities, I examine both the effect of direct competition on promotional intensity and the nature of promotional competition itself. In a counterintuitive finding, there appears to slightly less promotional activity in cities in which both chains compete directly, as compared to cities in which only one chain operates. Moreover, most promotional activity tends to be retaliatory, rather than accommodating, in nature. This study takes an important first step at quantifying the nature of competition between major supermarket chains through price promotions. Using data that covers virtually the entire product menus of supermarkets representing two major chains in 18 cities, I examine both the effect of direct competition on promotional intensity and the nature of promotional competition itself. In a counterintuitive finding, there appears to slightly less promotional activity in cities in which both chains compete directly, as compared to cities in which only one chain operates. Moreover, most promotional activity tends to be retaliatory, rather than accommodating, in nature.Agribusiness, Demand and Price Analysis,

Team One Carbon Catcher Design Report

Overview The burning of fossil fuels largely contributes to the increase of CO2 in the atmosphere. The US Department of Transportation alone contributed almost 6 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions in 2018 (EIA). Due to this, this report proposes recycling captured CO2 into a base for cleaner burning fuel in order to reduce emissions from the transportation industry and many others, which has the potential to impact many areas. Extraction of atmospheric CO2 is possible through a membrane filtration system based on traditional nitrogen generation. The passive filtration system autonomously separates the CO2 from other air components, thereby reducing energy consumption. The system's working sensors and actuators utilize similar energy saving strategies, such as distributing cloud-computing services over multiple servers and mainframes to reduce computing power. The movement of air is directed by a scalable fan device, which is presented as a modular design to allow customization of fan parts to specific size and installation requirements. As an integrated device, Team 1’s Carbon Catcher operates with a high efficiency in order to maximize the commercial opportunity of converting captured CO2 into cleaner fuel while also reducing CO2 emissions and the greenhouse effect. Goal The goal of Team 1’s Carbon Catcher project proposal is to design a cost-effective, scalable, and modular atmospheric carbon dioxide removal system that is capable of being utilized in a range of urban environments and may fit a variety of different customer requirements or requests