16,988 research outputs found

    The Takayama and Judge Price and Allocation Models and its application in non-linear Price Transmission Analysis Approaches

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    Demand and Price Analysis, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, C15, C18, C62,

    [my]-Bis(diphenylphosphanyl)borato-[kappa]2P:P'-bis[dicarbonyl([eta]5-cyclopentadienyl)iron(II)] tetrachloridoferrate(III) chloroform solvate

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    The title compound, [Fe2(C5H5)2(C24H22BP2)(CO)4][FeCl4]·CHCl3, is an oxidation product of CpFe(CO)2PPh2BH3. One pair of phenyl rings attached to the two different P atoms are almost parallel, as are the other pair [dihedral angles = 8.7 (5) and 8.9 (5)°]. The planes of the two cyclopentadienyl rings are inclined by 26.8 (7)° with respect to each other. The carbonyl groups at each Fe atom are almost perpendicular [C-Fe-C = 92.6 (6) and 94.3 (5)°]. Key indicators: single-crystal X-ray study; T = 173 K; mean σ(C–C) = 0.019 Å; R factor = 0.112; wR factor = 0.177; data-to-parameter ratio = 16.8

    Tetra­aceto­nitrile­lithium tetra­iso­thio­cyanato­borate

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    The crystal structure of the title salt, [Li(CH3CN)4][B(NCS)4], is composed of discrete cations and anions. Both the Li and B atoms show a tetra­hedral coordination by four equal ligands. The aceto­nitrile and iso­thio­cyanate ligands are linear. The bond angles at the B atom are close to the ideal tetra­hedral value [108.92 (18)–109.94 (16)°], but the bond angles at the Li atom show larger deviations [106.15 (17)–113.70 (17)°]

    Glycyl-L-proline hemihydrate at 298 K

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    The crystal structure of glycyl-L-proline (GLY-PRO) hemihydrate, C(7)H(12)N(2)O(3)(.)0.5H(2)O, has two molecules of GLY-PRO in the asymmetric unit; one molecule adopts the cis configuration at the peptide bond and the other adopts the trans configuration.</p

    Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities

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    This paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. We contribute to existing knowledge by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). As an illustrative example, we describe a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model of the major agents who exploit the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.Baltic Sea cod, characteristic function, coalition game, cooperation, fisheries, nucleolus, Shapley value, sharing rules, stability of cooperation, Environmental Economics and Policy, C62, C70, Q22, Q28,
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