197 research outputs found
Byzantine Agreement with Optimal Early Stopping, Optimal Resilience and Polynomial Complexity
We provide the first protocol that solves Byzantine agreement with optimal
early stopping ( rounds) and optimal resilience () using
polynomial message size and computation.
All previous approaches obtained sub-optimal results and used resolve rules
that looked only at the immediate children in the EIG (\emph{Exponential
Information Gathering}) tree. At the heart of our solution are new resolve
rules that look at multiple layers of the EIG tree.Comment: full version of STOC 2015 abstrac
In Search for an Optimal Authenticated Byzantine Agreement
In this paper, we challenge the conventional approach of state machine replication systems to design deterministic agreement protocols in the eventually synchronous communication model. We first prove that no such protocol can guarantee bounded communication cost before the global stabilization time and propose a different approach that hopes for the best (synchrony) but prepares for the worst (asynchrony). Accordingly, we design an optimistic byzantine agreement protocol that first tries an efficient deterministic algorithm that relies on synchrony for termination only, and then, only if an agreement was not reached due to asynchrony, the protocol uses a randomized asynchronous protocol for fallback that guarantees termination with probability 1.
We formally prove that our protocol achieves optimal communication complexity under all network conditions and failure scenarios. We first prove a lower bound of ?(ft+ t) for synchronous deterministic byzantine agreement protocols, where t is the failure threshold, and f is the actual number of failures. Then, we present a tight upper bound and use it for the synchronous part of the optimistic protocol. Finally, for the asynchronous fallback, we use a variant of the (optimal) VABA protocol, which we reconstruct to safely combine it with the synchronous part.
We believe that our adaptive to failures synchronous byzantine agreement protocol has an independent interest since it is the first protocol we are aware of which communication complexity optimally depends on the actual number of failures
The Contest Between Simplicity and Efficiency in Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement
In the wake of the decisive impossibility result of Fischer, Lynch, and
Paterson for deterministic consensus protocols in the aynchronous model with
just one failure, Ben-Or and Bracha demonstrated that the problem could be
solved with randomness, even for Byzantine failures. Both protocols are natural
and intuitive to verify, and Bracha's achieves optimal resilience. However, the
expected running time of these protocols is exponential in general. Recently,
Kapron, Kempe, King, Saia, and Sanwalani presented the first efficient
Byzantine agreement algorithm in the asynchronous, full information model,
running in polylogarithmic time. Their algorithm is Monte Carlo and drastically
departs from the simple structure of Ben-Or and Bracha's Las Vegas algorithms.
In this paper, we begin an investigation of the question: to what extent is
this departure necessary? Might there be a much simpler and intuitive Las Vegas
protocol that runs in expected polynomial time? We will show that the
exponential running time of Ben-Or and Bracha's algorithms is no mere accident
of their specific details, but rather an unavoidable consequence of their
general symmetry and round structure. We define a natural class of "fully
symmetric round protocols" for solving Byzantine agreement in an asynchronous
setting and show that any such protocol can be forced to run in expected
exponential time by an adversary in the full information model. We assume the
adversary controls Byzantine processors for , where is an
arbitrary positive constant . We view our result as a step toward
identifying the level of complexity required for a polynomial-time algorithm in
this setting, and also as a guide in the search for new efficient algorithms.Comment: 21 page
On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement
We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that:
1) BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+ o(1)].
2) BA protocols resilient against n/4 corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1-Theta(1).
3) For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)].
The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI).
The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS\u2717) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability
Randomized protocols for asynchronous consensus
The famous Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson impossibility proof shows that it is
impossible to solve the consensus problem in a natural model of an asynchronous
distributed system if even a single process can fail. Since its publication,
two decades of work on fault-tolerant asynchronous consensus algorithms have
evaded this impossibility result by using extended models that provide (a)
randomization, (b) additional timing assumptions, (c) failure detectors, or (d)
stronger synchronization mechanisms than are available in the basic model.
Concentrating on the first of these approaches, we illustrate the history and
structure of randomized asynchronous consensus protocols by giving detailed
descriptions of several such protocols.Comment: 29 pages; survey paper written for PODC 20th anniversary issue of
Distributed Computin
SoK: A Consensus Taxonomy in the Blockchain Era
Consensus (a.k.a. Byzantine agreement) is arguably one of the most fundamental problems in distributed systems, playing also an important role in the area of cryptographic protocols as the enabler of a (secure) broadcast functionality. While the problem has a long and rich history and has been analyzed from many different perspectives, recently, with the advent of blockchain protocols like Bitcoin, it has experienced renewed interest from a much wider community of researchers and has seen its application expand to various novel settings.
One of the main issues in consensus research is the many different variants of the problem that exist as well as the various ways the problem behaves when different setup, computational assumptions and network models are considered. In this work we perform a systematization of knowledge in the landscape of consensus research starting with the original formulation in the early 1980s up to the present
blockchain-based new class of consensus protocols. Our work is a roadmap for studying the consensus problem under its many guises, classifying the way it operates in many settings and highlighting the exciting new applications that have emerged in the blockchain era
Early Stopping for Any Number of Corruptions
Minimizing the round complexity of byzantine broadcast is a fundamental question in distributed computing and cryptography. In this work, we present the first early stopping byzantine broadcast protocol that tolerates up to malicious corruptions and terminates in rounds for any execution with actual corruptions. Our protocol is deterministic, adaptively secure, and works assuming a plain public key infrastructure. Prior early-stopping protocols all either require honest majority or tolerate only up to malicious corruptions while requiring either trusted setup or strong number theoretic hardness assumptions. As our key contribution, we show a novel tool called a polariser that allows us to transfer certificate-based strategies from the honest majority setting to settings with a dishonest majority
Robust P2P Primitives Using SGX Enclaves
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems such as BitTorrent and Bitcoin are susceptible to serious attacks from byzantine nodes that join as peers. Research has explored many adversarial models with additional assumptions, ranging from mild (such as pre-established PKI) to strong (such as the existence of common random coins). One such widely-studied model is the general-omission model, which yields simple protocols with good efficiency, but has been considered impractical or unrealizable since it artificially limits the adversary only to omitting messages.
In this work, we study the setting of a synchronous network wherein peer nodes have CPUs equipped with a recent trusted computing mechanism called Intel SGX. In this model, we observe that the byzantine adversary reduces to the adversary in the general-omission model. As a first result, we show that by leveraging SGX features, we eliminate any source of advantage for a byzantine adversary beyond that gained by omitting messages, making the general-omission model realizable. Second, we present new protocols that improve the communication complexity of two fundamental primitives
— reliable broadcast and common random coins (or beacons) — in the synchronous setting, by utilizing SGX features. Our evaluation of 1000 nodes running on 40 DeterLab machines
confirms theoretical efficiency claim
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