21 research outputs found
A New Paradigm in Split Manufacturing: Lock the FEOL, Unlock at the BEOL
Split manufacturing was introduced as an effective countermeasure against
hardware-level threats such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of
hardware Trojans. Nevertheless, the security promise of split manufacturing has
been challenged by various attacks, which exploit the well-known working
principles of physical design tools to infer the missing BEOL interconnects. In
this work, we advocate a new paradigm to enhance the security for split
manufacturing. Based on Kerckhoff's principle, we protect the FEOL layout in a
formal and secure manner, by embedding keys. These keys are purposefully
implemented and routed through the BEOL in such a way that they become
indecipherable to the state-of-the-art FEOL-centric attacks. We provide our
secure physical design flow to the community. We also define the security of
split manufacturing formally and provide the associated proofs. At the same
time, our technique is competitive with current schemes in terms of layout
overhead, especially for practical, large-scale designs (ITC'99 benchmarks).Comment: DATE 2019 (https://www.date-conference.com/conference/session/4.5
Hardware Trojan Detection on a PCB Through Differential Power Monitoring
There is a general consensus that contemporary electronics are at risk of cyber-attacks or malicious modifications, such as Hardware Trojans (HT). This makes it crucial to develop reliable countermeasures at both Integrated Circuit (IC) and Printed Circuit Board (PCB) levels. While HT detection at IC level has been widely studied in the past several years, there is still very limited research carried out to tackle HTs on PCBs. We propose a power analysis method for detecting HT components implanted on PCBs. An experimental setup, using a hardware prototype, is built and tested for verification of the methodology, taking process and temperature variations into account. The results confirm the ability to detect alien components on a PCB and provide directions for further research. The performance degradation of the original PCB due to the implementation of the proposed approach is negligible. The area overhead of the proposed method is small, related to the original PCB design, and consists of Sub Power Monitors of individual ICs on the PCB and Main Power Monitor for the overall power measurement of the PCB. To the best of our knowledge this research is the first to develop a PCB HT detection methodology using power analysis
Security Attack Models for Split Manufacturing of Integrated Circuits
Split manufacturing of integrated circuits reduces vulnerabilities introduced by an untrusted foundry by manufacturing only a part of design at an untrusted high-end foundry and the remaining part at a trusted low-end foundry. Unfortunately, a naïve spilt manufacturing alone does not ensure security. An attacker can use proximity attack to undermine the security offered by split manufacturing. However, this attack is applicable only to hierarchical designs.
We propose a physical attack model for split manufacturing for industry-standard/ relevant flattened designs. Our attack uses heuristics of physical design tools, which outperform previous attack. We also develop a logic-aware physical attack considering logic redundancy, which identifies incorrect connections effectively. The effectiveness of proposed techniques is demonstrated by simulations on benchmark circuits. Our attack success rate is ~10× that of the proximity attack; our attack predicts 80% of the missing BEOL connections correctly, while the proximity attack predicts only 8% for flattened designs