283 research outputs found
Large transitive models in local {\rm ZFC}
This paper is a sequel to \cite{Tz10}, where a local version of ZFC, LZFC,
was introduced and examined and transitive models of ZFC with properties that
resemble large cardinal properties, namely Mahlo and -indescribable
models, were considered. By analogy we refer to such models as "large models",
and the properties in question as "large model properties". Continuing here in
the same spirit we consider further large model properties, that resemble
stronger large cardinals, namely, "elementarily embeddable", "extendible" and
"strongly extendible", "critical" and "strongly critical", "self-critical'' and
"strongly self-critical", the definitions of which involve elementary
embeddings. Each large model property gives rise to a localization axiom
saying that every set belongs to a transitive model of
ZFC satisfying . The theories + are local analogues of the theories ZFC+"there
is a proper class of large cardinals ", where is a large cardinal
property. If is the property of strong extendibility, it is shown
that proves Powerset and -Collection. In order to
refute over LZFC, we combine the existence of strongly critical models
with an axiom of different flavor, the Tall Model Axiom (). can also
be refuted by plus the axiom saying that "there is a greatest
cardinal", although it is not known if is consistent over LZFC.
Finally Vop\v{e}nka's Principle () and its impact on LZFC are examined. It
is shown that proves Powerset and Replacement, i.e., ZFC
is fully recovered. The same is true for some weaker variants of . Moreover the theories LZFC+ and ZFC+ are shown
to be identical.Comment: 32 page
(b2023 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of some people (2006-2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in physics (quantum mechanics, cosmology), cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and philosophy (this manuscript would require a REVOLUTION in international academy environment!)
(b2023 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of some people (2006-2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in physics (quantum mechanics, cosmology), cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and philosophy (this manuscript would require a REVOLUTION in international academy environment!
Views from a peak:Generalisations and descriptive set theory
This dissertation has two major threads, one is mathematical, namely descriptive set theory, the other is philosophical, namely generalisation in mathematics. Descriptive set theory is the study of the behaviour of definable subsets of a given structure such as the real numbers. In the core mathematical chapters, we provide mathematical results connecting descriptive set theory and generalised descriptive set theory. Using these, we give a philosophical account of the motivations for, and the nature of, generalisation in mathematics.In Chapter 3, we stratify set theories based on this descriptive complexity. The axiom of countable choice for reals is one of the most basic fragments of the axiom of choice needed in many parts of mathematics. Descriptive choice principles are a further stratification of this fragment by the descriptive complexity of the sets. We provide a separation technique for descriptive choice principles based on Jensen forcing. Our results generalise a theorem by Kanovei.Chapter 4 gives the essentials of a generalised real analysis, that is a real analysis on generalisations of the real numbers to higher infinities. This builds on work by Galeotti and his coauthors. We generalise classical theorems of real analysis to certain sets of functions, strengthening continuity, and disprove other classical theorems. We also show that a certain cardinal property, the tree property, is equivalent to the Extreme Value Theorem for a set of functions which generalize the continuous functions.The question of Chapter 5 is whether a robust notion of infinite sums can be developed on generalisations of the real numbers to higher infinities. We state some incompatibility results, which suggest not. We analyse several candidate notions of infinite sum, both from the literature and more novel, and show which of the expected properties of a notion of sum they fail.In Chapter 6, we study the descriptive set theory arising from a generalization of topology, κ-topology, which is used in the previous two chapters. We show that the theory is quite different from that of the standard (full) topology. Differences include a collapsing Borel hierarchy, a lack of universal or complete sets, Lebesgue’s ‘great mistake’ holds (projections do not increase complexity), a strict hierarchy of notions of analyticity, and a failure of Suslin’s theorem.Lastly, in Chapter 7, we give a philosophical account of the nature of generalisation in mathematics, and describe the methodological reasons that mathematicians generalise. In so doing, we distinguish generalisation from other processes of change in mathematics, such as abstraction and domain expansion. We suggest a semantic account of generalisation, where two pieces of mathematics constitute a generalisation if they have a certain relation of content, along with an increased level of generality
Indeterminacy and the law of the excluded middle
This thesis is an investigation into indeterminacy in the foundations of mathematics and its possible consequences for the applicability of the law of the excluded middle (LEM). It characterises different ways in which the natural numbers as well as the sets may be understood to be indeterminate, and asks in what sense this would cease to support applicability of LEM to reasoning with them. The first part of the thesis reviews the indeterminacy phenomena on which the argument is based and argues for a distinction between two notions of indeterminacy: a) indeterminacy as applied to domains and b) indefiniteness as applied to concepts. It then addresses possible attempts to secure determinacy in both cases. The second part of the thesis discusses the advantages that an argument from indeterminacy has over traditional intuitionistic arguments against LEM, and it provides the framework in which conditions for the applicability of LEM can be explicated in the setting of indeterminacy. The final part of the thesis then applies these findings to concrete cases of indeterminacy. With respect to indeterminacy of domains, I note some problems for establishing a rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of the height of the set theoretic hierarchy. I show that a coherent argument can be made for the rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of its width, and assess its philosophical commitments. A final chapter addresses the notion of indefiniteness of our concepts of set and number and asks how this might affect the applicability of LEM
On Notions of Provability
In this thesis, we study notions of provability, i.e. formulas B(x,y) such that a formula
ϕ is provable in T if, and only if, there is m ∈ N such that T ⊢ B(⌜ϕ⌝,m) (m plays the
role of a parameter); the usual notion of provability, k-step provability (also known as
k-provability), s-symbols provability are examples of notions of provability.
We develop general results concerning notions of provability, but we also study in
detail concrete notions. We present partial results concerning the decidability of kprovability
for Peano Arithmetic (PA), and we study important problems concerning
k-provability, such as Kreisel’s Conjecture and Montagna’s Problem:
(∀n ∈ N.T ⊢k steps ϕ(n)) =⇒ T ⊢ ∀x.ϕ(x), [Kreisel’s Conjecture]
and
Does PA ⊢k steps PrPA(⌜ϕ⌝)→ϕ imply PA ⊢k steps ϕ? [Montagna’s Problem]
Incompleteness, Undefinability of Truth, and Recursion are different entities that
share important features; we study this in detail and we trace these entities to common
results.
We present numeral forms of completeness and consistency, numeral completeness
and numeral consistency, respectively; numeral completeness guarantees that, whenever
a Σb
1(S12
)-formula ϕ(⃗x ) is such that ⃗Q
⃗x .ϕ(⃗x ) is true (where ⃗Q
is any array of quantifiers),
then this very fact can be proved inside S12
, more precisely S12
⊢ ⃗Q
⃗x .Prτ (⌜ϕ(
•⃗
x )⌝). We
examine these two results from a mathematical point of view by presenting the minimal
conditions to state them and by finding consequences of them, and from a philosophical
point of view by relating them to Hilbert’s Program.
The derivability condition “provability implies provable provability” is one of the main
derivability conditions used to derive the Second Incompleteness Theorem and is known
to be very sensitive to the underlying theory one has at hand. We create a weak theory
G2 to study this condition; this is a theory for the complexity class FLINSPACE. We also
relate properties of G2 to equality between computational classes.O tema desta tese são noções de demonstração; estas últimas são fórmulas B(x,y) tais que
uma fórmula ϕ é demonstrável em T se, e só se, existe m ∈ N tal que T ⊢ B(⌜ϕ⌝,m) (m
desempenha o papel de um parâmetro). A noção usual de demonstração, demonstração
em k-linhas (demonstração-k), demonstração em s-símbolos são exemplos de noções de
demonstração.
Desenvolvemos resultados gerais sobre noções de demonstração, mas também estudamos
exemplos concretos. Damos a conhecer resultados parciais sobre a decidibilidade da
demonstração-k para a Aritmética de Peano (PA), e estudamos dois problemas conhecidos
desta área, a Conjectura de Kreisel e o Problema de Montagna:
(∀n ∈ N.T ⊢k steps ϕ(n)) =⇒ T ⊢ ∀x.ϕ(x), [Conjectura de Kreisel]
e
PA ⊢k steps PrPA(⌜ϕ⌝)→ϕ implica PA ⊢k steps ϕ? [Problema de Montagna]
A Incompletude, a Incapacidade de Definir Verdade, e Recursão são entidades que
têm em comum características relevantes; nós estudamos estas entidades em detalhe e
apresentamos resultados que são simultaneamente responsáveis pelas mesmas.
Além disso, apresentamos formas numerais de completude e consistência, a completude
numeral e a consistência numeral, respectivamente; a completude numeral assegura
que, quando uma fórmula-Σb
1(S12) ϕ(⃗x ) é tal que ⃗Q
⃗x .ϕ(⃗x ) é verdadeira, então este facto
pode ser verificado dentro de S12, mais precisamente S12
⊢ ⃗Q
⃗x .Prτ (⌜ϕ(
•⃗
x )⌝). Este dois resultados
são analisados de um ponto de vista matemático onde apresentamos as condições
mínimas para os demonstrar e apresentamos consequências dos mesmos, e de um ponto
de vista filosófico, onde relacionamos os mesmos com o Programa de Hilbert.
A condição de derivabilidade “demonstração implica demonstrabilidade da demonstração”
é uma das condições usadas para derivar o Segundo Teorema da Incompletude e
sabemos ser muito sensível à teoria de base escolhida. Nós criámos uma teoria fraca G2
para estudar esta condição; esta é uma teoria para a classe de complexidade FLINSPACE.
Também relacionámos propriedades de G2 com igualdades entre classes de complexidade
computacional
A generic absoluteness principle consistent with large continuum
We state a new generic absoluteness principle, and use Shelah's memory
iteration technique to show that it is consistent with the large continuum. We
also show that the principle implies the Moore's measuring principle.Comment: Comments are welcome. This is the preliminary version of the pape
Gabriel Vacariu (c2023 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of some people (2006-2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in physics (quantum mechanics, cosmology), cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and philosophy
Unbelievable similar ideas to my ideas published long before..
Rethinking inconsistent mathematics
This dissertation has two main goals. The first is to provide a practice-based analysis of the field of inconsistent mathematics: what motivates it? what role does logic have in it? what distinguishes it from classical mathematics? is it alternative or revolutionary? The second goal is to introduce and defend a new conception of inconsistent mathematics - queer incomaths - as a particularly effective answer to feminist critiques of classical logic and mathematics. This sets the stage for a genuine revolution in mathematics, insofar as it suggests the need for a shift in mainstream attitudes about the rolee of logic and ethics in the practice of mathematics
- …