PotLLL: A Polynomial Time Version of LLL With Deep Insertions

Lattice reduction algorithms have numerous applications in number theory, algebra, as well as in cryptanalysis. The most famous algorithm for lattice reduction is the LLL algorithm. In polynomial time it computes a reduced basis with provable output quality. One early improvement of the LLL algorithm was LLL with deep insertions (DeepLLL). The output of this version of LLL has higher quality in practice but the running time seems to explode. Weaker variants of DeepLLL, where the insertions are restricted to blocks, behave nicely in practice concerning the running time. However no proof of polynomial running time is known. In this paper PotLLL, a new variant of DeepLLL with provably polynomial running time, is presented. We compare the practical behavior of the new algorithm to classical LLL, BKZ as well as blockwise variants of DeepLLL regarding both the output quality and running time.Comment: 17 pages, 8 figures; extended version of arXiv:1212.5100 [cs.CR

Tensor-based trapdoors for CVP and their application to public key cryptography

We propose two trapdoors for the Closest-Vector-Problem in lattices (CVP) related to the lattice tensor product. Using these trapdoors we set up a lattice-based cryptosystem which resembles to the McEliece scheme

Worst-Case Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev Reduced Lattice Bases

The Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev reduction plays a central role in strong lattice reduction algorithms. By building upon a technique introduced by Ajtai, we show the existence of Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev reduced bases that are arguably least reduced. We prove that for such bases, Kannan's algorithm solving the shortest lattice vector problem requires d^{\frac{d}{2\e}(1+o(1))} bit operations in dimension $d$. This matches the best complexity upper bound known for this algorithm. These bases also provide lower bounds on Schnorr's constants $\alpha_d$ and $\beta_d$ that are essentially equal to the best upper bounds. Finally, we also show the existence of particularly bad bases for Schnorr's hierarchy of reductions

A Tale of Three Signatures: practical attack of ECDSA with wNAF

One way of attacking ECDSA with wNAF implementation for the scalar multiplication is to perform a side-channel analysis to collect information, then use a lattice based method to recover the secret key. In this paper, we reinvestigate the construction of the lattice used in one of these methods, the Extended Hidden Number Problem (EHNP). We find the secret key with only 3 signatures, thus reaching the theoretical bound given by Fan, Wang and Cheng, whereas best previous methods required at least 4 signatures in practice. Our attack is more efficient than previous attacks, in particular compared to times reported by Fan et al. at CCS 2016 and for most cases, has better probability of success. To obtain such results, we perform a detailed analysis of the parameters used in the attack and introduce a preprocessing method which reduces by a factor up to 7 the overall time to recover the secret key for some parameters. We perform an error resilience analysis which has never been done before in the setup of EHNP. Our construction is still able to find the secret key with a small amount of erroneous traces, up to 2% of false digits, and 4% with a specific type of error. We also investigate Coppersmith's methods as a potential alternative to EHNP and explain why, to the best of our knowledge, EHNP goes beyond the limitations of Coppersmith's methods