An individually verifiable voting protocol with complete recorded-as-intended and counted-as-recorded guarantees

Democratic principles demand that every voter should be able to individually verify that their vote is recorded as intended and counted as recorded, without having to trust any authorities. However, most end-to-end (E2E) verifiable voting protocols that provide universal verifiability and voter secrecy implicitly require to trust some authorities or auditors for the correctness guarantees that they provide. In this paper, we explore the notion of individual verifiability. We evaluate the existing E2E voting protocols and propose a new protocol that guarantees such verifiability without any trust requirements. Our construction depends on a novel vote commitment scheme to capture voter intent that allows voters to obtain a direct zero-knowledge proof of their vote being recorded as intended. We also ensure protection against spurious vote injection or deletion post eligibility verification, and polling-booth level community profiling

SHAREDWEALTH: A CRYPTOCURRENCY TO REWARD MINERS EVENLY

Bitcoin [19] is a decentralized cryptocurrency that has recently gained popularity and has emerged as a popular medium of exchange. The total market capitalization is around 1.5 billion US dollars as of October 2013 [28]. All the operations of Bitcoin are maintained in a distributed public global ledger known as a block chain which consists of all the successful transactions that have ever taken place. The security of a block chain is maintained by a chain of cryptographic puzzles solved by participants called miners, who in return are rewarded with bitcoins. To be successful, the miner has to put in his resources to solve the cryptographic puzzle (also known as a proof of work). The reward structure is an incentive for miners to contribute their computational resources and is also essential to the currency\u27s decentralized nature. One disadvantage of the reward structure is that the payment system is uneven. The reward is always given to one person. Hence people form mining pools where every member of the pool solves the same cryptographic puzzle and irrespective of the person who solved it, the reward is shared evenly among all the members of the pool. The Bitcoin protocol assumes that the miners are honest and they follow the Bitcoin protocol as prescribed. If group of selfish miners comes to lead by forming pools, the currency stops being decentralized and comes under the control of the selfish miners. Such miners can control the whole Bitcoin network [29]. Our goal is to address this problem by creating a distinct peer-to-peer protocol that reduces the incentives for the miners to join large mining pools. The central idea is to pay the “runners-up” who come close to finding a proof, thereby creating a less volatile payout situation. The work done by the “runners-up” can be used by other miners to find the solution of proof of work by building upon their work. Once they find the actual solution they have to include the solution of the other miner in order to get rewarded. The benefit of this protocol is that not only the miners save their computational resources but also the reward is distributed among the miners

CALYPSO: Private Data Management for Decentralized Ledgers

Distributed ledgers provide high availability and integrity, making them a key enabler for practical and secure computation of distributed workloads among mutually distrustful parties. Many practical applications also require strong confidentiality, however. This work enhances permissioned and permissionless blockchains with the ability to manage confidential data without forfeiting availability or decentralization. The proposed Calypso architecture addresses two orthogonal challenges confronting modern distributed ledgers: (a) enabling the auditable management of secrets and (b) protecting distributed computations against arbitrage attacks when their results depend on the ordering and secrecy of inputs. Calypso introduces on-chain secrets, a novel abstraction that enforces atomic deposition of an auditable trace whenever users access confidential data. Calypso provides user-controlled consent management that ensures revocation atomicity and accountable anonymity. To enable permissionless deployment, we introduce an incentive scheme and provide users with the option to select their preferred trustees. We evaluated our Calypso prototype with a confidential document-sharing application and a decentralized lottery. Our benchmarks show that transaction-processing latency increases linearly in terms of security (number of trustees) and is in the range of 0.2 to 8 seconds for 16 to 128 trustees

Privacy-preserving auditable token payments in a permissioned blockchain system

Token management systems were the first application of blockchain technology and are still the most widely used one. Early implementations such as Bitcoin or Ethereum provide virtually no privacy beyond basic pseudonymity: all transactions are written in plain to the blockchain, which makes them perfectly linkable and traceable. Several more recent blockchain systems, such as Monero or Zerocash, implement improved levels of privacy. Most of these systems target the permissionless setting, just like Bitcoin. Many practical scenarios, in contrast, require token systems to be permissioned, binding the tokens to user identities instead of pseudonymous addresses, and also requiring auditing functionality in order to satisfy regulation such as AML/KYC. We present a privacy-preserving token management system that is designed for permissioned blockchain systems and supports fine-grained auditing. The scheme is secure under computational assumptions in bilinear groups, in the random-oracle model

PAPR: Publicly Auditable Privacy Revocation for Anonymous Credentials

We study the notion of anonymous credentials with Publicly Auditable Privacy Revocation (PAPR). PAPR credentials simultaneously provide conditional user privacy and auditable privacy revocation. The first property implies that users keep their identity private when authenticating unless and until an appointed authority requests to revoke this privacy, retroactively. The second property enforces that auditors can verify whether or not this authority has revoked privacy from an issued credential (i.e. learned the identity of the user who owns that credential), holding the authority accountable. In other words, the second property enriches conditionally anonymous credential systems with transparency by design, effectively discouraging such systems from being used for mass surveillance. In this work, we introduce the notion of a PAPR anonymous credential scheme, formalize it as an ideal functionality, and present constructions that are provably secure under standard assumptions in the Universal Composability framework. The core tool in our PAPR construction is a mechanism for randomly selecting an anonymous committee which users secret share their identity information towards, while hiding the identities of the committee members from the authority. As a consequence, in order to initiate the revocation process for a given credential, the authority is forced to post a request on a public bulletin board used as a broadcast channel to contact the anonymous committee that holds the keys needed to decrypt the identity connected to the credential. This mechanism makes the user de-anonymization publicly auditable

Performances of Cryptographic Accumulators

International audienceCryptographic accumulators are space/time efficient data structures used to verify if a value belongs to a set. They have found many applications in networking and distributed systems since their in- troduction by Benaloh and de Mare in 1993. Despite this popularity, there is currently no performance evaluation of the different existing de- signs. Symmetric and asymmetric accumulators are used likewise without any particular argument to support either of the design. We aim to es- tablish the speed of each design and their application's domains in terms of their size and the size of the values

Chainspace: A Sharded Smart Contracts Platform

Chainspace is a decentralized infrastructure, known as a distributed ledger, that supports user defined smart contracts and executes user-supplied transactions on their objects. The correct execution of smart contract transactions is verifiable by all. The system is scalable, by sharding state and the execution of transactions, and using S-BAC, a distributed commit protocol, to guarantee consistency. Chainspace is secure against subsets of nodes trying to compromise its integrity or availability properties through Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT), and extremely high-auditability, non-repudiation and `blockchain' techniques. Even when BFT fails, auditing mechanisms are in place to trace malicious participants. We present the design, rationale, and details of Chainspace; we argue through evaluating an implementation of the system about its scaling and other features; we illustrate a number of privacy-friendly smart contracts for smart metering, polling and banking and measure their performance