4,663 research outputs found

    A General Bin Packing Game: Interest Taken into Account

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    In this paper we study a general bin packing game with an interest matrix, which is a generalization of all the currently known bin packing games. In this game, there are some items with positive sizes and identical bins with unit capacity as in the classical bin packing problem; additionally we are given an interest matrix with rational entries, whose element aija_{ij} a i j stands for how much item i likes item j. The payoff of item i is the sum of aij{a_{ij}} a i j over all items j in the same bin with item i, and each item wants to stay in a bin where it can fit and its payoff is maximized. We find that if the matrix is symmetric, a Nash Equilibrium (NE) always exists. However the Price of Anarchy (PoA) may be very large, therefore we consider several special cases and give bounds for PoA. We present some results for the asymmetric case, too. Moreover we introduce a new metric, called the Price of Harmony (PoH for short), which we think is more accurate to describe the quality of an NE in the new model

    Dagstuhl Reports : Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2011

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    Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Internet (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 11061) : Simone Fischer-HĂźbner, Chris Hoofnagle, Kai Rannenberg, Michael Waidner, Ioannis Krontiris and Michael MarhĂśfer Self-Repairing Programs (Dagstuhl Seminar 11062) : Mauro PezzĂŠ, Martin C. Rinard, Westley Weimer and Andreas Zeller Theory and Applications of Graph Searching Problems (Dagstuhl Seminar 11071) : Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud, Stephan Kreutzer and Dimitrios M. Thilikos Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Sequence Processing (Dagstuhl Seminar 11081) : Maxime Crochemore, Lila Kari, Mehryar Mohri and Dirk Nowotka Packing and Scheduling Algorithms for Information and Communication Services (Dagstuhl Seminar 11091) Klaus Jansen, Claire Mathieu, Hadas Shachnai and Neal E. Youn

    Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership

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    This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in- divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these environments.stability, fairness, membership, coalition formation

    Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

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    This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.Stability, Fairness, Membership, Coalition Formation

    Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

    Get PDF
    This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.Stability, Fairness, Membership, Coalition Formation

    Smoothed Efficient Algorithms and Reductions for Network Coordination Games

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    Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a PLS-complete problem in the worst case. This is a potential game where the sequential-better-response algorithm is known to converge to a pure NE, albeit in exponential time. First, we prove polynomial (resp. quasi-polynomial) smoothed complexity when the underlying game graph is a complete (resp. arbitrary) graph, and every player has constantly many strategies. We note that the complete graph case is reminiscent of perturbing all parameters, a common assumption in most known smoothed analysis results. Second, we define a notion of smoothness-preserving reduction among search problems, and obtain reductions from 22-strategy network coordination games to local-max-cut, and from kk-strategy games (with arbitrary kk) to local-max-cut up to two flips. The former together with the recent result of [BCC18] gives an alternate O(n8)O(n^8)-time smoothed algorithm for the 22-strategy case. This notion of reduction allows for the extension of smoothed efficient algorithms from one problem to another. For the first set of results, we develop techniques to bound the probability that an (adversarial) better-response sequence makes slow improvements on the potential. Our approach combines and generalizes the local-max-cut approaches of [ER14,ABPW17] to handle the multi-strategy case: it requires a careful definition of the matrix which captures the increase in potential, a tighter union bound on adversarial sequences, and balancing it with good enough rank bounds. We believe that the approach and notions developed herein could be of interest in addressing the smoothed complexity of other potential and/or congestion games

    MATCOS-10

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