Towards a theory of ground-theoretic content

A lot of research has recently been done on the topic of ground, and in particular on the logic of ground. According to a broad consensus in that debate, ground is hyperintensional in the sense that even logically equivalent truths may differ with respect to what grounds them, and what they ground. This renders pressing the question of what we may take to be the ground-theoretic content of a true statement, i.e. that aspect of the statement's overall content to which ground is sensitive. I propose a novel answer to this question, namely that ground tracks how, rather than just by what, a statement is made true. I develop that answer in the form of a formal theory of ground-theoretic content and show how the resulting framework may be used to articulate plausible theories of ground, including in particular a popular account of the grounds of truth-functionally complex truths that has proved difficult to accommodate on alternative views of content

Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back

There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism from the bilateralist perspective. Price gives an informal argument for classical negation based on a pragmatic notion of belief, characterised in terms of the differences they make to speakers' actions. The main part of this paper puts Price's argument under close scrutiny by regimenting it and isolating principles Price is committed to. It is shown that Price should draw a distinction between A or ¬A making a difference. According to Price, if A makes a difference to us, we treat it as decidable. This material allows the intuitionist to block Price's argument. Abandoning classical logic also brings advantages, as within intuitionist logic there is a precise meaning to what it might mean to treat A as decidable: it is to assume A ∨ ¬A

The illusion of choice: the European Union and the trade-labour linkage

Why has the European Union refrained from pushing for economic sanctions in the promotion of labor standards? In this paper we argue that a cost-effectiveness approach is not fully capable to grasp this decision. The effectiveness of the different instruments the EU has at its disposal are constrained by the internal and external context where decisions on labor-standards have been taken. The internal context suggests that what we observe is the emanation of the ‘lowest common denominator’ on which a consensus could be found, i.e. the normative underpinnings on which all member states can agree. Alternatively, the EU’s decisions are shaped by the perceptions that negotiating partners hold on the motivations behind such decisions. In this paper, we focus mostly on the discussions held at the multilateral level

Playing Three-Level Games in the Global Economy. Case Studies from the EU. College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2008, May 2008

The case studies in this paper are a selection of essays that have been written in the framework of the compulsory first-semester course The EU in a Global Political Economy Context, taught by Professor Sieglinde Gstöhl, in the academic year 2007-2008 in the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies programme at the College of Europe. They all address recent cases of two- or three-level games played by the European Union in different policy fields of the global economy (reflecting the state of affairs at the end of 2007)

Reflections on the EU objectives in addressing aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices Final Report. CEPS Report November 2019

This Report analyses the EU’s instruments to tackle aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. Based on desk research, interviews with stakeholders and expert assessments, it considers the coherence, relevance, and added value of the EU’s approach. The instruments under analysis are found to be internally coherent and consistent with other EU policies and with the international tax agenda, in particular with the OECD/G20 BEPS framework. The Report also confirms the continued relevance of most of the original needs and problems addressed by the EU’s initiatives in the field of tax avoidance. There is also EU added value in having common EU instruments in the field to bolster coordination and harmonise the implementation of tax measures. One cross-cutting issue identified is the impact of digitalisation on corporate taxation. Against this background, the Report outlines potential improvements to the EU tax strategy such as: making EU tax systems fit for the digital era; leading the international debate on tax avoidance; enabling capacity building in Member States and developing countries; strengthening tax good governance in third countries; ensuring a consistent approach at home and abroad; achieving a level playing field for all companies; and increasing tax certainty and legal certainty

Funding global public goods: the dark side of multilateralism

The funding of global public goods, such as climate mitigation, presents a complex strategic problem. Potential recipients demand side payments for implementing projects that furnish global public goods, and donors can cooperate to provide the funding. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of this problem. In our model, a recipient demands project funding. Donors can form a multilateral program to jointly fund the project. If no program is formed, bilateral funding remains a possibility. We find that donors rely on multilateralism if their preferences are relatively symmetric and domestic political constraints on funding are lax. In this case, the recipient secures large rents from project implementation. Thus, even donors with strong interests in global public good provision have incentives to oppose institutional arrangements that promote multilateral funding. These incentives have played an important role in multilateral negotiations on climate finance, especially in Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011)

Mid-term evaluation of the support to strengthened bilateral relations under the EEA and Norway Grants

Through the EEA Grants and Norway Grants, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein aim to reduce economic and social disparities and strengthen cooperation with 16 countries in Central and Southern Europe. A mid-term evaluation of the current EEA and Norway Grants 2009-14 was conducted by COWI during the second half of 2015 and early 2016 at the request of the Financial Mechanism Office, EEA and Norway Grants. The aim of the mid-term evaluation is to assess to what extent and in which way the EEA and Norway Grants contribute towards strengthening bilateral relations between donor and beneficiary states. The evaluation covers four out of the ten priority sectors of the EEA and Norway Grants and five of the 16 beneficiary countries (Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), representing 19.4% of the allocated total of EUR 1.8 billion

The political economy of Hong Kong's "open skies" legal regime: an empirical and theoretical exploration

Copyright 2009 San Diego International Law Journal. Reprinted with the permission of the San Diego International Law Journal.The article presents an empirical and theoretical research which describes the functions of the international legal regime through powerful economic forces in Hong Kong, China. The government applied aviation policies with respect to open skies platform to provide a basis for a thorough understanding of government's legitimacy based on neoclassical logic and analysis. Conceptual perspectives of realists, liberals and cognitivists were acknowledged by the economically-inspired nationalists

Beyond MAD

"The temptation to escape the logic of mutually assured destruction may be too powerful to resist." Ivan Safranchuk is the director of the Moscow office of the World Security Institute